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Abstract 
This thesis sets out to challenge identitarian understandings of group formation premised in 
a dichotomous view of state-society relations, by paying closer attention to the technical 
means by which groups are sought to be mediated. It proposes to do so through the concept 
of techno-politics, which encompasses literacy as a technology that is not limited to the 
study of texts or the exclusive preserve of the literate. It aims to contribute to literature on 
modern Indian politics, and also to that on general themes and specific topics. At the meta-
level it offers a reconsideration of social and political communication. In general, state 
language and media policy, censorship, emergency rule and electoral law. Specifically, 
Urdu’s status and fluctuating fortunes in post-Independence India; the first iteration of Abul 
Kalam Azad’s al-Hilal magazine, discussed in genealogical relation to later Urdu journalism; 
the internal emergency of 1975-77; and the 2014 general election.   
Through case studies of an ‘exceptional’ language and various ‘special’ periods, it seeks to 
cover both critical events and the workings of the everyday state. In keeping with its 
scepticism about unilinear sender-message-receiver models of communication, it is based 
on a multi-layered methodological approach: the reading of government reports and 
statistical information, constitutions and legal codes, against the findings of archival 
research, interviews and ethnographic observation, conducted in north India over two years 
in total, between August 2010 and September 2014. 
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A note on transliterations and translations 
 
As this is not a work on language or philology, I have not adapted common spellings or given 
names to comply with transliteration guidelines. For the sake of consistency, I have also not 
italicised ‘foreign’ words.  Unattributed translations from French, Hindi and Urdu have been 
done by me.   
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Introduction 
 
“A second glance at any activity undermines the easy, commonsense idea that humans speak and act.”  
(Latour 1994: 54) 
 
Recent socio-political change in India, greater electoral volatility and alliances amongst 
disadvantaged groups, which cut across lines of caste, religion and ethnicity, would appear 
to confound standard identity-based explanations of social and political behaviour. These 
trends seemed to be combined in the 2014 Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party’s 
election victory, in which vote bank politics, voting on the basis of ascriptive identity, was 
apparently superseded by the BJP’s inclusive development agenda of “sabka saath, sabka 
vikas” (together with all, development for all).  
In a section of the BJP’s 2014 election manifesto titled “Widen the Platform”, this 
message was directed to segments of the population said to have been “historically 
disadvantaged” due to “a lopsided development approach and skewed allocation of 
resources” (BJP 2014: 15). Encompassed under this label were the familiar categories of the 
poor and marginalized, religious minorities such as Muslims, Scheduled Castes and the Other 
Backward Classes, socio-economically disadvantaged castes not listed in the Indian 
constitution’s schedule of castes entitled to reservations.  But the term also included a cross-
denominational group identified as the “neo middle class”, consisting of those who have 
“risen from the category of the poor” and are “yet to stabilize in the middle class” (ibid: 17).  
Appeals to this amorphous group seemed to be part of the BJP’s attempt to shake off its 
upper-caste Hindu image and counterpoise the newly founded Aam Admi Party’s populist 
appeals to the “aam admi” (“ordinary man”).  
The final chapter of this thesis, which partly deals with the 2014 election, will look at 
the BJP’s election campaign in closer detail. Across the thesis as a whole I argue that socio-
political change could be better understood by not taking identity for granted as a static and 
exclusive form of affiliation, and focusing instead on the processes through which various 
groups are ventriloquized: ‘the nation’, ‘the people’, this or that ‘community’ or ‘class’, 
10 
 
remaining mindful all the while that the groups invoked neither seamlessly map onto those 
they describe nor remain external to their formation. The subjects I deal with might be easily 
identified as ‘political’: state language and media policy in post-Independence India, 
‘seditious’ journalism in the colonial and post-colonial period, attempts to control public 
communication through emergency rule and election law. But I aim to depart from a 
classical political science approach to speeches, texts and voting behaviour, based in a 
broad-brush mass communications model.  
This project was provoked into existence by dissatisfaction with generalizing 
accounts of group formation, which begin by identifying a group and therefore fail to 
account for variability and heterogeneity. In the first instance, by the discrepancy between 
the multilingual Indian media scene and Benedict Anderson’s description of how large 
anonymous communities such as nations are created through the practice of reading a 
newspaper written in a single language dealing with events occurring all over the world 
(Anderson 1991). At the same time it is inspired by Anderson’s insights into how everyday 
practices effect large-scale socio-political transformations by altering the way people 
perceive time, space and community, and his sensitivity to the role played by language and 
media in this process.  That is, it takes issue with his universalist assumptions at the same 
time as being informed by his insights into how universal forms become effective in 
particular settings.  
It is also a response to more sociological understandings of group formation, which 
attempt to negotiate between producing reifying accounts of how they are bounded and a 
distorting blindness to how stubborn they can be once formed; in particular, to Bourdieu’s 
work on symbolic power (1994, 1987a, 1987b, 1984) and Paul Brass’s multi-symbol 
congruence theory (2004, 1991, 1989 and 1974).  Both theorists attempt to go beyond 
essentialising perspectives on groups and mechanistic understandings of the operations of 
power, which do not allow for synchronic and diachronic variation within ‘given’ groups. In 
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so far as these theories denaturalise the categories of class, ethnicity and nationality by 
playing close attention to how they are made through communicative practices, I find their 
work useful. But I argue that their continued reliance upon them, and instrumentalist 
understanding of how they are achieved, tips the balance in favour of an ‘objective’ view of 
society in which actors are fitted within a network whose coordinates are determined in 
advance. 
I have therefore been drawn towards some aspects of Actor Network Theory,  and in 
particular to Latour’s concept of “technical mediation” (1994), in which meaning is not just 
transported by its medium but, in part, made by it. Thinking of meaning creation as 
something that “does not antecede technological devices” (Latour 1991a: 19) is a radical 
departure from conceptualisations of it as something that is merely distorted in 
dissemination through the biases of mediators and inefficiency of transmission media. These 
understandings are often the corollaries of totalising social theories, which view 
information/knowledge/meanings as the stuff that bind social groups, be they primordial, 
constructed or imagined. Whereas I understand collectivities to include people, things and 
abstractions, and the way they mutually constitute one another, and argue that there are 
multiple agencies and actors at work in this process.  
I am accordingly inclined to focus on what Latour describes as the means and 
instruments that make a grouping “reach a bit further and stand a bit longer” (2005b: 35): 
the ‘paper chains’ along which messages are sent by various agencies, and through which 
collectivities are mediated.  This means I pay attention to texts such as newspapers and 
journals, party manifestoes, policy documents and codified laws, but I also deal with non-
textual aspects of their production and dissemination – from how they are financed to how 
they are printed and intersect with other media. In this way I hope to better reflect the 
contingencies of their production and the unpredictable nature of their reception. By taking 
into account the techno-politics of communication, I hope to modify standard models of the 
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transparency of speech, without replacing the intentionality of human actors working 
through the state and markets with the material constraints of technology. Rather, I propose 
an expanded conception of technology, which would render the concept of material 
determinants redundant and thus allow more possibilities for speech – encompass non-
verbal communication and non-human agency.  
I will begin by briefly outlining the aspects of Anderson, Paul Brass and Pierre 
Bourdieu’s theories that seem applicable or inapplicable to the cases I study, and then 
proceed to describe the alternative concepts of ‘the dispositif of state’ and the 
‘insurrectionary possibilities of writing’. The final section will outline the methodology for 
my project and the organisation of the thesis as a whole.  
 
Empty homogenous time 
In Imagined Communities, Anderson sets himself against “provincial European thinking 
about the rise of nationalism” by locating its origins further west, in the new American states 
of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (1991: 47). Language was not a factor 
in differentiating these states from the imperial metropolis as they were all “creole states, 
formed and led by people who shared a common language and common descent with those 
against whom they fought” (ibid: 47). By de-emphasising vernacular culture and nativism as 
determinants, Anderson throws into relief the greater significance of other factors: 
increased but limited mobility, print capitalism. Although this produces a much less 
essentialist view of nationalism, one which stresses its dynamism and ingenuity, standard 
ideas about national space-time remain intact in this work. The nation-state is viewed as a 
western innovation, albeit Anderson’s west lies further west than just Europe and indirect 
non-European input is acknowledged.   The nation is also linked to a progressive notion of 
historical time. According to Anderson, Walter Benjamin's notion of empty homogeneous 
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time is “a precise analogue of the idea of the nation, a solid community moving steadily 
down (or up) history” (Anderson 1991: 26). A modular form of the nation is imagined: 
originating in the west, progressing through time, and moving flatly and evenly across space. 
These rather abstract notions are embodied in the processes of print-capitalism. 
Capitalism and print technology are said to have created the conditions for “a new form of 
imagined community, which in its basic morphology set the stage for the modern nation” 
(ibid: 46). Mass consumption of newspapers in particular established the basic 
morphological elements of these imagined communities: a conception of empty 
homogeneous time and universal space, as events occurring all over the world are 
connected by “calendrical coincidence” (ibid: 33). Anderson expands upon the importance of 
universality in The Spectre of Comparisons, where he argues that newspapers, in taking “this 
world of mankind” as their domain, reinforce a sense of “natural universality”, which, 
alongside empty homogeneous time, is a conceptual prerequisite for the development of 
national consciousness (1998b: 33). Everyday practices “rooted in industrial material 
civilization” thus “displaced the cosmos to make way for the world” (ibid: 29). That is, 
displaced cosmological notions of time and the centripetal and porous spatializations of 
dynastic states.  
Language is said to have played a key part in this process. Imagined Communities 
proceeds from the assumption that the bulk of mankind has always been monolingual and 
widely held ideas about the logic of markets to describe how the “revolutionary 
vernacularizing thrust of capitalism” created monoglot mass reading publics, which evolved 
into national publics (1991: 39). In The Spectre of Comparisons, Anderson links this to what 
he describes as the planetary spread of “a profoundly standardized conception of politics” 
(1998b: 29). This apparently worked at both the linguistic and conceptual level. Languages 
were standardized as they became associated with political units; political concepts were 
standardized as they were translated into print-languages. For example, “quotidian 
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universals” were created as particular figures (e.g. monarchs) were located in a “single 
categorical series” and presented “to the simultaneous imaginings of millions of people 
around the world” (ibid: 33).   
Heterogeneity in the form of multilingualism, or at least recent emergence of 
multilingual nations, is acknowledged in Imagined Communities, but these aberrations from 
the monoglot norm are explained by the fact that the nation is itself, by now, the 
“overwhelming norm” (1991: 135). Nations can be imagined without linguistic communality 
because “of general awareness of what history has demonstrated to be possible” (ibid: 135). 
Political standardization in multi-ethnic last wave nations is therefore said to have been a 
second-hand process. Unlike the language of politics in Europe, where terms such as 
‘industrialism’ were coined after the phenomena they described came into existence, 
vocabularies of politics in Asia and Africa preceded their institutional realization. Political 
concepts were “read about, then modelled from” (1998b: 32).  
It is not difficult to challenge an argument as broad in its outlines as this with the 
details of specific case studies. To speak of language and locality alone, Anderson's theories 
about natural universality, monolingualism, and linguistic and conceptual standardization 
are contradicted by practices in Hindi and Urdu knowing parts of India, which are the focus 
of my research. On the one hand, consumption of a particular newspaper written in a 
particular language would seem to identify a reader’s national, ethnic and political location. 
This is why politicians and advertisers seek to influence specific groups through certain 
papers: Muslims through the Urdu press; Hindus through the Hindi press; relatively affluent 
readers through English media; voters in a constituency through a local edition of a paper. 
On the other hand, these identifications are complicated by the fact that consumers and 
producers have multiple and shifting locations. This is evident in many newspapers’ lack of 
consistent political message and divergent conceptions of what constitutes their locality – 
changes in the areas covered by papers and readerships outside designated localities. 
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Anderson’s claim that “newspapers everywhere” have a universal scope, because it would 
be unnatural for them to confine their reports to the political realm in which they are 
published (1998b: 33), would seem to be disproved by (outsider) localisation of the content 
of Hindi papers on the one hand, and the increasingly international focus (in so far as it 
relates to the ummah) of Urdu press on the other. Both Hindi and Urdu newspapers seem to 
focus on events within their own differently defined realms rather than the “world of 
mankind” generally.  
Regarding monolingualism and linguistic standardization, Anderson’s arguments are 
complicated by the history of Hindi and Urdu, the saga of how a language known by a variety 
of names, spoken in a range of dialects and written in a number of scripts became Hindi and 
Urdu, languages that in their spoken forms are virtually indistinguishable, but which are 
written in two different scripts. This does not quite accord with Anderson's theory of how 
idiolects evolve into standard print-languages. Locality and language are combined when 
Anderson argues that natural universality is further encouraged “by an unselfconscious 
standardization of vocabulary which radically overrides any formal division in the newspaper 
between local and foreign news” (1998b: 33). Again, his thesis is belied by the particular 
development of Hindi and Urdu, with some written forms of both languages self-consciously 
straining to differentiate themselves from one another: Hindi taking a greater proportion of 
its literary and technical vocabulary from Sanskrit, Urdu looking to Persian and Arabic.  Not 
to mention the history and continued existence of multilingual newspapers in India. 
With regard to conceptual standardisation, theorists working on South Asia have 
contested the idea that political concepts originating in the West were simply borrowed in 
the non-West.  Kaviraj has written of how modern political concepts failed to translate in 
India, remained confined to an ‘upper’ state-centred discourse which was radically at odds 
with a ‘lower’ discourse of indigenous politics (1997). To this he attributes the failure of 
various Nehruvian modernisation projects. The idea that there is such a thing as a standard 
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form of politics is not directly challenged, but Kaviraj diverges from Anderson in refusing it 
universal applicability. Other writers have argued that modern political concepts such as 
democracy and the nation have been successfully adopted through creation of institutions 
that are responsive to local conditions (Kohli 2002) and translation into religio-cultural 
idioms (Hauser and Singer 1986). Both strands of literature (literature of failure, literature of 
success) oppose the idea of a simple adoption of so-called universal forms, both emphasise 
the particular. 
Significantly, Anderson is himself aware of the contradictions inherent in his ironic 
faith in “the goodness of nations”, whose “unbound serialities” he perceives to be the most 
inclusive forms of community, encompassing, as they do, various ethnicities and races, The 
Unborn, The Living and The Dead (1998b). This awareness is evident in his contrary use of 
Walter Benjamin’s concept of ‘empty homogenous time’, which Benjamin intended as a 
critique of social democratic notions of progress and which Anderson deploys as a 
description of the ideal time-space of the nation. Within his very use of the concept lies an 
awareness of a critique of it.  
A more nuanced understanding of nationalism is also expressed in his comparative 
study of the effects of colonial language policy in Southeast Asia. In this essay he finds proof 
of the emancipatory potential of a national language in the unlikely setting of Indonesia 
under Suharto. Dutch Romanization of Bahasa Indonesia and the Japanese decision to 
persist with this policy meant that by the 1950s Indonesia found itself with “a simple and 
uncontroversial written and spoken national and official language” (1996: 21). This was a 
product of economic and political expediency rather than linguistic nationalism, but its 
potential is said to have been developed in the 1910s and 1920s by the popular left-wing 
press and the Sino-Indonesian community, and to have been realized in a tetralogy of novels 
written by the dissident Indonesian writer and historian, Pramoedya Ananta Toer (ibid: 24). 
Anderson’s description of the radical potential of national forms (“open-to-the-world 
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plurals”) might be attractive, but, as I have described using the case of South Asia, and as he 
himself describes using the case of South-East Asia, at odds with what can be readily 
observed. Indeed, he chooses to emphasise the paradoxes inherent in his argument: the 
colonial origins of this emancipatory tool, the fact that despite Indonesia’s successful 
development of a national language it compares badly in terms of national unity and free 
public forums with the Philippines, whose unity is said to be assured by its citizens 
underdeveloped sense of nationality. This is said to be apparent in a linguistic situation, 
much like India’s, where there is “no consensus on a national language, and none is spoken 
or written comfortably by a commanding majority of the population” (ibid: 17). Anderson’s 
account of nationalism is at one and the same time descriptive and prescriptive, in other 
words, normative.   
The fact that Anderson is able to pre-empt and absorb these objections indicates 
that critiques of universalist assumptions about community, history and politics need to do 
more than point to instances where their categories and temporalities fail to apply. As 
Dipesh Chakrabarty observes, “an absolutist relativism can easily be shown to be self-
contradictory” (2002: 82). Chakrabarty himself attempts to find a middle-way, arguing in his 
essay on “Universalism and Belonging in the Logic of Capital” that grasping a category such 
as capital means both recognizing its limits and grasping its universal constitution. In place of 
usual descriptions of transitions to capitalism, Chakrabarty speaks of how the empty, 
universal history posited by capital, History 1, is modified and domesticated through History 
2s, pasts that inhere in capital but do not belong to its life process (ibid: 99). That is, which 
do not ineluctably look forward to capital and therefore both “interrupt and punctuate” the 
run of its totalizing logic (ibid: 99). Chakrabarty describes this as a two-way process of 
translation rather than a transition. Rather than rejecting universalism altogether, he 
describes how the universal acts as an empty placeholder, “its place always usurped by a 
historical particular seeking to present itself as the universal” (ibid: 105).  
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Chatterjee goes even further by refusing universality itself, critiquing assumptions 
about national time-space, which underlie Anderson's theories about nationalism 
(Chatterjee 2004). Building on Bhabha's idea of the split temporality of the nation, its 
pedagogic and performative temporal registers (Bhabha 2004), he writes about the nation in 
heterogeneous time, the particular manifestations of it in parts of the world labelled 
‘backward’, ‘modernising’ or ‘developing’.  He describes forms of popular politics spawned 
by governmentality, which elide Anderson's distinction between bound and unbound 
serialities (Anderson 1998a and 1998b). Chatterjee combines both critiques to show how 
political society emerges from the governmental operations of nation-states, as groups 
defined as populations (pedagogical objects for ‘developing’ nations) represent themselves 
as identity groups (potential vote-banks and subsets of the peoples that endow nations with 
popular sovereignty) in order to access state resources. 
These approaches inform my understanding of the ‘modern’, used to describe a 
period that spans India’s experience of both colonialism and independence. Each chapter 
deals with the colonial and post-colonial period, not just to see how the former influences 
the latter, but also to trace the outlines of what Michael Freeden has described as a shared 
“idea environment” (1983), spanning ideologies as well as epochs (liberalism, socialism), 
whose progressive ideals are based in what Timothy Mitchell describes as the 
spatiotemporal “staging” of capitalist modernity (2000). I am particularly interested in what 
Mitchell describes as the possibility of “shift, displacement, or contamination” inherent in 
each “staging” of the “historical immediacy and spatial extension” of the social world and 
“the unified global history of modernity” (ibid: 23-24). In both periods I focus upon such 
moments of slippage, look for vestiges of other ways of imagining community and 
conceptualising the movement of historical time. 
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Symbolic mediation 
In a similar vein to writing which seeks a middle-path between universalism and 
particularism in understanding nationalism, Brass and Bourdieu attempt to go beyond 
standard objectivist and subjectivist accounts of ethnicity and class through theories of 
symbolic mediation.  Bourdieu writes that obedience to state injunctions cannot be 
understood as either “mechanical submission to an external force or as conscious consent to 
an order” (Bourdieu et al 1994: 14), but describes a social world “riddled with calls to order” 
(ibid). In Language and Symbolic Power he attempts to transcend alternative “energetic 
models, which describe social relations as relations of force, and cybernetic models, which 
turn them into relations of communication” through the concept of symbolic power, which 
by “dissimulation and transfiguration” efficiently transubstantiates power relations by 
rendering “recognizable and misrecognizable” the violence they contain (1994: 170).  
Brass also opposes cybernetic theories of national “integration”, according to which 
the “the ‘gap’ between the modernizing elite” and the “masses” is “reduced or overcome by 
the communication to the mass of the goals of the elite and the transformation of mass 
values to make them compatible with the aspirations of the elite” (1974: 5-6). He argues 
that shared differences do not in themselves produce a subjective sense of identity. Ethnic 
groups are said to be “objectively distinct” but not necessarily attaching “importance or 
political significance to that fact” (ibid: 8). In this way, he differs from ethno-symbolists such 
as Anthony Smith, who are reluctant to see nations as “just so many populations bounded in 
political space” and seek more affective bases for their formation (Smith 1993: 2). Smith 
argues that while “population size, economic resources, communications systems and 
bureaucratic centralization” help create the environment of nations, “they tell us little about 
the distinctive qualities and character of the national community that emerges” (ibid: 3). For 
this he suggests we “turn to more 'subjective' factors...cultural attributes of memory, value, 
myth and symbolism” (ibid), and towards this end proposes the concept of “ethnie (ethnic 
20 
 
communities)…named human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and 
cultures, having an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity” (ibid: 32). 
But for Brass an ethnic group is merely a group of people who share certain “objective” 
characteristics; a community is an ethnic group “whose members have developed an 
awareness of a common identity”, and a nationality is a community that “mobilizes for 
political action and becomes politically significant” (1974: 8). Some kind of political agency is 
required to effect the transition from ethnic group to community to nationality, in particular, 
state policy and elite politicking. 
Symbols play an important part in this process, too. Whereas nationalist elites are 
said to “emphasize one symbol above others and strive to bring other symbols into 
congruence with the primary symbol” in order to foster a national identity coextensive with 
the modern state, indigenous elites, who place more value on caste, religion and region, 
“seek to induce multi-symbol congruence in their groups to achieve separateness and 
political rights” (Brass 1974: 45). Such an approach does not begin with the nation and 
process of modernization and ask how each territorial group of people reaches these goals, 
but begins with the ethnic group and asks “under what conditions do ethnic groups develop 
into nations” (ibid: 7).  
Brass is aware that even this is problematic given that “objective” differences are 
themselves “highly variable” (ibid: 405).  With regard to language, in “traditional societies, 
the differences between elite and mass speakers of a particular language or communicants 
of a particular religion may be as great or greater than the differences between ordinary 
people who are presumed to speak different languages or practice different religions” (ibid). 
With regard to the region he is focusing on this is further encouraged by dialectical diversity 
in the “so-called Hindi-speaking area” (ibid: 407), resulting in a situation where “ordinary 
Hindus and Muslims can communicate more easily with each other than they can with elite 
speakers of their own religious group” (ibid: 405). Nevertheless, his definition of ethnic 
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groups is orthodox in its reference to “language, culture, territory, diet, and dress *rather+ 
than to a role in the division of labor” (ibid: 8). The idea of ethnicities and nations as isolable 
and quantifiable units persists.  
Similarly, Bourdieu continues to use the term class even as he rejects the usual 
economist understandings of it. In defining the term he attempts to go beyond both views of 
social groups in which agents are classified like objects, and a subjectivist perspective, 
according to which they construct social reality (1987b: 1).  For Bourdieu agents are “both 
classified and classifiers, but they classify according to (or depending upon) their position 
within classifications” (ibid: 2). He seeks to reveal the structure of symbolic space within 
which social practices take place by partially setting aside pre-constituted variables such as 
“socio-occupational category” (1984: 102), retrieving “class habitus, the internalized form of 
class condition and of the conditioning it entails”, and from this constructing “the objective 
class”, a set of agents placed in “homogenous conditions of existence imposing homogenous 
conditionings and producing homogenous systems of dispositions capable of generating 
similar practices” (ibid: 101).  By reconstituting these homogenous units from the 
perspective of “three-dimensional space”, defined by “volume of capital, composition of 
capital, and change in these two properties over time”, he attempts to account for their 
variability and changeability within a schema that is “unitary and specific” (ibid: 114).  
Brass and Bourdieu’s attachment to these ill-fitting labels seems to ultimately favour 
an ‘objective’ view of social reality, which verges on being deterministic if not essentialist. 
This tendency is particularly pronounced in Bourdieu’s work, in whose field theory relations 
are formed within a grid of objective structures rather than as a result of potentially 
unstable interactions, as in George Mead’s theory of symbolic interactionism (Mead 1967).  
In “Legitimation and Structured Interests in Weber’s Sociology of Religion”, Bourdieu 
distinguishes between “direct interactions” and “the objective structure of the relations that 
become established between religious agencies”, and claims that the latter is crucial (1987a: 
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126).   The structure of “the objective relations between the positions these agents occupy 
in the religious field” is said to both determine the form of these interactions and their 
representation (ibid: 121). These owe their specific form to the play of interests: lay people’s 
expectations of the this-worldly outcomes of magical or religious action, competition for 
religious legitimacy and followers amongst religious agents.  
A corollary of this view is a kind of instrumentalism. Although Brass speaks of the 
“the ways in which a people creates its own history through a conscious process of symbol 
selection” (1974: 121) and Bourdieu of “deeply buried corporeal dispositions, outside the 
channels of consciousness and calculation” (Bourdieu et al 1994: 14), both describe how 
symbols are instrumentalised by states and elites to construct social groups (classes, 
ethnicities) on their own terms. Elites are the main agents in these operations, but the state 
is the motive power: owner of “meta-capital” in the work of Bourdieu (Bourdieu et al 1994: 
4), and therefore capable of spanning the various fields, the catalyst for subjective 
consciousness of identity in Brass.  
Brass was to modify his opinions in response to criticism of this early work, and 
reject an “extreme instrumentalist perspective” that would deny history and agency to the 
groups it describes by representing their pre-existing cultural and religious practices as 
“infinitely malleable by elites” (1991: 77). There is a more diffuse sense of the workings of 
power in his later work on communal violence in India, which he has ascribed to a reading of 
Foucault (Brass 2000). But he reiterates his basic thesis on language politics and applies it to 
a wider pan-Indian context three decades later in the article “Elite interests, popular 
passions, and social power in the language politics of India” (2004).  
Bourdieu’s understanding of the state is also more multidimensional and dynamic 
than Althusser’s theory of the state apparatus, but he speaks of it in familiar totalising terms 
as “the culmination of a process of concentration of different species of capital” (Bourdieu et 
al 1994: 4; italics in the original). This is said to include “capital of physical force or 
23 
 
instruments of coercion (army, police), economic capital, cultural or (better) informational 
capital, and symbolic capital” (ibid).  From this process of concentration the state emerges as 
“a sort of meta-capital granting power over other species of capital and over their holders” 
(ibid). Those who question the seamlessness of the state’s monopoly are said to ignore the 
effects of its “obligatory reference to the values of neutrality and disinterested loyalty to the 
public good”, including upon bureaucrats themselves (ibid: 17). Through these unfold “the 
long work of symbolic construction”, whereby “official representation of the state as the site 
of universality and of service of the general interest is invented and imposed” (ibid). But, as I 
will go on to demonstrate in subsequent chapters, the state can also be experienced and 
known through unofficial transactions and constructed in discourses of corruption. In their 
introduction to a collection of essays on the everyday state in India, Fuller and Harriss point 
out that, through these, too, in the negative, a picture of what an ideal, impartial state 
should be can sometimes emerge (2000), but this suggests a more indirect and haphazard 
process than symbolic construction.  
Casting about for an alternative understanding of the ‘mechanics’ at work, one 
responsive to the case of Urdu in particular, I was initially drawn to more fine-grained 
studies of the Indian state in the past and present day. From a historical perspective, to 
Dalmia’s book on Sanskrit, Hindi, Urdu poet and Hindi-advocate, Harischandra, in nineteenth 
century Banaras (1999), and Stark’s on the multilingual Naval Kishore Press in Lucknow 
(2007), works which substantiate and counterpoise Brass’s arguments through their 
accounts of north Indian language movements and print culture. Both describe 
dichotomisation of the categories Hindi-Urdu and Hindu-Muslim as effects (intended or not) 
of colonial rule. For instance, as a result of the decision to declare Urdu court language in 
the North-Western Provinces in 1837, enhancing the status of that language at the same 
time as catalysing into existence a Hindi language movement with Hindu and Indian 
nationalist undercurrents. However, their descriptions of how Harischandra and publishing 
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magnate Naval Kishore sought to advance the cause of Hindi and Urdu for both personal 
gain and altruistic ends, whilst participating in the process of dichotomisation that would 
lead to the decline of the latter, undermines any view of religio-cultural identities as 
determined by state intervention and ‘elite’ machinations.  
At the same time this history does not quite accord with anthropologist James 
Scott's account of the autonomy conferred by “unique languages”, which he views as 
treasuries of local knowledge and therefore formidable obstacles to external control (Scott 
1998: 72). By attempting to see like a state, Scott draws attention to “legibility as a central 
problem of statecraft” (ibid: 5). The “synoptic” state depicted is unlike the panoptic state in 
that it is always foreshadowed by the potential failure of its projects, with state 
simplifications continually outpaced by local knowledge and improvisations (ibid: 79). 
Illegibility of neighbourhoods and vernaculars/unique languages, in particular, are said to be 
a resource for local political autonomy:  
A distinct language, however, is a far more powerful basis for autonomy than a complex 
residential pattern. It is also the bearer of a distinctive history, a cultural sensibility, a 
literature, a mythology, a musical past. In this respect, a unique language represents a 
formidable obstacle to state knowledge, let alone colonization, control, manipulation, 
instruction, or propaganda. 
(ibid: 72) 
 
Histories of Urdu, on the other hand, speak of the role played by cultural sensibility, 
literature, myth, a musical past and state knowledge, colonization, control, manipulation, 
instruction and propaganda. In North India one finds both strong state influence on language 
and media and a range of dialects and languages that baffle attempts to control 
communication, even at the basic level of linguistic standardisation.   Neither aspect of its 
history supports a view of the state as an “apparatus that stands apart from the rest of the 
social world”, or the opposed but complementary notion of the subject “who stands outside 
the state and refuses its demands”, from “some wholly exterior social space” (Mitchell 1991: 
93). 
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The dispositif of state  
When thinking of the operations of power, and of state power in particular, in place of this 
image of the apparatus/instrument I posit Foucault’s use of the term ‘dispositif’, 
heterogeneous assemblies that between them establish a shifting network of relations.  
These arise at a given historical moment in response to a strategic imperative, but are 
expressed within and influenced by this same network; or, as he put it in an interview, titled 
“Le jeu de Michel Foucault” (“The game of Michel Foucault”), in which he expands upon this 
concept: “Le dispositif lui-même, c'est le réseau qu'on peut établir entre ces elements” 
(1994: 299). (“The dispositif itself is the network which can be established between these 
elements.”) The English translation of this interview glosses dispositif as “apparatus” and 
réseau as “system” (1980: 194), which overstates the coherence of the process. Foucault 
speaks of a “jeu” of these elements: “Bref, entre ces éléments, discursifs ou non, il y a 
comme un jeu, des changements de position, des modifications de fonctions, qui peuvent, 
eux aussi, être très différents” (1994: 299). (“In sum, between these elements, discursive or 
not, it is like a game, [with] changes of position, modifications of function, which can, 
between them also, be very different.”) This describes a much more ambiguous and open-
ended relation than the model of interactions contained in Bourdieu’s field theory in which 
“objective structures” form the basis for the “‘typical’ behaviour of participants” (Bourdieu 
et al 2013: 116).  
When questioned, in the aforementioned interview, on what he means by “non-
discursive” elements, Foucault specifies them as everything that functions as a system of 
social constraint that is not an utterance, for example, an institution (1980: 197-198). In 
response to Jacques-Alain Miller’s observation that institutions are discursive, too, he lightly 
concedes the point (ibid: 198). Earlier, he also describes dispositifs as consisting of “the said 
as much as the unsaid”: discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, 
laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic 
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positions (ibid: 194). I therefore interpret it as not being limited to the human capacity for 
speech/discourse rather than simply non-discursive. Whilst acknowledging that these terms 
are not mutually exclusive, I prefer the term ‘dispositif’ to ‘discourse’, because it is better 
able to capture the role of technology in affecting the mixture of human and non-human 
agency involved in any speech act.  
This is the aspect of the term which Latour picks up in order to locate purposeful 
action and intentionality in dispositifs rather than humans or objects: corporate bodies that 
are able to absorb mediators, regulate their expansion and redistribute their skills (1994: 46).  
Latour’s description of “technical mediation” in many ways resembles Laclau and Mouffe’s 
definition of “articulation” as “any practice establishing a relation among elements such that 
their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice” (2014: 91). Articulation is 
specifically opposed to theorizations of “mediation”, much like Anderson’s, according to 
which the fragments of a lost organic unity are organised as necessary moments of a totality 
which transcends both the fragments and their organisation (ibid: 80). In articulation the 
organisation is contingent and external to the fragments themselves, rather than based in a 
conception of society as a “founding totality of its partial processes” (ibid: 82). On the 
contrary, social relations are constituted and organized through articulatory practices.  
Articulation therefore forms the starting point for Laclau and Mouffe’s conception of 
hegemony. It is their chosen heuristic for understanding social aggregation because of its 
greater responsiveness to the necessarily incomplete character of the social. Latour also 
argues against the idea of the social as “material” or a “domain”, and advances an 
alternative view of it as “the name of a movement, a displacement, a transformation, a 
translation, an enrollment” (2005b: 64-65). Rather than speaking of communities, he refers 
to groups and collectivities, terms empty enough to include all sorts of aggregates of human 
and non-human actors without specifying their size or contents.   
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Affinities with Latour’s theories are also strong during moments when Laclau and 
Mouffe refuse what they describe as Foucault’s earlier distinction between discursive and 
non-discursive practices, and affirm “the material character of every discursive structure” 
(2014: 93-94). They illustrate this with the example, in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations, of a language game between a builder and his assistant, observing that it is 
not the idea of a building-stone or slab that “constitutes a differential position and therefore 
a relational identity”, but “the building-stone or the slab as such” (Laclau and Mouffe 2014: 
94-95). In his later work on populism, Laclau restates his contention that discourse is not 
restricted to speech and writing but “any complex of elements in which relations play the 
constitutive role” (2007: 68). He also mentions the possibility of going beyond Saussurean 
“enthralment” to “phonic and conceptual substances” by taking on board the insights of the 
Copenhagen and Prague schools of linguistic formalism, in order to abandon “all purely 
regional linguistic reference” (ibid: 68).  
It has been argued that Laclau does not follow through with the promise of these 
ideas, that his theories lack explanatory force because he continues to deal with discourse in 
abstract, formal terms – structuralist linguistics and, increasingly, Lacanian psychoanalysis – 
which are said to be blind to “historical contingencies” (Simons 2011: 212).  Simons suggests 
that these perceived shortcomings could be overcome by paying more attention to the 
“practical construction” of “the people” through “mass mediated” relations of equivalence 
and difference, which would be better able to explain why certain hegemonic formations of 
‘the people’ fail and others succeed at a given time (ibid: 214).  
As mentioned earlier, I have reservations about the concept of ‘mass mediation’, 
and would argue that Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of articulation deals more sensitively with 
the ‘contingent’ nature of the transmission of messages.  But I agree with the general point 
about paying attention to “practices and institutions” when theorizing ““the discursive 
construction of “the people”” (ibid). It is for this reason that I prefer the term ‘dispositif’ to 
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‘discourse’, because it seems to better encompass these aspects of this process by being less 
closely associated with the linguistic, and more attuned to the technical and the material.   
As expressed through Latour’s concept of ‘technical mediation’ (Latour 1994), in particular, it 
conveys a stronger sense of how the material is interwoven into human thought and 
activity.1  
The distinctive aspects of this understanding of technology are foregrounded by how 
other theorists have understood its role in subjectification and sociation. Deleuze speaks of 
the ‘dispositif’ as encompassing a multilinear ensemble, consisting of lines of visibility, 
enunciation, thought and subjectification (1992: 160); or, more succinctly, as “machines 
which make one see and speak” (ibid), and for Agamben this is where the trouble starts. His 
essay, “What is an apparatus?” (2009), traces Foucault’s use of the term “dispositif” (which 
Agamben’s English translators follow Foucault’s in reproducing as “apparatus”) to the 
theological term oikonomia. This is defined as “management of the home” (ibid: 8), and 
described as the apparatus through which “the Trinitarian dogma and the idea of a divine 
providential governance of the world” were introduced into Christianity (ibid: 10). Linked in 
this way to “a pure activity of governance devoid of any foundation in being”, apparatuses 
are said to always imply a process of subjectification (ibid: 11). He expands the category of 
apparatuses to include anything that has the capacity to “capture, orient, determine, 
intercept, model, control or secure the gestures, behaviors, opinions or discourses of living 
beings” (ibid: 14). Encompassed under this label are not just the institutions, disciplines and 
practices that Foucault mentions, but writing and its implements and language itself, 
described as “perhaps the most ancient of apparatuses” (ibid: 14). In an era of capitalist 
development, however, apparatuses have gone from being machines that produce subjects 
to participants in a dehumanising blurring of the processes of subjectification and 
                                                 
1 In a recent book review, for example, he suggests we break down the “idealized definition of matter” as the solid 
ground upon which signification rests (2014: 509), and “narrowly ethnocentric” definitions of “what it is to be an 
object or an organism” (ibid: 508), and pay attention to the role played by the technical in weaving together 
different entities. 
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desubjectification (ibid: 21). This is exemplified for Agamben by the cellular telephone, 
which is said to have reshaped behaviour and made interpersonal relationships more 
abstract in his native Italy (ibid: 15-16).   
In arguing this, Agamben proceeds from what he describes as a “partitioning” of 
beings into “two large groups or classes”: “living beings” and “apparatuses in which living 
beings are incessantly captured” (ibid: 13). Latour, on the other hand, refuses the dualist 
separation of humanity and technology, and emphasises that the human body itself is 
composed of “sociotechnical negotiations and artifacts” (1994: 64). Rather than abstracting 
social relations, dispositifs help to forge social ties through processes of translation, 
crossover, enrolment, mobilization and displacement (ibid: 46). For Latour, the term 
therefore encompasses a two-way process rather than the reshaping of human behaviour by 
external techno-material constraints.  
The implications of this for thinking of communication are expanded upon in 
Reassembling the Social (2005b), his introduction to Actor Network Theory. In this work, 
Latour, like Anderson, associates newspapers with group formation; indeed, he starts his 
discussion of group formation and dissolution with the reading of a newspaper, in whose 
“every two lines, a trace is being left by some writer that some group is being made or 
unmade” (ibid: 27). But he goes further and argues that newspapers do not only trace these 
groups or reveal how they are formed, they make them: “Who would learn to ‘feel European’ 
without the editorials of the liberal press?” (ibid: 29). Groups (and those who study and 
write about them) are “the provisional product of a constant uproar made by the millions of 
contradictory voices about what is a group and who pertains to what” (ibid: 31). The 
implications of this idea for political communication specifically are dealt with in the essay 
“From Realpolitik to Dingpolitik: or How to Make Things Public” (2005a), in which he makes 
the interesting suggestion that politics should become a branch of disability studies. Rather 
than valorise the “radiant citizen” freely speaking his mind, acknowledge that we are all 
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“politically challenged”, and reveal the hidden impediments and instruments that impair and 
enable political talk (ibid: 30).   
As well as being a handy way to think of the discursive construction of ‘the people’, 
or a particular subset of the same, it can also be used to deal with the obverse process: the 
discursive construction of the state through the failure or success of these efforts. My sense 
of the state as the sum of its discursive practices is influenced by Timothy Mitchell’s 
understanding of it as a “structural effect”, created by “detailed processes of spatial 
organization, temporal arrangement, functional specification, and supervision and 
surveillance” (1991: 95). As this list suggests, his post-structuralist sense of the state owes a 
great deal to Foucault – specifically recalls the earlier discussion of the dispositif in its 
awareness of the non-linguistic and material nature of these processes – although here the 
focus is the state itself rather than those who are subject to its power. I have also found his 
more empirically based work useful for providing examples of how case studies can be used 
to think about the operations of state power. From the discussion of mechanistic views of 
language and statecraft advanced in Colonizing Egypt (1988), to his overview of the “techno-
politics” of the modern Egyptian state (2002) and his recent book on Carbon Democracy 
(2011) it has worked through the consequences of thinking about human intention as 
interwoven with a variety of other forces. For example, in the last work, thinking in terms of 
energy and ecological time makes externalisation of these forces impossible. Thinking of 
fossil fuels as concentrated time and power in potentia means that the qualities of coal and 
oil can be directly related to the different types of socio-political organisation and subjective 
consciousness their extraction helps to produce.  
With specific reference to literature on South Asia, I have been inspired by work 
which has built on these insights to do ethnography of the state, and in particular that done 
by the political anthropologist Akhil Gupta; by his essay on how local, vernacular Indian 
newspapers delineate its “multilayered and pluricentric nature” (1995: 38) and also his 
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discussion of the impact of transnational phenomena produced by global capitalism on how 
we conceptualise it (Sharma and Gupta 2006). Instead of seeing states as “preconstituted 
institutions that perform given functions”, he deals with how they are produced through 
everyday practices and public representations (ibid: 27). That this does not excuse state 
irresponsibility is clear in Gupta’s recent work on bureaucracy and structural violence, in 
which he describes extreme poverty in India as “a direct and culpable form of killing” made 
possible by its policies and practices (2012: 5). Rather than diffusing the operations of power 
so widely that it makes it impossible to attribute responsibility for such outcomes, sensitivity 
to the capillary flow of power allows him to calculate the number of “excess deaths” in India, 
the number of people missing from the population due to malnutrition and morbidity, to be 
“approximately 140 million” (ibid).  
Gupta’s reckoning is in direct contradiction to Amartya Sen’s claim that “no 
substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent and democratic country with a 
relatively free press” (1999: 6-7), a powerful argument lent force by childhood memories of 
the Great Bengal Famine of 1943, which reverberate through his writings on development. 
Gupta, however, not taking official pronouncements at their word or locating power in a 
single place, perceives how ‘thanatopolitics’ works in spite of proclaimed state policy and 
regardless of the intentions of bureaucrats. Ethnographic observation of development 
programs, in which officials are revealed to make decisions on the basis of “guesswork and 
contingency”, attunes him to how they are shot through with “barely controlled chaos” 
(2012: 14). The resulting scepticism about bureaucracies as representing “the rationalization 
of power in a disciplinary society” (ibid) sensitises him to the “irrational” faith in 
qualifications and documents held by officials and those who appeal to them (ibid: 208). 
Building upon Michael Herzfeld’s work on bureaucracies as machines for the social 
production of indifference (1992), and Kleinman, Das and Lock’s work on how they 
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exacerbate social suffering (1997), he argues that “bureaucratic action repeatedly and 
systematically produces arbitrary outcomes in its provision of care” (2012: 6).  
There might seem to be a contradiction between Gupta’s scepticism about the 
efficacy of state intentions and his criticism of its failure to live up to them, but I resolve this 
with reference to Bhavani Raman’s discussion of how “optimum conditions for the operation 
of abuses” can operate through “a moral discourse on corruption” (2012: 17). In her work on 
the British East India Company’s administrative offices in the Madras Presidency, she 
describes how “absolute faith in paternal governance fashioned under Company rule” 
produced a “power-laden world of documentary transactions”, along with a “burgeoning 
document bazaar” (ibid: 18). Like Gupta, Raman draws upon work on the subversive 
potential of paper and signature, but she is also attuned to how legal protocols that 
underwrite the modern state are constituted through “contradictions inherent in the moral 
claim of paper procedure” (ibid). That is, contradictions between rule and discretion, public 
office and private gain, which she describes as both the “central problematic for the colonial 
state” and as “central to its making” (ibid). Drawing upon media theorist Cornelia Vismann’s 
work on the relationship between law and writing (Vismann 2008), Raman describes files as 
“variables that control the formalization and differentiation of the law” (2012: 3). Rather 
than stabilizing the contradictions of rules, they are said to generate domains for all kinds of 
transactions at the margins of the documentary state.   
 
The insurrectionary possibilities of writing  
 
In thinking about where human agency lies within this schema, I draw upon Judith Butler’s 
work on discursive agency and implicit censorship, in which she both emphasises that 
“speech is always in some ways out of our control” (1997: 15), and that censorship 
“precedes the text (by which I include “speech” and other cultural expressions), and is in 
some sense responsible for its production” (ibid: 128).  Both assumptions are premised in a 
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post-sovereign view of agency, in which it is not the property of the subject “but an effect of 
power”, and therefore constrained but not determined in advance (ibid: 139). Butler uses 
the Derridean concept of the break that occurs when speech is taken out of context in 
utterance to locate in the gap between redundancy and repetition of reiteration the space 
of agency (ibid: 129). This would encompass “impossible speech”, the ramblings and rantings 
of the asocial and the psychotic, which haunt the rules that govern speakablity (ibid: 133).  
But it also includes “the political promise of the performative” (ibid: 161), “the 
insurrectionary “force” of censored speech as it emerges into “official discourse” and opens 
the performative to an unpredictable future” (ibid: 142).  
The political potential of the open temporality of the performative is certainly an 
important aspect of this project, but I have come to reflect on how this potential is also 
located in the past and the virtual, both of which are perhaps more easily accessed by what 
Goody describes as the “technology of writing” (2000). That is, writing’s capacity to affect 
individual cognition and social organisation through its “storage capacities” and the 
interaction it produces “between the human mind and the written word, which is external to 
the actor in a way spoken language is not” (ibid: 144-145).  Although, proceeding from the 
different understanding of technology outlined in the previous section, I stop short of 
arguing that it inevitably leads to scientific and systematic thinking, to ‘rationality’ or the 
“domestication of the savage mind” (Goody 1973: 7). 
I therefore supplement this with the keener sense of the significance of the written 
word expressed by Rancière’s analogous concept of “literarity” (2004 and also 2011b, where 
it is translated as “literariness”). Whereas, on the one hand, Butler seems to conflate text, 
speech and “cultural expression”, and on the other, to counterpoise bodily “excess” to the 
force of habitus (Butler 1997: 155), Rancière speaks of the disordering of hierarchy particular 
to writing: 
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By confusing the destination of living speech, writing confuses this relationship between 
ways of doing, ways of being and ways of speaking whose harmony constitutes, according to 
Plato, the community animated by its living soul. 
(2004: 103) 
 
Rather than being a “‘secondary modeling system’, dependent on a prior system, spoken 
language”, as Ong expresses it in his work on the relationship between orality and literacy 
(1982: 8), writing has “insurrectionary” possibilities. The “community of readers” is said to 
be “a community without legitimacy, a community formed only by the random circulation of 
the written word” (Rancière 2011c: 14). Literary ‘intransitivity’ is set apart from all the 
transmitter-message-receiver models of communication in which a message leaves “the 
proper transmitter and goes to the proper receiver by the proper channel” (ibid: 55). The 
groupings which emerge from this circulation also differ from Anderson’s imagined 
communities not just in their ‘illegitimacy’, but in the indifference to market logics (print-
capitalism) demonstrated by the randomness of their organization and the openness to 
appropriation of the texts around which they momentarily coalesce. Rancière proposes the 
alienability of the written word as a basis for the formation of community: 
To put it very crudely, you cannot lay your hands on capital like you can lay your hands on 
the written word. The play of language without hierarchy that violates an order based on the 
hierarchy of language is something completely different than the simple fact that a euro is 
worth a euro and that two commodities that are worth a euro are equivalent to one another. 
It is a matter of knowing if absolutely anyone can take over and redirect the power invested 
in language.  
(2011c: 55) 
 
Both Rancière and Butler refer to the example of Rosa Parks’s violation of racial 
segregation laws in the US as an illustration of how the insurrectionary possibilities of 
speech/writing might work in practice (Butler 1997: 147; Rancière 2006b: 61), thereby 
linking it to social recomposition rather than reproduction.  Butler emphasises that Rosa 
Parks had no prior right to sit at the front of the bus in Montgomery, Alabama, but that 
through the act of doing so “she endowed a certain authority to the act, and began the 
insurrectionary process of overthrowing those established codes of legitimacy” (1997: 147). 
Likewise, Rancière describes Parks’s actions as reclamation of the rights of which she had 
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been deprived, and as therefore exemplary of the double manoeuvre of the democratic 
process.  That is, “the action of subjects who, by working the interval between identities, 
reconfigure the distinction between the public and the private, the universal and the 
particular” (Rancière 2006b: 61-62).  Again and again in this thesis, we will see individuals 
and groups who attempt this manoeuvre, who do not just ‘perform’ the identity allotted to 
them but overstep its ‘given’ boundaries and lay claim to a right to intervene in the affairs of 
the community.  
Rancière develops his arguments on literarity in the context of ‘democratic’ forms of 
writing emerging in nineteenth century France, and Madame Bovary seems to be something 
of a key text for him. Flaubert’s decision to confer as much importance to the adultery 
committed by a farmer’s daughter as the heroic actions of “great men”, is said to be in 
harmony with the fact that, when the novel was written, “nearly everyone” knew how to 
read and could make the fictitious life of Emma Bovary their own through “the egalitarian 
circulation of writing” 2011c: 55). It could be argued that this concept is inapplicable to India, 
given the continued inegalitarian distribution of literacy in that country (marked 
discrepancies between male-female and urban-rural literacy rates that continue to be a 
feature of Indian censuses). This criticism has also been levelled at Imagined Communities, 
whose theory of print-capitalism is said to fail to apply to Anderson’s main fieldsite of 
Indonesia, where nationalism arose during a time when “most Indonesians were illiterate 
and beyond the effective reach of print media” (Hobart 2013: 515).  
 Regarding the question of elitism and bias in focusing on printed material, it can be 
countered that, unlike many other places in the world, print continues to be a significant 
medium in India, as has been documented by Jeffrey (2000) and Ninan (2007), who argue 
that this is largely a result of increased literacy and political awareness in mofussil and rural 
India. Moreover, from colonial attempts to regulate, monitor and control the contents of 
print media, it would seem that print was significant even during periods when literacy rates 
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were very low. In Empire and Information, Christopher Bayly accounts for this by describing 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century north India as “a ‘literacy aware’ society, if not a 
highly literate one” (2007: 39). Although literacy rates may have been low by European or 
East Asian standards, “illiteracy” did not preclude “sophistication in using others’ learning” 
(ibid: 38).  Most north Indians had access to literate people and knew “the meaning and 
power of writing” (ibid: 36). This “talkative, knowing society, highly competitive about the 
use and diffusion of information” is said to have been hard for any government to dominate 
(ibid: 40).   
 This may sound romantic but Akhil Gupta describes a similar scenario in his work on 
bureaucracy, structural violence and poverty in twenty-first century India (2012), in which he 
stresses the centrality of writing in shaping the state, but rejects both developmental faith in 
literacy as a tool of emancipation and the view of it as an instrument of domination, and 
argues that the relationship between literacy and orality is one of “radical contingency”, 
with there being no necessary relationship between literacy and “reliable communication, 
democratic participation, or subaltern empowerment” (ibid: 197). Poor people are said to 
suffer from lack of assets and services that might enable them to survive rather than inability 
to read the writings of state officials (ibid: 208). At the same time, bureaucrats are 
accountable to elected officials, some of whom are “barely literate” (ibid: 200). Their very 
emphasis on writing can also be combated by mimicry and subversion (ibid: 232) and 
through what Gupta describes as “the political potential of counterfeit writing” (ibid: 226-
231). Television and new telecommunications technologies are said to have further opened-
up avenues for subaltern peoples to put pressure on bureaucrats (ibid: 232).  My thesis deals 
with how this “radical contingency” worked across the colonial and post-colonial period, 
with special focus on Urdu. What Kaviraj, referring to Sanskrit, has described as “the 
mysterious process by which a high literature which they would never be able to read 
nonetheless confers an identity on the illiterate” (1992: 43), by now also applies to Urdu. 
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Many of its designated ‘mother tongue’ speakers, in both India and Pakistan, are unable to 
read it in the Perso-Arabic script in which it is most commonly written.  
 All of the above suggests that literacy exists on a sliding scale rather than as an 
absolute value. This is perhaps especially clear in a multilingual context such as India where 
two major religions – Hinduism and Islam – have a more complex understanding of the 
relationship between the spoken and written word. But it is also a feature of other periods, 
regions and religious traditions. In her work on everyday literacy in Africa, Karin Barber 
usefully describes literacy as a “vector” rather than a “fixed attribute” of a particular social 
class or segment of society (2006: 5). Thinking of literacy in this way undercuts the cliché 
that Hindi is the preserve of Hindus and Urdu the language of Muslims, by including all those 
involved in production and consumption of various media in these languages.  Because of 
the novelty of these ascriptions, Hindi and Urdu also offer good case studies of how these 
labels come to be applied and to stick.  
 
Methodology and chapter plan 
I did fieldwork and archival research over more than two years in total between August 2010 
and September 2014. The themes I have been concerned with remained constant, but 
perspectives and methodologies shifted as I learned more about my topic, and moved from 
a Politics department to a multi-disciplinary Study of Religions department, whilst teaching 
courses in social and anthropological theory.  Working at the interstices of two fields 
(anthropology and religions), which have different and sometimes even opposed 
understandings of the significance of texts, I found myself reflecting on the relationship 
between orality and literacy, and accordingly incorporating a stronger theoretical 
component into my work. By now this is essentially a thesis in the field of social and political 
theory, in which the empirical material on India works out the theoretical arguments 
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advanced. Throughout I have remained focused on what could be described as ‘political 
communication’ – attempts to articulate constituencies through communicative practices – 
even whilst coming to eschew the cybernetic (Deutsch 1963 and 1966) and mass 
communications (Shannon 1998) models often used to understand this process by political 
scientists.  
I did my first period of fieldwork and archival research in Delhi and Lucknow 
between August 2010 and September 2011. At this stage my project was focused on Urdu 
newspapers, and I spent this time looking at Urdu language policy and print media. When 
dealing with media production, the impediments and instruments that enable 
communication are particularly obvious, and this was one of the reasons why I wanted to 
study media, because of the opportunity it would afford to “study sideways” (Hannerz 1998), 
to deal with people whose position and task is analogous to that of a researcher. When 
looking for examples of such work I came across Ursula Rao’s anthropological studies of 
Hindi and English newspaper offices in Lucknow (2006, 2010). Rao claims that she never felt 
that she knew more than or knew things in a radically different way from her subjects, and 
this sets her apart from Köpping’s theories about how transgressive ethnographic research 
transforms perspective through inculcation of an emic point of view (Köpping 2002).  For her, 
the emic/etic distinction, based in the notion of bounded cultural units, did not seem to 
apply, and this seems partly to be a result of her decision to focus on media rather than one 
such unit.  Always identifiable as an outsider (a foreigner, a woman, a non-native speaker of 
Hindi-Urdu and a first language speaker of English), I at times experienced a similar 
convergence of perspectives during the course of conversations and interviews. 
Some of the most productive of these were to inform my theoretical reflections. 
Early on in my research, Abid Suhail, a senior journalist whom I interviewed in Lucknow, 
spoke to me of “the complete newspaper”:  
No newspaper can become a complete newspaper, but no newspaper has a right to call itself 
a respectable daily without trying to become a complete newspaper. A complete newspaper 
39 
 
must provide all important news from the region, then the country, then of the world. There 
is a perpetual conflict in the daily newspaper between the regional, national and 
international. Suppose a government is overthrown in UP and on the same day the USA 
attacks Baghdad. There will be a conflict. On that day Baghdad will be close to Lucknow 
because of our Muslim heritage and foreign policy. The defeat of the state government is 
also of great importance. One of these stories will be first lead. But there is a method to 
make the first page in such a way that both stories draw almost equal attention without 
disturbing the make-up of the page.
2
  
 
Suhail acknowledged that this was an “ideal which is never achieved”, but still regretted that 
contemporary Urdu newspapers continued to make up their pages in a “random” manner. 
He spoke of a time when the first page of a newspaper was made by the chief sub-editor 
himself, who would both decide the chief story and its layout. Now it is the compositor who 
decides, he complained, and greater emphasis is laid on filling space than careful 
composition of a newspaper. One finds two related stories at a distance from one another 
on the first page; continuity errors in run-on stories; inconsistent localization of the various 
editions of a newspaper; information that should be in the introduction crammed into a 
subheading; lack of immediate relevance in the selection of editorials; and so on.  
He partly attributed this to the impact of television upon the production, contents 
and layout of Indian newspapers. Previously, dailies used to be produced in three shifts: 
morning, mid-day and night. Now there was only one shift from 5pm to midnight, and 
newspapers had a tendency to follow the lead of television in selecting major news items. 
Even though journalism is “a craft of direct expression”, an “element of ornamentation” had 
been introduced in order to counter the effects of TV. Through these statements he touched 
upon the corollary of Latour’s assertion that society does not exist, that it needs to be made 
to exist through technical instruments, which are “means and ends at the same time”, and 
therefore capable of bearing upon the wider social fabric (Latour 1994: 53).  Hence the 
adverse effects of television on the cycle of newspaper production. But in describing how 
the impossibility of these ideals of ‘direct expression’ and ‘completion’ paradoxically set the 
                                                 
2 Interview with Abid Suhail, Lucknow, 7 December 2010. 
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process in motion, he also went beyond a normative understanding of the necessity of 
‘transparency’ and ‘balance’.   
Seeing how state, market and political party pressure affected newspaper content 
also sensitised me to the ‘quirks’ of the Indian newspaper market, its lack of adherence to 
the notion of print-capitalism in both its multilingual content and business model. Pressures 
from various directions, an Urdu newspaper editor informed me, mean that it is not possible 
for a daily paper to function as a “machine”, a vehicle for a single ideology, agent or party.3 
This was said to contrast with weeklies such as the Jammat-i-Islami's Dawat, which are 
cheaper and easier to produce, and more didactic in tone. These socio-material constraints 
also did not seem to work in a straightforward way. Conversations with senior journalists 
who had experienced both colonial repression and the Indian emergency of 1975-77, made 
it clear that technological improvements and absence of strict censorship laws did not 
inevitably lead to a freer press. Rather, the previously slow and cumbersome nature of Urdu 
press production in particular seems to have restricted state oversight and control of 
newspaper content.  This encouraged me to consider the significance of gaps and breaks, 
moments and spaces in which communication networks change pace, scatter and terminate, 
to reflect on the productive effects of these, and on how ‘the people’ are rearticulated 
during ‘special’ periods.   
I returned to Delhi between May and September 2013 to do archival research on 
censorship in general and the internal emergency of 1975-77 in particular. Learning about 
media reception during the emergency period, and thinking about the significance of 
Congress’s defeat in the 1977 general election, held during the emergency itself, led me to 
consider tensions inherent in the idea of elections held in society and conducted by the state 
as free expression of the voice of the people. A further period of fieldwork occurred 
between December 2013 and May 2014, which I spent observing the Uttar Pradesh phase of 
                                                 
3 Interview with Aman Abbas, Editor of Sahafat, Lucknow, 13 September 2011. 
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the Indian election. I returned to India between June and September 2014 to do follow-up 
interviews and archival research.  
My research involved work in libraries, archives and research centres, government 
departments and newspaper offices. In Delhi I consulted the Central Secretariat Library, 
Jamia Millia University Library, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Library, the National Archives 
and the P.C. Joshi archive in Jawaharlal Nehru University, looking through material on 
central and UP State language and media policy, emergency-era censorship and its 
precedents, and electoral regulation. I also consulted the archives of Hindi and Urdu 
newspaper offices in Delhi, Lucknow, Meerut and Muzaffarnagar: Aag, Inquilab, Roznama 
Rashtriya Sahara and Sahafat (Urdu); Amar Ujala, Dainik Jagran, Rashtriya Sahara and Shah 
Times (Hindi). When in London this was supplemented by material in the British Library and 
the SOAS library. Whilst in India, I conducted 94 semi-structured interviews in Hindi-Urdu 
and English with people involved in public communication: newspaper editors, journalists, 
advertising agents, government officials, politicians and party workers, religious 
professionals and social workers. I also spent time in newspaper, NGO and government 
offices, political party offices, places of worship, in schools, colleges, shops, private homes 
and on the street, getting a sense of everyday communication practices.  
This research was not done with the intention to get a holistic picture of a pre-
existent field, nor to read actual practices against unrealistic policies, but in order to capture 
the mutually constitutive relations between different elements. Likewise, the topics I cover 
may be presented in roughly chronological order, but they are not intended to provide an 
overview of a century of Indian political history. I have selected these examples because 
they illuminate a different aspect of mediation at a particular time.  
The thesis is divided into four chapters. Each chapter deals with state and ‘elite’ 
attempts at the discursive construction of ‘the people’ through some or other state of 
exception: during wartime, emergencies and elections and through a ‘special’ language, 
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which flouts most of the criteria for official language status.  In this way I hope to cover both 
critical events and the workings of the everyday state, through exceptional cases which 
throw intro relief general patterns. The first chapter, “The immense writing-machine and the 
reading public”, looks at the effects of local and central state language and media policy in 
post-Independence India, through the prism of Urdu language and print media, with focus 
on its former heartland, the State of Uttar Pradesh. Despite marginalisation of Urdu and 
promotion of Hindi, the unofficial afterlife of spoken Hindi-Urdu evokes Hindustani, which 
encompasses both languages, and gradually disappeared from the census schedule as Hindi 
and Urdu became associated with Hindu and Muslim identity respectively. I look in detail at 
the incongruence of an apparent boom in Urdu newspapers accompanying a perceived 
decline in Urdu readerships, and Hindu nationalist support for a language by now associated 
with Muslims.  
The second chapter, “Impossible speech”, builds upon the previous chapter’s 
discussion of Urdu to deal with the effects of state censorship on political communication in 
colonial and post-colonial India, with focus on moments when the writings of two Urdu 
journalist-editors, Abul Kalam Azad and Aziz Burney, were censored or censured. I trace the 
vestiges of a more encompassing notion of the ‘qaum’ (loosely translatable as ‘nation’) in 
the run-up to the Khilafat movement, and a narrower definition of it in a later period. In 
terms of media, this chapter deals with the intersection between the typed word and the 
printed image in Abul Kalam Azad’s al-Hilal magazine and the relationship between print and 
electronic media in Burney’s writings. 
The third chapter, “Emergency pedagogy”, picks up on the preceding discussion of 
censorship to look at the reception of the assassination of the President of Bangladesh, 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, in emergency-era India, through the prison writings of opposition 
leaders J.P. Narayan and L.K. Advani. It deals with the themes of the diffusion of power and 
information, the autocratic legacies of the colonial state and oligarchic tendencies of all 
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states, through cross border dissemination and reception of an event that reawakens 
memories of previous forms of the nation. In terms of media, it considers the relationship 
between the written and spoken word in underground literature produced in India during 
the internal emergency of 1975-77.  
The final chapter, “The Model Code of Conduct and the scandal of democracy”, 
brings to a culmination the preceding discussion of the technical mediation of ‘the people’, 
by looking at attempts to regulate public speech during Indian elections, through imposition 
of a special electoral time, when many kinds of political activity are restricted. It looks at 
how the election office’s preoccupation with print, public spaces and official election periods, 
left it unable to span the informal spaces, unofficial periods and mix of old and new media 
forms in which the BJP’s election campaign was conducted.    
By looking at the effects of state attempts to regulate communication during special 
periods and through an ‘exceptional’ language, I highlight the slippages between its central 
and local levels, the incoherence of its policies and the unfaithful nature of their 
implementation by state functionaries. Through close reading of ‘elite’ communications (the 
words of politicians, journalists and bureaucrats), I deal with the gap between speech and 
utterance, and the techno-material constraints through which it is shaped. By paying 
attention to how these state and ‘elite’ messages are disseminated and received, I suggest 
the presence of a subject that exceeds any pre-formatted outline of ‘the people’. 
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Chapter one: The immense writing-machine and the reading public 
Writing in 1853, on the occasion of a debate on renewal of the East India Company’s rule 
over India’s territories, Marx noted the absurdity of a senate ruling more than 156 million 
people, putting its heads together to ask, who is the governing power in India?  On looking 
deeply into “the framework of this anomalous government” he identified “a third power”, 
supreme but hidden from public view, the two thousand stockholders who had no interest in 
India other than securing dividends on their revenue (2011: 34). The men elected from this 
pool being unfit for their duties, the real government was said to consist of “the permanent 
and irresponsible bureaucracy” who had transformed it into “one immense writing-machine” 
(ibid: 34-35).  The combination of automation and inscription suggested by this image looks 
forward to the fragment on machines in The Grundrisse, in which the automaton, “a moving 
power that moves itself”, is said to supplant the worker (1973: 693). Unlike the instrument, 
which the worker “animates and makes into his organ with his own skill and strength”, the 
machine “is itself the virtuoso”:   
The science which compels the inanimate limbs of the machinery, by their construction, to 
act purposefully, as an automaton, does not exist in the worker’s consciousness, but rather 
acts upon him through the machine as an alien power, as the power of the machine itself.  
(ibid.) 
 
Both the article on India and the text on automation contain the suggestion of a blurring of 
boundaries between humans and non-humans, which renders human labour and the 
typically human task of inscription ‘mindless’. As discussed in the introduction, Agamben 
expresses similar anxieties about the dehumanising effects of the ‘apparatus’, but the 
process described by Marx is arguably stronger and stranger. De-centring the subject of 
these operations makes it hard to ascribe authorship for actions and to assign responsibility 
for their consequences. Although, in India, there is “a financial deficit”, an “over-supply of 
wars”, “no supply at all of public works”, abominable systems of tax, justice and law, he 
observes, no party is held responsible for any of this (2011: 31).  
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In this chapter I pick up on a post-sovereign understanding of agency suggested by 
this image, to oppose an Althusserian theory of the ‘state apparatus’: a model of state-
society relations in which the former is portrayed as “a 'cold monster' imposing its rigid 
order on the life of society” (Rancière 1998: 29) through repressive and/or ideological means 
(Althusser 1977a). Working from the alternative concepts of the dispositif of state and the 
insurrectionary possibilities of writing, outlined in the introduction, I look at the state’s own 
writing practices to question the coherence of its policies and argue against understandings 
of social group formation that view language as a fixed marker of difference pertaining to 
objectively definable social groups, with specific reference to the ambiguous status and 
fluctuating fortunes of Urdu in post-Independence India.  
Although historically and politically informed approaches now predominate in the 
literature on nationalism and ethnicity, even accounts which emphasise the role of political 
and economic interests, and of the modern nation-state, continue to work within the 
primordialist framework of the “givens” of social existence, as anthropologist Clifford Geertz 
puts it in an article on the conflict between primordial sentiments and civil politics in “new 
states”, which gained independence following World War Two (1963: 109). He enumerates 
these as “Assumed Blood Ties”, “Race”, “Language”, “Region”, “Religion” and “Custom”, and 
claims that in “modernizing societies” they are the “preferred bases for the demarcation of 
autonomous political units” (ibid: 110). This is said to result in a tension between “the gross 
actualities of blood, race, language, locality, religion, or tradition” and “the steadily 
accelerating importance in this century of the sovereign state as a positive instrument for 
the realization of collective aims” (ibid: 108). So as well as being based in a primordial 
understanding of the significance of race, religion, language etc. Geertz's assertion is based 
in a view of state and society as discrete and possibly antagonistic entities, the former 
perpetually threatened by more profound and ancient ties rooted in the latter, especially in 
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non-Western societies upon which novel forms of the state are said to have been awkwardly 
superimposed.  
Geertz wrote his essay in the wake of reorganization of Indian states on linguistic 
lines, and describes this political decision as an outbreak of “linguism”, a form of 
primordialism said to be “particularly intense in the Indian subcontinent” (ibid: 112). In the 
event, creation of linguistic states in 1956 did not lead to dissolution of the union, and has 
even been cited as a factor in India’s continued unity and the success of its democracy, an 
early instance of how an identity-based conflict was successfully defused by political 
engineering; so-called natural and spiritual affinities successfully reduced to the level of civil 
politics, states re-moulded to accommodate societal identities. According to Paul Brass 
linguistic states helped foster “a sense of multilayered nationality”, whereby it was possible 
for Indians to think of themselves as members of two nations: “a Sikh, Bengal, or Tamil 
nation at one level of identity and an Indian nation at another”, and thereby helped to 
maintain the integrity of India (Brass 1988: 170). This perspective departs from 
primordialism's fatalism in arguing that these attachments can be used and adapted by 
states to further their nation-building and modernising agendas. It also allows that states 
and societies can cross-influence each other. But it continues to view ethnicity and 
nationality as objective and potentially conflictive attachments, and to think of states and 
societies as discrete entities. 
Both of these notions are belied by the histories of Hindi and Urdu: congeries of 
languages known by many names and written in a number of scripts coalescing and then 
dividing into Hindi and Urdu over the course of the nineteenth century and coming to be 
conflated with Hindus and Muslims respectively by the twentieth, with Urdu consequently 
falling into decline in India, going from its nineteenth century status as the link language of a 
multi-religious elite, the pre-eminent language for print media at that time, to its current day 
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reputation as the language of lower-middle-class Muslims, its written form the preserve of 
the Madrassa educated, its press, a minority concern reliant on government subsidies. 
In post-Independence India, the cliché Hindi = Hindu and Urdu = Muslim has been 
further undone by marginalisation of Urdu and promotion of Hindi meaning that many 
Muslims are unable to read Urdu but can read Hindi, if they can read any language at all. At 
the same time, remembering the history of Urdu (language of the court and the trans-
denominational groups associated with it), and also bearing in mind that many of these new 
readers are only first or second generation literate, it is hard to say that they have ‘lost’ the 
ability to read Urdu. Indeed, it is arguable that as literacy per se has increased the total 
number of people reading Urdu in India has also increased concomitant with its diminished 
official status, although because Indian censuses do not record which language respondents 
are literate in this is hard to verify. The unverifiable but highly probable fact that most 
recorded speakers of Urdu are Muslim also makes it hard to talk of any decline in the 
language’s political significance. 
Through the prism of Urdu, a ‘vernacular’ language that spans regions and nations, I 
hope to extend my arguments about the dispositif of state, by looking at the practices and 
associations, as well as the ideologies and instrumental rationalities, which influence its 
linguistic policy. Such a perspective does not seek to downplay the significance of power 
dynamics and the ideas and intentions of actors.  Rather, it encourages closer attention to 
how they become effective in specific contexts, and broader reflection on the relationship 
between post-Independence linguistic, education and media policy, and the multiple 
readerships for Indian newspapers, incompletely distinguished by language, region and 
religion.  
Thinking along these lines, remembering that reading is both an individual activity 
and a social one, the surrounding circumstances to a reading also include those in which 
literacy is acquired, and in multilingual so-called ‘new states’ such as India this firstly 
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involves whether literacy is acquired at all, and secondly in which languages it is acquired. 
State policy and economic conditions are obviously key factors here, but they do not work 
singly or in a singular fashion. Some of the most insightful studies of literacy and language 
acquisition in multi-lingual postcolonial states attempt to go beyond economic determinism 
and a state-centric focus to produce more subtle analyses of literacy acquisition and 
language outcomes.  
In The Child and the State in India, for instance, Myron Weiner attributes India’s 
poor record in achieving universal literacy to the prejudice held by bureaucrats, social 
workers and activists alike that certain people are born to do certain jobs, a prejudice that 
often is not expressed or even consciously held (1991). Weiner describes India as “the 
largest single producer of the world’s illiterates” and discounts an economic explanation for 
the fact as many African countries “with income levels lower than India have expanded mass 
education with impressive increases in literacy” (ibid: 4). He attributes this to a casteist and 
classist variant of the mind/body and labour/cognition divide. Middle class Indians are said 
to “conceptualize a distinction between children of the poor and their own 
children…between children as “hands” and children as “minds”; that is, between the child 
who must be taught to “work” and the child who must be taught to “learn”, the acquisition 
of manual skills as distinct from cognitive skills” (ibid: 188). With regards to language 
acquisition, David Laitin in Language Repertoires and State Construction in Africa adapts 
game theory and Indian language policy to encompass both micro level choices and macro 
level determinants, set against a backdrop of historical context and motored by instrumental 
rationality, in his three plus/minus one language formula for determining language 
outcomes (1992). These books acknowledge the importance of state institutions whilst 
remaining sensitive to how they are informed by ideologies and work through the individuals 
who run them and make language and educational choices. 
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In keeping with the multi-scale perspective of such work, but departing from it in not 
separating power, action and belief (Law 1986), singling out a single factor (ideologies or 
interests rather than income level) and relegating others to context (historical background), I 
will look at the current day significance of Urdu in light of the effective history of the Hindi-
Urdu controversy. Rather than presenting an overview of the topic I am proposing a shift in 
focus induced by a “filled out” (Latour 1991a) understanding of literacy, derived from 
concepts such as literacy awareness (Bayly 2007) and literacy as a vector (Barber 2006). This 
understanding can usefully be extended to encompass language acquisition, and in the case 
of Hindi and Urdu this is further justified by the fact that by now the main difference 
between the two languages lies in their scripts, being virtually indistinguishable at the 
everyday spoken level. As a result, many Indians of various faiths are aware of Urdu, 
appreciate the language and its literature and even define themselves as Urdu speakers, 
whilst being unable to read it in Nastaliq, the Perso-Arabic script in which it is now most 
commonly written.  
I will look at how Urdu’s historical status as a link language works out in the post-
Independence period through three case studies spanning the areas of language policy, 
party politics and market forces. Through these cases I will demonstrate how on the ground, 
history and policy combine to inform practices that do not quite adhere to the letter of 
various ‘laws’: of the state, of ascriptive attachments, of supply-and-demand. In the first 
section I will look at the convolutions of language policy nationally and in the State of UP, 
where post-Partition Urdu has been marginalised in education and bureaucracy despite 
constitutional and central government level safeguards for minority languages. In the second, 
the paradox of the Jana Sangh, and its successor, the Bharatiya Janata Party’s at times 
avowedly pro-Urdu platform. Finally, I will consider the Urdu newspaper market, which, 
despite the apparent declining significance of Urdu as a language, continues to expand, 
largely as a result of indirect state support. Proceeding from the concept of techno-politics 
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outlined in the introduction, this chapter attempts to go beyond pointing out obvious 
inconsistencies to understand how various factors work together to produce these 
apparently arbitrary outcomes.   
 
Split publics, forked tongues 
 
Over the years pro-Urdu measures by political parties and governments have been a 
standard way of dealing with Muslim voters, although the way this works can be paradoxical. 
On the one hand Hindu nationalist organisations have continued to play a role in the 
marginalisation of Urdu. At the same time the BJP’s origins in north India (‘Cow-belt’ and 
Hindi-Urdu heartland) and a section of its leadership’s appreciation for Urdu and its 
associated culture mean that a kind of ‘soft corner’ for the language exists within its ranks. 
Even more significant is the presence of certain concentrations of Muslim voters in 
particular regions and nationally. In this section I will look at how Urdu’s historical status as a 
link language works out in the contemporary period through the convolutions of the Jana 
Sangh, and its successor, the BJP’s Urdu policy. Apparent Hindu nationalist support for a 
language by now associated with Muslims would seem to be un-anticipated by theories of 
multisymbol congruence and symbolic power, premised in the idea of ‘objective’ differences 
between ethnic groups and social classes, and therefore highlights how the multivalence of 
symbols can work to bring together disparate elements as well as manipulated to separate 
them. 
The 1951 Jana Sangh manifesto does not mention language policy, but the one 
which followed it in 1954 promises to introduce Hindi as a national language, whilst 
encouraging the development of “regional languages”, with the proviso that they accept 
Devanagari script and a common scientific and technical vocabulary based on Sanskrit to 
further “the growth of national solidarity and goodwill” (BJS 2005: 280). But it does not 
recognise English and Urdu as national languages, and promises to remove Urdu from the 
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list of languages recognised in the Constitution. It also pointedly declares that “Hindi will be 
secured its rightful place in Jammu and Kashmir” (ibid: 281). This attitude towards Urdu was 
to remain largely unchanged in the 1950s and 1960s, but a mellowing in attitude is 
discernible in the 1971 manifesto. A section titled “Developing Indian Languages” proclaims 
that “Swarajya is incomplete without Swabhasha” (“self-rule” and an “autonomous 
language”) and promises to “expedite the replacement of English by Indian languages at the 
State level” and develop Hindi as a link language (ibid: 171). But it also promises to “pay 
attention to the promotion of the Urdu language, and ensure that facilities due to it under 
the law are accorded to it”, whilst being opposed to making it the second official language of 
U.P., Bihar and Madhya Pradesh (ibid: 172). The last comment is a response to pro-Urdu 
agitations that took place around the time of the 1967 elections, during which second 
language status for Urdu came to be the plank of several political parties. This movement 
gained impetus from non-Hindi States’ success in pushing for amendment of The Official 
Languages Act in 1967, affirming the use of English as an associate official language. 
Although the Jana Sangh had expressed vocal resistance to the amendment, it ultimately 
agreed to it out of a concern to extend its national support-base into areas such as the 
Punjab, where it had a relationship with the Akali Dal, and Kerala, where it had been making 
some headway (Das Gupta 1970: 258). 
Congress fragmentation was an important factor in these developments. Congress 
had won a slender majority in the 1967 general election, but failed to secure an outright 
majority in a number of States, leading to the formation of Samyukta Vidhayak Dal 
governments in north India.  These consisted of broad-based coalitions between Jana Sangh 
and other parties, including, in Bihar, the Communist Party of India. These volatile 
combinations showed early signs of strain, and Congress would return to something 
approaching its former stature in the 1971 election. But these forces would reunite during 
the emergency period, go on to form the Janata Party and contest and win the 1977 election.  
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The 1977 Janata Party manifesto states that it will implement the three-language 
formula and protect the rights of linguistic minorities, and accord “due importance and 
encouragement” to Urdu and Sindhi (BJS 2005: 139). Urdu and Sindhi are non-regional 
languages mostly spoken by Muslims and displaced Hindus from Sindh, so this was a 
carefully balanced combination. This was toughened-up in the 1980 manifesto, in response 
to doubts about the secularism of the Janata Party given its incorporation of the Jana Sangh 
party and members of the Hindu nationalist paramilitary organisation, the Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). This document mentions its commitment to implementation of 
the recommendations of the Gujral Committee Report, and to the Urdu language generally 
“which originated in India, and whose contribution to the country’s literature and culture 
has been immense”, with special provisions for Urdu as a medium of instruction for Urdu-
speaking children “wherever there is adequate demand” (BJS 2005: 95-96).   
The coalition was soon to come unstuck, leading to the formation of the Bharatiya 
Janata Party in 1980. The BJP’s stance towards Urdu hardened during this decade, a period 
of increased communalisation of Indian politics, and the BJP strongly opposed moves to 
make Urdu second state language of UP in 1989. BJP state President Kalyan Singh 
threatened a "violent and gigantic" agitation in response, sentiments reportedly “echoed” 
by party leader Atal Bihari Vajpayee and manifested in a gathering of more than 250 Shiv 
Sena men “brandishing spears and trishuls” outside the Vidhan Sabha (legislative assembly) 
building in Lucknow (Awasthi 1989). The BJP Manifesto for that year also mentions the Act in 
a list of examples of Congress appeasement of Muslims: 
By negativing [sic] the Supreme Court judgment in the Shah Bano case, the government has 
put a premium on communalism and obscurantism. And by recognizing Urdu as second 
official language in Uttar Pradesh on election eve, it has shown more interest in Muslim 
votes than in Urdu language. In the process it has only given the country so many corpses. By 
not allowing the rebuilding of the Ram Janma Mandir in Ayodhya, on the lines of the 
Somnath Mandir build by the Government of India in 1948, it has allowed tensions to rise, 
and gravely strained social harmony. 
(BJP 2005: 358) 
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The abrupt transition from Urdu to Ayodhya indicates how language and religion were 
connected in Hindu nationalist thinking (any corpses that year would have more likely 
related to the Ram Mandir than The Uttar Pradesh Official Language Amendment Act). 
However, even in this year, in the section on language, there is a promise to assist in the 
development of Indian languages “which are neither State languages nor regional languages, 
but have contributed to the enrichment of Indian culture” (ibid: 384). This could mean Sindhi 
and Sanskrit, but both these languages are explicitly mentioned elsewhere (ibid: 378 and 
384) and the wording is left vague enough to include Urdu.  
There is no direct reference to Urdu in the 1991 and 1996 manifestos, but there is a 
notable use of Urdu in the latter’s description of Congress misrule:  
never since the scourge of the Pindaries [mercenaries, often Muslim, who were active in the 
Maratha region] has the writ of our state been as enfeebled as by this Congress misrule. The 
primary task, therefore, is to restore to the state, and to governance, its honour and prestige 
– izzat and iqbal. 
(BJP 2005: 250) 
 
On the one hand there is a reference to Muslim treachery and on the other a use of Urdu 
words to express noble sentiments. Both were the legacy of centuries of Muslim rulers in 
India, who left a corpus of political heroes/villains and Arabic, Persian and Turkic words, 
many of which relate to politics. Controversial ‘Muslim’ figures such as the Pindaris, who 
have been depicted as both marauders and heroes of anti-British struggle, exemplify Brass’s 
critique of Cohn’s theory of the parallel development of regional and all-India “symbol pools” 
(Cohn 1966). The former are said to encompass figures such as the Maratha king Shivaji and 
the latter languages such as Urdu and Sanskrit and lifestyles such as the courtly-Persian and 
Brahmanic.  But, as Brass points out, “regional and national symbols are frequently in 
conflict and…many all-India symbols are competitive” (1974: 139), not least all-India Urdu 
and regional Hindi.  
 Nineteen ninety-six was also the year that saw the formation of an abortive BJP 
government. When the BJP returned to power in 1998, with a coalition of smaller and 
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regional parties in the National Democratic Alliance, its official policy towards Urdu had 
cooled to carefully balanced and rather vague statements about encouraging “the 
enrichment, preservation and development of all Indian languages, including Sanskrit and 
Urdu” (BJP 2005: 182). This document also mentions the diversity that is “an inseparable 
part of India’s past and present national tradition”, which comprises not only the Hindu holy 
books but “also the Indian traditions of the Muslims, Christians and Parsis” (ibid: 142). This 
exists alongside sections on “the cultural nationalism of India which is the core of Hindutva”, 
and the “integrative” ideas which led it to support the Ram Janambhoomi movement (ibid: 
146). But even the tone of these statements is markedly different from that of earlier 
manifestoes. When elections were called the following year after the Tamil All India Anna 
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam’s exit from the coalition, there is no mention of Hindutva in the 
1998 National Democratic Alliance (NDA) manifesto. There is even very little mention of the 
BJP. All emphasis is on the new coalition, as the NDA mission statement proclaims: “The 
NDA is new, the NDA is the future and the NDA is a broad-based movement for progress and 
justice” (ibid: 122).  
By the time of the next polls in 2004 the BJP had been holding power across India 
and at the centre in a coalition government for five years, and needed to take into account 
other parties, Muslim voters and a general distaste for blatant communalism after over a 
decade of riots and violence reaching its apogee in the Gujarat pogrom. The sitting BJP 
Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, was himself seen as an embodiment of composite 
Indian culture, socially comfortable around Muslims, product and proponent of ‘ganga-
yamuni tehzeeb’, even a Hindustani poet of sorts. It was during his term in office and just 
prior to the Lok Sabha elections that a series of ‘pro-Urdu’ measures were announced. 
Notably Vajpayee’s 2004 promise to recruit 200,000 Urdu teachers and spend Rs 740 million 
on madrassa education. This, again, reinforces the conflation between Urdu, Muslims and a 
particular type of religious education, and was opposed on this account by some Muslim 
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public figures. Ather Farouqui, for example, has dismissed it as “unconstitutional” (from 
personal communication with Ather Farouqui).  
The move was condemned by the VHP as “an insulting slap to all Hindus, Christians 
and others” – but both the proposal and the VHP’s careful reference to “Christians and 
others” in its critique of it, mark a shift from the harder-edged rhetoric of earlier periods, 
including that expressed by Vajpayee himself.4 Just two years earlier, in 2002, on the eve of 
the burning of the Sabarmati Express, the ostensible trigger for the Gujarat pogrom of that 
year, he had proclaimed that the BJP could win the upcoming UP Assembly elections without 
Muslim support.5  The menace in this statement was underlined by events that were to 
unfold a few days later. However, Vaypayee’s comments also suggest that demography is 
not destiny. The proportion of Muslim voters being unlikely to have changed significantly 
during this time, a roughly similar number was being addressed quite differently over a two-
year period.    
How to understand these sudden shifts and apparent incongruities? You could argue 
that they result from deficiencies in Indian democracy which have created “an incompletely 
modern polity” with a “split public” sphere, in which there is a divide between the political 
society desired by modernizing elites and “its actual historical forms”, a central fault line 
being the “the unfulfilled mission of secularism” in a country where a compromise between 
Hindu orthodoxy and progressive nationalism launched an anti-colonial independence 
movement, culminating in creation of a secular state (Rajagopal 2001: 152). The emergence 
and success of the Hindu nationalist BJP in an avowedly secular country would be proof of 
such a split, as would its double discourse on Muslims.  
Setting aside for a moment the sincerity or otherwise of their intentions, and 
thinking about the idea of secularism implicit in these gestures, for whatever reason, the BJP 
                                                 
4 “VHP flays Vajpayee on support to Urdu, madrasas”, The Times of India 23 April 2004: 
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2004-04-23/india/28324162_1_madrasas-urdu-general-secretary-praveen-togadia 
(accessed 21/06/2012). 
5 “BJP can win even without Muslim votes: PM”, The Hindu 20 February 2002:  
http://hindu.com/thehindu/2002/02/20/stories/2002022003000100.htm (accessed 21/06/2012). 
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was seeking to demonstrate its secularism through this policy rather than gesture to the 
historical form of, say, a Hindu kingdom, and the VHP’s critique was also ostensibly secular. 
Both the BJP and VHP allude to a view of secularism as a state of equilibrium between the 
faiths, only differing on how this balance should be maintained, the BJP seeming to think 
that it entails support for religious minorities, the VHP that it means not favouring one group 
above others. This understanding is by now commonplace and even said to be distinctively 
Indian, although something like it can be seen in other countries where the predominant 
religion does not support the separation of church and state because, like Hinduism, it has 
no church. This case of forked tongues and nuanced readings of doublespeak ventriloquizing 
a monolithic, Urdu-reading, Muslim vote bank and a view of secularism as interfaith 
equilibrium, suggests that polysemy is not the same as incoherence and multivalence does 
not inevitably result in fragmentation. It would seem that catchall categories and concepts 
(Urdu, secularism) can also work to momentarily coalesce groups.  
Moving beyond the idea of consistency as a possibility in social life, through talk of 
fragments and margins, often negatives of the very notion of totality that it aims to critique 
through its flagging of exceptions, makes it possible to think in terms of kaleidoscopic 
configurations and to look at the different ways that such measures work within and across 
different levels. Without dismissing rumours of the divisive way it was to work locally, the 
fact that it was introduced prior to a general election encourages reflection on how it might 
work at the national level, where different elements come into play. Muslims who do not 
read Urdu or even speak Urdu, and who might prefer their children to be educated in English 
(or Hindi or Tamil), could still interpret pro-Urdu measures as signalling that a party is 
attuned to their presence. This is to say nothing of how they might be aimed at and received 
by non-Muslims – Christians, Buddhists etc. and Hindus too, an attachment to secular values, 
however defined, not being exclusive to religious minorities.  
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A decade later, during the 2014 general election, a non-Muslim audience seemed to 
be implicit for measures listed in the section on equal opportunities for minorities, which 
included a commitment to “preservation and promotion of Urdu” (BJP 2014: 17). Pro-Urdu 
measures allowed the BJP to gesture towards secular ideals despite its controversial choice 
of leader. Narendra Modi may have been cleared by the Supreme Court for culpability in the 
2002 Gujarat pogrom, but questions remained over his role in the violence. At the same 
time, adoption of Hindi allowed Modi, the first Chief Minister other than, briefly, Charan 
Singh (1979-80), to assume the position of Prime Minister, to counter charges of 
parochialism. Standing from Varanasi and speaking in Hindi allowed this Gujarati politician to 
lay claim to a regional identity now viewed as national: Hindu, Hindi-speaking, Hindustani, 
Banarasi, and to even parlay this into the international arena, delivering his first speech to 
the United General Assembly in Hindi.6   
To mix metaphors, all of these ideological convolutions seem to be less indicative of 
elites rallying pre-constituted groups through an appeal to shared, ‘given’ characteristics, 
than parties semaphoring their intentions, voters reading and sometimes reading between 
the lines of these signals, and meanings being created through these circuits. Through such 
impure processes of semiosis, popularly known as ‘dirty politics’ or ‘opportunism’ (‘gandi 
siyasat’, ‘mauqaparasti’), constituencies are continually being mediated.  
 
Language recognition and misrecognition 
Probably no census could capture the complexity of linguistic practices in India, but the 
three questions relating to them in the 2011 census form offer a particularly stark 
assessment of literacy and language.7 Question ten asks for “Mother Tongue”; question 
                                                 
6 “PM Modi's US visit: Modi follows footsteps of AB Vajpayee, speaks in Hindi at UN” in The Economic Times, 
27 September 2014: http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-09-27/news/54377095_1_hindi-divas-prime-minister-
narendra-modi-pm-modi (accessed 31/08/2015). 
7 http://censusindia.gov.in/2011-Schedule/Shedules/English_Household_schedule.pdf (accessed 15/03/2015). 
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eleven for “Other languages known” (a maximum of two can be listed) and question twelve 
for “Literacy status” – giving two options “Literate” or “Illiterate”.  Categories such as 
Mother Tongue and Literate/Illiterate do not take into account how multiple 
languages/dialects can be spoken within a family, how and to what extent literacy has been 
acquired, and which language respondents are literate in.  Only sixteen languages are listed 
on the census schedule, encompassing hundreds of “mother tongues”, a term which covers 
both dialects and languages.8 Because the distinction between dialect and language is not 
self-evident, and mother tongue is no less contentious a term, schedule listing is fiercely 
contested and often quite arbitrary in practice.9 Einar Haugen describes the terms as existing 
on a “continuum” rather than in “neat opposition” (1972: 237).  The decisive movement 
from dialect to language is said to be brought about by selection, codification and 
community acceptance of a ‘norm’ rather than cut-and-dried linguistic differences, and to be 
closely related to the rise of nationalism. According to the indologist Sheldon Pollock, 
‘mother tongue’  is an alien concept in South Asia, where multilingualism has historically 
been pervasive, and modern instances of linguism, manifested in creation of linguistic states, 
are “of entirely recent stamp and largely exogenous origin” (2006: 507).   
This multilingualism is attested to by the profusion of terms deployed in colonial 
censuses to record spoken, as opposed to written, languages; variously, “mother tongue”, 
“parent tongue”, “language ordinarily used”, “language ordinarily spoken in the household” 
(Brass 1974: 193). In the 2011 census handbook enumerators are instructed to take its 
meaning literally, as “the language spoken in childhood by the person's mother to the 
person” (54).10 This language may or may not have a script, and might not even be 
understood by the person it is spoken to, in the case of “infants and deaf mutes” and also, 
                                                 
8  The examples of “Mother tongue” given in figures 6.55-6.58 of the enumerators handbook(Sadri, Hindi, 
Malayalam and Bhojpuri) encompass two dialects or “bolis” – Sadri and Bhojpuri, which are both classified as 
languages and mother tongues grouped under Hindi: 
 http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Census_Data_2001/Census_Data_Online/Language/Statement1.aspx (accessed 16/03/2015). 
9 As exemplified by the failure of Maithili failure to make the list despite meeting all the criteria of a “language” 
rather than a dialect, as described in Brass (1974) and Burghart (1993). 
10
http://censusindia.gov.in/2011-Documents/Updating%20of%20Abridged%20Houselist-English.pdf (accessed 16/03/2015). 
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potentially, adults who are no longer conversant with it. All that is required is that their 
mother should have spoken it to them when they were a child, with the only exception 
being someone whose mother died in infancy. In such instances the language used in the 
person’s childhood home is said to qualify. Both the category and its exception overlook 
multilingualism within the Indian family, where the language you speak with your mother 
could be different from that used to address your father, which could differ yet again from 
that spoken with siblings.  
In the eyes of its critics simplifications are compounded by distortions as it is left to 
census workers to complete the form. Enumerators are instructed not to attribute religion 
on the basis of “caste names” and also not to establish any relationship between religion 
and mother tongue (ibid: 45). Enumerators who suspect that “due to any organised 
movement”, religion is not being accurately recorded, are to record them as reported by the 
respondent and then make a report to their Supervisory Officer for verification (ibid). The 
presence of the interdiction and the attempt to monitor and counter it suggest that these 
practices may be quite common, as has historically been the case. According to Brass no 
census of Hindi and Urdu speakers in the north Indian states of UP and Bihar has ever 
accurately reflected the number and relative proportion of Hindi or Urdu speakers (1974: 
190). Before 1951 the goal is said to have been subverted in practice because enumerators 
were told to record as mother tongue “something different from what they were told by the 
people” (ibid). (For example, with various languages/dialects grouped under the label 
“Hindustani”.) Following partition, when Urdu became national language of Pakistan, Hindi 
the official national language of India (alongside English), and “Hindustani”, which 
encompassed them both, gradually disappeared from the Indian census, they have been 
viewed with no less scepticism.  
Although Hindustani lost official language status following Independence, it 
continued to be a census category until a sharp decline in recorded speakers led to its virtual 
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disappearance from the 1971 census schedule.11 Over the same period the numbers of Hindi 
and Urdu speakers increased as these languages became equated with Hindus and Muslims 
respectively. In a post-Partition context, declaring yourself a ‘mother tongue’ Urdu speaker 
would become a means to assert a minority identity, and a census enumerator’s decision to 
ignore your claim and record the language you ‘actually’ speak would also be read politically. 
Brass describes Urdu movement leaders dismissing the 1961 census as “bogus” on the basis 
that it recorded two million fewer Urdu speakers than Muslims in UP (1974: 189). In recent 
times, during my fieldwork in Uttar Pradesh, I was repeatedly told about Muslims being 
recorded as mother-tongue Hindi speakers even though they identify themselves as 
speaking Urdu, in what was perceived to be a deliberate attempt to underestimate the 
numbers of Urdu speakers and Muslims in India. Contrary to the claims of Bernard Cohn, 
who limits the census’s effects to the enumerators who then as now were responsible for 
filling in the forms (1987: 248), these examples suggest that questions left unasked and 
answers misrepresented also work to make the bias and arbitrariness of state classifications 
legible to those whom it claims to describe. 
State sanctioned language censuses may be “political, not philological, documents” 
(Brass 1974: 190), but they are also part of a bureaucratic process, subject to bureaucratic 
inertia and opacity, with repercussions for the efficacy of “the biopolitical project of knowing 
the population to manage it better” (Gupta 2012: 43). In Red Tape Gupta observes that 
neglecting to observe how statistics are collected and deployed is likely to obscure “the 
relationship between biopower and issues like sovereignty and violence” (ibid: 42). Statistics 
may be linked to state attempts to impose legibility on populations, but in practice 
“possessing more detailed statistics does not always correspond to better knowledge about 
the subject of scrutiny” (ibid). He illustrates this with his experience of doing fieldwork in 
                                                 
11 The Report of the Committee for the Promotion of Urdu (hereafter the Gujral Committee Report) records that 
6,742,937 Hindustani speakers were recorded in Uttar Pradesh in 1951; 100,530 in 1961 (although “Nil” were 
recorded in urban areas); and a statistically negligible number in 1971, there are no figures given for Hindustani in 
this year (GI [Government of India] 1975: 19).   
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rural UP and learning of how census data for an entire village was collected from the first 
house on the main road that led to it (ibid: 43). The farmer living there claims a census 
worker had sat on his cot and asked him who lived in the village and how many people there 
were in each household. Gupta observes that whilst some information may have been 
collected this way, its accuracy was questionable. Awareness of such dubious data collection 
methods leads him to conclude that statistics can be an ineffective instrument of biopolitics.  
This does not, however, preclude them enabling less transparent exercises of state 
power. In their work on anthropology in the margins of the state Veena Das and Deborah 
Poole point to the “many different spaces, forms, and practices through which the state is 
continually both experienced and undone through the illegibility of its own practices, 
documents, and words” (Das and Poole 2004: 9-10). In her essay “The Signature of the State: 
The Paradox of Illegibility”, Das relates Derrida’s critique of notions of the intentionality of 
language, which would connect “consciousness in speech acts to the presence of the person 
and in writing to the apprehending of a signature” (2004: 227), to reconsider the instability 
produced by the gap between a rule and its implementation in state operations. This alerts 
her to how what in “ordinary life” would fall within the domain of “human vulnerability” 
(that words can be de-contextualised and transfigured) in the life of the state becomes “a 
mode of circulation through which power is produced” (ibid: 245). When she speaks of how 
the state is brought into the public realm by technologies of writing that simultaneously 
institute “the possibility of forgery, imitation and the mimetic performances of its power” 
(ibid: 227), she describes a much more uncertain process than Bourdieu’s description of a 
social world “riddled with calls to order” (Bourdieu et al 1994: 14), and her account would 
seem to accord with how Muslims come to ‘know’ the state through census operations 
perceived to underestimate their presence.  
Conversely, there is nothing straightforward about how these statistics are in turn 
read by the state. Although the census matters to language activists because it forms the 
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basis for provision of facilities, in practice, its recording of a certain number of Urdu speakers 
has been insufficient to secure its position in India. Urdu may be the sixth most widely 
spoken language in the country according to the census, but, unlike most of the languages 
on the census schedule, it is not the language spoken by the majority of people in any State. 
(It is the official language of the State of Kashmir, but not the main spoken language there.)  
Article 345 of the Indian Constitution declares that there is no bar to a State Legislature 
adopting more than one official language, and Article 347, that the President may authorize 
State recognition of a language, if he believes a “substantial proportion” of the population 
“desire the use of any language spoken by them to be recognised throughout that State or 
any part thereof”. However the vagueness of the terms “substantial proportion” and 
“languages spoken” has hampered its implementation. Questions have also been raised 
about whether Article 347 refers to the total number of speakers in a State, or could 
accommodate provisions for linguistic minorities concentrated in certain parts of it.  
When the central state appointed Gujral Committee called on legal experts to clarify 
the term “substantial proportion”, they expressed the view that it suggests a percentage of 
no less than 15 to 20 percent in a State as a whole (GI 1975: 28). According to the census 
Urdu does not have that many speakers in any Indian State, and one of the legal experts 
suggested that this obstacle could be overcome if a distinction was made between mother-
tongue, official language and language spoken (ibid: 29). In a State such as Uttar Pradesh in 
which many more people speak Urdu than the 11% then recorded on the census, this would 
justify official status for the language.  
The report produced by the Gujral Committee sidesteps the question of how Article 
347 should be interpreted (ibid: 142), but commends use of Urdu for official purposes where 
there are 10% or more speakers of Urdu (ibid: 147).  The Union Government and State Chief 
Ministers had already agreed to provide facilities to “linguistic pockets having a population 
of fifteen per cent or more”, but a “more liberal attitude” is enjoined in the case of a 
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language like Urdu, which has “no compact concentration of speakers in any one State but 
has a substantial population in a number of States” (ibid). Despite this, no such recognition 
was accorded to Urdu in UP until The Uttar Pradesh Official Language (Amendment) Act was 
passed in 1989. The move was instigated by Congress Chief Minister N.D. Tiwari, apparently 
with a view to winning the Muslim vote in the Lok Sabha election of that same year, and was 
immediately contested by Hindu nationalist and Hindi organisations. (I will discuss BJP 
opposition to the move in more detail in the next section.) The Allahabad Hindi Sahitya 
Sammelan filed a Personal Interest Litigation in the Lucknow bench of the Allahabad High 
Court on the grounds that it was not within the power of the legislature to adopt an 
additional official language, and that there was an insufficient proportion of Urdu speakers 
in UP to warrant such a measure. The High Court rejected the case in 1996, which led the 
Hindi Sahitya Sammelan to file a special leave petition in the Supreme Court. The case 
dragged on in the courts for over two decades, until the Supreme Court in September 2014 
upheld the 1996 judgment giving Urdu the status of second official language for seven 
administrative purposes. But even these belated and hard-won concessions were limited in 
scope, as was observed, when they were first proposed, by the 1990 report on the 
implementation of the Gujral Committee’s recommendations.12  
Alongside its marginalization in bureaucracy, Urdu was to gradually disappear from 
state school education, despite constitutional safeguards and central state policy guidelines 
for education in minority languages. Article 350a of the Constitution, introduced in 1956 as 
an implementation of a recommendation of the Report of the States Reorganisation 
Commission (1955), requires States to provide facilities for primary-level instruction in the 
mother tongue language of children belonging to linguistic minority groups. But this has 
                                                 
12  The report notes that the provisions of the Act “are much less than those recommended by the Gujral 
Committee” (64). They covered: “entertaining petitions and applications in Urdu and replies thereof in Urdu; 
receiving documents written in Urdu by the registration office; publication of important government rules, 
regulations and notifications in Urdu also; issuing government orders and circulars of public importance in Urdu 
also, publication of important government advertisements in Urdu also, publication of Urdu translation also of the 
Gazette and exhibition of important signposts in Urdu.” http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/sc-upholds-urdu-as-second-
official-language-in-uttar-pradesh/1/380970.html (accessed 08/03/2015).  
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been unevenly applied across regions and languages, because of ambiguity surrounding the 
terms ‘linguistic minority’ and ‘mother tongue’. In implementing Article 350a the State of UP 
has been guided by the “10-40” formula issued by the Department of Education in 1952, 
which stipulates that in a primary school class of 40 students ten would have to request 
instruction in their mother-tongue for such an arrangement to be made. The Report of the 
Uttar Pradesh Language Committee, for example, upholds this (GUP [Government of UP] 1962: 
32-33). The Gujral Committee Report points out that the formula has been unworkable 
because of its unwieldiness and non-implementation by lower-level educational authorities 
(GI 1975: 44), and a follow-up report records that there were only 1375 Urdu medium 
primary schools in UP, despite the presence of 10,767,175 Urdu speakers, and that most of 
these were religious schools run by the “linguistic minority” itself, although sometimes 
financed by the state (GI 1990: 69). The situation was said to be even worse at the secondary 
level, where there is no constitutional obligation for representation of minority languages. 
The same report claims that in Uttar Pradesh “there is not a single Government Urdu 
medium secondary school” (ibid: 12), and in his 2006 overview of the state of Urdu 
education in India, Ather Farouqui writes that there is “not a single primary Urdu-medium 
school” in the state and only two secondary schools, both of which were run by Aligarh 
Muslim University (2006: 184).  
In addition to the disappearance of Urdu-medium state schools, Urdu as a subject 
was affected by a particular understanding of the Education Ministry’s three-language 
formula of language learning, which was introduced in The National Policy on Education 
(1968).13 According to the formula, secondary school children in the Hindi-speaking States 
would study Hindi, English and a modern Indian language apart from Hindi,  and those in the 
non-Hindi-speaking States, the regional language, Hindi and English. The National Policy on 
Education recommends that Hindi-speaking States choose a modern Indian language from 
                                                 
13 http://mhrd.gov.in/sites/upload_files/mhrd/files/document-reports/NPE-1968.pdf (accessed 07/04/2015). 
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the southern States, but the decision was left to their discretion. In the Hindi-speaking States, 
where the choice of third language was dependent on “the majority wish of the students” 
(Brass 1974: 210), there was little incentive to study another regional language whilst English 
and Hindi continued to be official languages of the Union. Urdu might seem to be the natural 
choice of third language, given that prior to Independence both Hindi and Urdu had been 
used in state education (GI 1975: 42), but this was discouraged by the decision to recognise 
Sanskrit as a “modern Indian language”. Faced with a choice between Urdu and Sanskrit, the 
former for many students requiring the acquisition of a new script, students are said to have 
been “practically required to learn Sanskrit as their third language” (Brass 1974: 210).   
The National Policy on Education also leaves open this interpretation by encouraging 
greater resources for Sanskrit because of “its unique contribution to the cultural unity of the 
country” (1968: 40). This perception is by now hard to fathom after decades of pro-Sanskrit 
advocacy by Hindu nationalist organisations, but Sanskrit was available as a choice of 
“Modern Indian Language” because it had been listed in the Eighth Schedule of the 
Constitution on these grounds. In “Sanskrit for the Nation” (2009), Sumathi Ramaswamy 
describes support for the cause of Sanskrit as a national language by a wide range of people 
during the Constituent Assembly debates, many of whom came from beyond the Hindi belt, 
such as Ambedkar and Naziruddin Ahmad of the Muslim League in Bengal. This is said to 
have been partly “a last-ditch effort to salvage the linguistic mess in which the Constituent 
Assembly found itself” after three years of deliberation on the future of India’s languages 
(ibid: 108), but also because the language was perceived to belong to “no one single region, 
caste, or religion, even while belonging to all of them” (ibid: 122). In its detachment from 
any particular region it resembles Urdu and was therefore able to supplant it as third 
language in the Hindi-speaking States. 
State level subversion of constitutional injunctions and central state policy directives, 
based in a restricted understanding of what constitutes a ‘substantial proportion’ and a 
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flexible understanding of the ‘modern’, can be seen to have led to the decline of Urdu in a 
region where it was formerly the predominant language. The attitude that led to this 
situation is conveyed by J.B. Kripalani, the Chairman of the UP Language Committee, in his 
introduction to the Committee’s 1962 report on the status of Urdu following the creation of 
linguistic states: 
I would like to remind you that though Urdu is the language of a minority of people living in 
this State, it is not the language of a particular minority community or religious group. Only a 
minority of the whole population of Uttar Pradesh speak and write in the Urdu style of 
language. This minority consists of members of both the majority and minority communities, 
as also of some Christians and Sikhs. When, therefore, we say that Urdu is a minority 
language, it does not mean that the minority belongs to a particular religion or religious 
community. 
(GUP 1962: 7) 
 
These equivocating statements about the “Urdu style of language” are consistent with the 
report’s emphasis on how Indian culture being a harmonious fusion of various influences it is 
unfeasible “to demarcate different cultural groups in India or term any of them as ‘cultural 
minorities’” (ibid: 19). It dismisses calls for Urdu to be made second language of UP with 
reference to the recommendations of the States Reorganisation Commission (that second 
language status could only be accorded to those spoken by 30% or more of the population), 
and emphasizes that linguistic facilities should “be in tune with the larger interests of 
national integration” (ibid: 25).  In his analysis of this document Brass underlines the 
“remarkable sophistry” at the heart of its assertion that although a certain number of people 
speak Urdu as their mother tongue and it is the language of a minority of people living in the 
State, Urdu speakers do not constitute “‘a particular minority community or religious group’” 
(1974: 204).  
Rather than arising out of a concern with legibility or ‘control on the basis of 
knowledge’ UP State language policy and its bureaucratic implementation seems to have 
been characterized by wilful blindness and ignorance. Its reluctance to confer central state 
sanctioned recognition on Urdu could even be described as a case of ideologically motivated 
deliberate misrecognition, some aspects of which are illuminated by Bourdieu’s concept of 
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“méconnaissance”. That is, a system of classification which reproduces the objective classes 
“by securing the misrecognition, and hence the recognition, of the arbitrariness on which 
they are based” (2000: 164). The term is also an important aspect of Althusser’s writings on 
ideology, derived from his reading of Freud’s extension of Marx’s de-centering of the 
“human subject, the economic, political or philosophical ego”, to discover the “individual in 
his essence” as constituted “by a structure which has no ‘centre’ either, except in the 
imaginary misrecognition of the ‘ego’, i.e. in the ideological formations in which it recognizes 
itself” (Althusser 1977b: 201).  
For Bourdieu méconnaissance is both a question of embodied durable dispositions 
as well as consciousness, and language is of particular interest to him because it partakes of 
the two. In Language and Symbolic Power he describes how on the one hand, language is a 
“body technique” and linguistic competence a dimension of one’s “bodily hexis”, through 
which a socially informed relation to the world is expressed (1994: 86). At the same time it 
participates in the act of naming which helps to structure this world: “gossip, slander, lies, 
insults, commendations, criticisms, arguments and praises are all daily and petty 
manifestations of the solemn and collective acts of naming” (ibid: 105). But the belief and 
legitimacy which gives these words efficacy is said to derive from another source. Namely, 
symbolic power, an “almost magical power” that transforms “the vision of the world itself” 
through the structure in which belief is produced rather than by coercive force (ibid: 170).  
When dealing with a language such as Urdu, which reveals the limits of standard 
criteria for official language status (‘mother tongue’, ‘minority’ and ‘region’), the role of 
“imaginary misrecognition” in both its marginalization and promotion would seem to be 
particularly clear. Paul Brass neatly connects the two strands, the psychoanalytic and the 
political, in his critique of what he describes as “the infantile and narcissistic metaphors of 
mother tongue and mother’s milk”, said to be based in “self-glorification and other 
disparagement” and a politics of “mobilization and separation” (2004: 366). By extension, 
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the continued significance of Urdu in the informal education sector and its unofficial cultural 
afterlife in post-Independence India might seem to be captured by the term “allodoxia”, 
“misapprehension” of the true value of their qualifications by victims of devaluation arising 
out of a “hysteresis of habitus, which causes previously appropriate categories of perception 
and appreciation to be applied to a new state of the qualification market” (Bourdieu 1984: 
142).  
But all this talk of false knowledge, based in assumptions about true knowledge and 
objectively verifiable social positions, provokes the question: who is to judge? Who is to say 
what constitutes true or false knowledge? Or, more specifically, which language someone is 
‘actually’ speaking or ‘should’ learn? This is the crux of Rancière’s critique of Bourdieu, and 
more generally of a sociological method which would presuppose the result that it is 
supposed to establish, and whose “scientific” war against allodoxy he views as a “war 
against the aesthetic and democratic unrest of the division of the body politic within itself” 
(2006c: 7). He asserts that what is called “allodoxy is in fact aesthetic dissensus, the 
dehiscence between the arms and the gaze of the carpenter, the sensible rupture of the 
relation between a body and what it knows – in the double sense of knowing” (ibid). Rather 
than being reducible to interests and drives, in the terms of political and psychoanalytic 
theory, aesthetics means “‘finality without end’…a pleasure disconnected from every science 
of ends” (ibid: 5). 
This aesthetics of politics also counters Althusser’s distinction between art and 
knowledge, which is the basis of his famous dismissal of the significance of lived experience: 
Neither Balzac nor Solzhenitsyn gives us any knowledge of the world they describe, they only 
make us ‘see’, ‘perceive’ or ‘feel’ the reality of the ideology of that world. When we speak of 
ideology we should know that ideology slides into all human activity, that it is identical with 
the ‘lived’ experience of human existence itself: that is why the form in which we are ‘made 
to see’ ideology in great novels has as its content the ‘lived’ experience of individuals. This 
‘lived’ experience is not a given, given by a pure ‘reality’, but the spontaneous ‘lived 
experience’ of ideology in its peculiar relationship to the real. 
(Althusser 1977c: 223) 
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Knowledge is said to always be conceptual, moving beyond the epiphenomena of perception 
to penetrate the “complex mechanisms” which produce the ‘lived experience’ described in 
Solzhenitsyn’s fiction (ibid).     
Rancière, on the other hand, pays more respect to both the perceptual and the 
imaginary, he describes refusal and consent as a matter of perceptual experience (2011a: 
240) and writes of the double nature of all knowledge, of an ensemble of knowledges and an 
organized distribution of positions, and of how both are shadowed by “an ignorance which 
liberates” (2006c: 3). This liberatory potential is realised in the example of artisans who act 
“as if they were at home in the house that they otherwise know is not theirs” (ibid: 6). Far 
from being an example of false consciousness, this “as if” supplements their identity as a 
worker at home in a defined regime with “a proletarian identity”, which for Rancière means 
“the identity of a subject capable of escaping the assignment to a private condition and of 
intervening in the affairs of the community” (ibid). For both Bourdieu and Rancière, class is a 
conceptual category rather than an exclusively socioeconomic one, but in the latter’s work 
proletarian identity opens up the possibility of escaping structural determinants rather than 
establishes their coordinates.   
This ‘as if’ is therefore also quite distinct from what Chatterjee describes as “the “as 
if” behaviour of economic agents”, brought into being by the often coercive force of “new 
economic institutions backed by the regulative and legal powers of the modern state” (2011: 
138). In his essay, “The People in Utopian and Real Time”, he also expresses scepticism 
about the Marxist distinction between “the fetishism of ideology and the truth of science”, 
drawing attention to how, in the twentieth century, the all pervasiveness of statistical 
reasoning has incorporated the “allegedly fetishized behaviour of economic agents as data 
for policy-making” (ibid: 137). Nevertheless, he persists in tracing this ‘behaviour’ back to 
the state, conceived as the determining element in the ‘real’ political order.  
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As well as allowing more room for ‘proletarians’ to manoeuver, Rancière’s non-
instrumentalist aesthetics of politics also opens up the possibility of a less rigid view of state-
society relations. The idea of the universal imposition of a legitimate national culture and 
language (Bourdieu 1994: 8) in particular does not account for the survival of Urdu and the 
un-success of attempts to legitimise the imposition of Hindi, from creation of Linguistic 
States in 1956, amendment of The Official Languages Act (1963) to allow for the continued 
use of English in 1967, to Urdu’s continued unofficial and informal afterlife in the State 
where it has suffered the worst decline. Linguistic States and the amendment of The Official 
Languages Act were brought about because of protests and pressure from the non-Hindi 
speaking States. The continued significance of Urdu in UP is largely because of the support of 
religious establishments who run Urdu medium schools in the informal education sector, in 
rural and remote areas often stepping into a state-created vacuum, and also its continued 
presence in media. Informal educational institutions and private media organisations are 
sometimes indirectly supported by the state, but neither can be seen as pure and 
anticipated outcomes of its policies.  
A significant recent example of this is the popular Urdu poetry and literature site 
Rekhta.org, which presents Nastaliq, Devanagari and Roman versions of Urdu poems, with 
crowd-sourced Urdu-to-English translations and links to YouTube videos and audio 
recordings.  In an interview with the Hindu newspaper, Sanjiv Saraf, the entrepreneur who 
founded the site, declares “Urdu is not my mother-tongue but the language of my heart 
because Urdu poetry embeds every emotion in it”.14 Wider appreciation of Urdu poetry is 
made possible by a combination of factors: a wealthy benefactor, new technology, the close 
concordance between spoken Hindi and Urdu, increased literacy in Hindi and English and the 
persistence of poetry as a living form in South Asia. 
                                                 
14 “Urdu poetry made accessible”, The Hindu, 17 January 2013:  
http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-features/tp-metroplus/urdu-poetry-made-accessible/article4314372.ece (accessed 
16/03/2015). 
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The reading public 
Into the current day, repressive colonial-era legislation continues to frame Indian newspaper 
production (1860 Penal Code, 1867 Press and Registration of Books Act, 1885 Telegraph Act, 
1898 Indian Post Office Act, 1923 Official Secrets Act) and the Indian Constitution notably 
lacks a provision on freedom of the press. Until quite recently, with the introduction of The 
Freedom of Information Bill (2000) and The Right to Information Act (2005), regulation 
seems to have been weighted towards control rather than freedom of expression, and even 
then it would seem to depart from what Kathryn Woolard describes as “the American folk 
ideology of free speech, which fosters the sense that speakers control language” (1998: 26), 
and which she views as being contextualised by Western, vernacular belief systems that 
naturalise language standards through “metaphors such as that of the free market” (ibid: 21). 
This belief is more commonly described as universal, and a conflation of free speech with 
free markets can be discerned in one of its most famous expressions, The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948). Article 19 of the UDHR defines freedom of expression 
as the right “to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers”. Reference is made to 
the imparter, seeker and receiver of information and ideas, to the opinion holder, but there 
is no mention of any wider context except for references to the media through which ideas, 
information and opinions flow, and the interference and frontiers that are said to potentially 
restrict their circulation.  This section of the UDHR therefore seems to embody the ideal of 
what Latour has described as “double click communication”, “the dream of honest thinking, 
of non-deformation, of immediacy, of the absence of any mediator” (2003: 145-146).  
As Latour observes, this ideal is easily disproved by any mouse user.  India may have 
been a signatory of the UDHR, but in the immediate post-Independence era, the turmoil of 
Partition and socialist sympathies of Congress party leadership encouraged a cautious 
attitude towards freedom of speech, free markets and the combination of both found in the 
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newspaper market. It was at the instigation of Nehru that the first restrictions on the Indian 
Constitution’s provisions on “Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech etc.” 
were introduced in 1951, as part of The Constitution (First Amendment) Act.15 This subjected 
Article 19(1)(a), concerning freedom of speech, to “reasonable restrictions” in order to 
safeguard India’s sovereignty and integrity, “friendly relations with foreign States”, and 
public order, decency and morality. When justifying the amendment in Parliament, Nehru is 
said to have emphasised his appreciation for the press as “‘one of the vital organs of modern 
life’”, but maintained that the “‘concept of individual freedom has to be balanced with social 
freedom and the relations of the individual with the social group” (Austin 1999: 46).16 He 
also questioned the idea of the press as guardians of free speech, given the existence of 
newspaper monopolies: “‘When gigantic newspaper chains spring up and undermine the 
freedom of the independent newspapers, when the press in India is controlled by three or 
four groups of individuals, what kind of a press is that?” (ibid).  
A vitalist conception of Capital and information as self-determining forces underlies 
the Indian state’s attempts to harness the double-edged power of print capitalism to both 
create new forms of sociality and threaten the integrity of social groups, through rationing of 
newsprint and attempts to control the price of newspapers through The Newspaper (Price & 
Page) Act (1956) and The Daily Newspapers (Price & Page) Order (1960). This legislation was 
apparently intended to protect small newspapers from unfair competition by preventing big 
newspapers from cutting prices whilst increasing volume. Rationing and restrictions on the 
import of newsprint were eased in 1992 and have been inoperative since 1997 (GI 2011: 39-
40), and price controls were vetoed by the Supreme Court on the basis that stipulating a 
minimum price for a newspaper would “deter a class or section of its readers from 
purchasing such a newspaper” and therefore be an infringement on freedom of expression 
                                                 
15 http://indiacode.nic.in/coiweb/amend/amend1.htm (accessed 17/04/2015). 
16 Austin notes that the amendment ironically ended up strengthening the Article, as “providing that any limitations 
on free speech must be „reasonable‟ strengthened the right through judicial review” (ibid: 50). In chapter three, 
dealing with the emergency, I will look at the often counterproductive nature of censorship in more detail. 
73 
 
as guaranteed by the Indian Constitution (Basu 2010: 287).  Both the legislation and the 
Supreme Court judgment overturning it evoke social harmony: The Daily Newspapers (Price 
& Page) Order cites the risk of creating monopolies that will drive smaller newspapers to the 
wall and in this way skew the whole newspaper market. The Supreme Court judgment’s 
reference to a “certain class of reader” evokes a larger society composed of various classes 
whose balance must be protected from market forces.   
Nowadays, continuity with pre-censorship through indirect pressure can be seen 
most clearly in the significance of state advertising revenue.  Advertising has traditionally 
been a major support for newspapers around the world. Although this business model no 
longer works so well in countries with high levels of internet penetration such as the US,17 it 
still seems to in India, where according to World Bank estimates only 15.1% of Indians had 
used the internet in 2013 via computer, mobile phone, personal digital assistant, games 
machine, digital TV etc.18 This percentage is increasing year-on-year, it has doubled from the 
7.5% first recorded in 2010. But, from what can be gathered from official circulation 
statistics, into the 2000s Indian newspapers seem to be doing well. Press in India: 2009-10 
reports a 5.8% growth in total registered publications over the previous year (GI 2011: xi) 
and a 19.71% increase in total circulation of newspapers.  
According to the First and Second Press reports, almost half of the revenue of Indian 
newspapers came from advertising, and following the economic liberalization polices of the 
early nineties the proportion seems to have increased significantly. According to Vanita 
Kohli-Khander’s overview of The Indian Media Business, approximately 80% of a 
publication’s revenue comes from advertising, the exact amount varying according to 
“language, frequency, price, the market it addresses” (2010: 29). Private advertising revenue 
is greater for newspapers with large circulation and written in English, because of what is 
                                                 
17 See the Pew Research Center's Project for Excellence in Journalism‟s 2012 report “The Search for a New 
Business Model”, which describes how American newspapers struggle to build up digital revenue to make up for 
print losses: http://www.journalism.org/files/legacy/SEARCHFORNEWREVENUEMODEL.pdf  (accessed 14/04/2016). 
18 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2 (accessed 20/03/2015).   
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perceived to be their more affluent readership, meaning that Urdu papers tend to be reliant 
on state advertising revenue, but also relatively independent of consumer demand. Hence 
the increase in the number of registered Urdu newspapers, in part facilitated by new 
technology (more on this in next chapter), despite the apparent decline of Urdu in India 
generally and Uttar Pradesh in particular. DAVP rates are also fixed according to circulation 
and vary according to language, district and the type of advert.  
 
Directorate of Advertising and Visual Publicity – Cost estimate of advertising – Display 
(Colour)19 
Proposed to be published in Lucknow in the following newspapers on 18/04/2015 
Newspaper Language Circulation Rs per sq. cm 
Dainik Jagran* Hindi 251855 114 
Times of India* English 107820 49 
Rashtriya Sahara  Hindi 82483 38 
In Dinon* Urdu 75000 34 
Sahafat Urdu 67083 34 
Roznama Rashtriya Sahara Urdu 41199 25 
Indian Express English 25064 20 
*Newspaper with highest circulation within that language.  
 
To put these figures into perspective, a private colour display advert on the front page of the 
Lucknow edition of The Times of India cost Rs 1005.75 per square centimetre in April 2015, 
as per its website.20 The same advert in its Delhi edition cost Rs 5550 per centimetre. 
Nonetheless, because of a policy of preferring Urdu newspapers for state advertising, they 
remain a lucrative source for newspapers published in that language. The editor of a Sahafat, 
                                                 
19 http://www.davp.nic.in/Upload/davp_estimate.aspx (accessed 18/4/2015) 
20 http://timesofindia.releasemyad.com/display-ad.php (accessed 18/4/2015).   
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an Urdu paper headquartered in Lucknow and largely catering to a Shia readership, claimed 
that advertising made up more than 90% of the revenue of his paper, and that almost all of 
this came from the central and State level government.21 Looking at these figures, it is 
striking that the rate for Sahafat (Rs 34 per sq. cm) is significantly higher than that for the 
Indian Express (Rs 20 per sq. cm).  Although Indian Express may on paper have a lower 
circulation rate than Sahafat it is one of the most widely read newspapers by journalists and 
politicians in north India, famous for its editorials, commentary and investigative journalism; 
whereas Sahafat has a niche audience even within the small Urdu-reading market.  
The DAVP is the main body for co-ordinating conferral of central state advertising to 
newspapers and journals, and regional information departments often follow the lead of its 
policy in selecting newspapers in which to advertise and fixing advertising rates. According 
to this policy “the DAVP does not take into account the political affiliation or editorial 
policies of newspapers/journals” when releasing adverts.22  However claims to impartiality 
sit alongside several moments when it has preferred certain papers on the basis of their 
political affiliations, notoriously during the internal emergency of 1975-77.23  In recent times 
the DAVP has sought to introduce greater transparency into its workings through a written 
advertising policy (2007) and online empanelment process. But there are still anomalies in 
its distribution of adverts, notably over-representation of Hindi and Urdu papers 
proportionate to their readerships, and of the north Indian state of Uttar Pradesh relative to 
its population. In an attempt to go beyond pointing out obvious inconsistencies and instead 
                                                 
21 Interview with Aman Abbas, Editor of Sahafat, Lucknow, 13 September 2011. 
22 http://www.davp.nic.in/Newspaper_Advertisement_Policy.html (accessed 15/11/2011). 
23 The report of the Shah Commission enquiry into emergency-era abuses describes how the DAVP categorised 
newspapers as “friendly, neutral and hostile”, and government advertising was awarded or withdrawn on this basis. 
It cites the example of Dastan-e-Watan, an Urdu paper published from Delhi, which had its advertising resumed 
after the journal ceased to follow “a pro-Jana Sangh policy” and started to support Congress (GI 1978, Vol. I: 40). 
The report concludes that the government during this period had “utilised its advertising policy as a source of 
financial assistance or denial of financial assistance to newspapers” (ibid: 41), and had even put pressure on 
private advertising agencies to do the same (ibid: 42).  
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trying to understand how policy works alongside other factors to produce specific outcomes, 
I will proceed to focus on how it favours certain regions and languages. 
Almost half the daily newspapers registered in India for the period 2009-10 were 
written in Hindi (1844 out of 3909) and the second most significant language for daily papers 
was Urdu (GI 2011: 7). The Indian census does not indicate which languages respondents are 
literate in, merely records spoken language and literacy per se, and its definition of Hindi is 
very broad. In the 2001 census the scheduled “language” Hindi encompasses more than 49 
“mother tongues”.24 Even if we were to assume that the recorded 41.05% Hindi speakers 
and 5.01% Urdu speakers are also able to read these languages, this would still not account 
for their prominent position amongst registered newspapers.  
With regards to regional concentration of registered newspapers, according to the 
2011 census UP has an overall literacy rate of 69.72% as opposed to the national average of 
74.04%, putting it in 28th place out of a total of 35 States and Union Territories. 
Nevertheless Uttar Pradesh has the largest number of registered daily newspapers in India: 
964 according to the RNI annual report covering the period 2009-2010 (GI 2011: 8). That is 
almost twice as much as the next territory, Andhra Pradesh, which has 500 registered daily 
newspapers (ibid), and out of proportion to its population. According to the 2011 census UP 
is home to 199 million of India’s 1.21 billion people.   
The first explanation for these apparent anomalies that comes to hand is DAVP 
advertising policy, which in many ways seems to provide greater incentive for Hindi and 
Urdu papers to register with the RNI than those written in other Indian languages, and to 
therefore disproportionately favour north Indian newspapers.25 (Registrar of Newspapers of 
India membership is one of the requirements for empanelment with the DAVP.) 
 
                                                 
24
http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Census_Data_2001/Census_Data_Online/Language/Statement1.aspx (accessed 16/02/2015).   
25 http://www.davp.nic.in/Newspaper_Advertisement_Policy.html (accessed 05/07/2012). 
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Clause 3 of the DAVP’s advertising policy 
Language 
30% (approx.) of its advertising budget is devoted to English publications. 
35% (approx.) to Hindi  
35% (approx.) to papers written in “Regional and other languages”, in keeping with its 
concern to encourage unity and communal harmony. (“Other” languages include Bodo, 
Dogri, Garhwali, Kashmiri, Khasi, Konkani, Maithili, Manipuri, Mizo, Nepali, Rajasthani, 
Sanskrit, Santhali, Sindhi, Urdu and state government certified Tribal languages.) 
Size 
15% minimum to small papers (with a circulation of 25,000 copies per publishing day) 
35% minimum to medium sized newspapers (with a circulation of between 25,001 and 
75,000 copies per publishing day).  
50% maximum to big papers (with a circulation of more than 75,000) 
 
Hindi and English, the two official languages of the Union as per The Official Languages Act 
(1963),26 receive the bulk of central state advertising, as do big newspapers. But this is 
balanced against a concern for smaller and medium sized papers, which are less well placed 
to attract lucrative private advertising, and newspapers written in “Regional and other 
languages”. The requirement for newspapers to be “uninterruptedly and regularly under 
publication” for 36 months is relaxed for the latter. Proof of only six months continuous 
publication is required from papers written in these languages.  
Because of the history of Hindi, Urdu and English in India, of all the “Regional and 
other languages” Urdu is easily the most established as a print language in the post-
Independence period. Additionally, according to Audit Bureau of Circulation figures for 2013 
there is no Urdu newspaper with “big” circulation, meaning that they also benefit from 
                                                 
26 http://deity.gov.in/content/official-language-act (accessed 20/3/2014). 
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concessions for small and medium papers. The Munsif Daily, published from Hyderabad, has 
the highest circulation of any registered Urdu paper. In the period from July – December 
2013, it recorded a circulation of 61,113.27 Figures for Roznama Rashtriya Sahara, which 
claims to be the most widely circulated Urdu paper in India, and which I will discuss in the 
subsequent chapter, are not available via the ABC. But its website claims Roznama Rashtriya 
Sahara is the “most widely read Urdu daily of the country”, with a “print-run” of 393,000 
and a “readership base” of 3.151 million.28 Whereas Rashtriya Sahara (Hindi) claims a daily 
readership of 98,000 in accordance with the 2011 Indian Readership Survey (IRS), and a 
circulation of 100,000 on the basis of ABC figures.29  
Despite the much wider geographical spread of Urdu compared to Hindi, it seems 
unlikely that there would be more readers for Sahara’s Urdu paper. Doubts are further 
encouraged by the fact that figures for its Urdu edition are ambiguously worded and not 
independently verified. “Print run” exists in even more tangential relationship to actual sales 
than does “circulation”. Circulation is defined in Press in India: 2009-10 as average number 
of newspapers “sold and distributed free per publishing day” (GI 2011: x). These figures are 
self-reported by newspapers, verified by accountants hired by the Audit Bureau of 
Circulation, and then used to attract advertising revenue, meaning that even official figures 
are viewed with scepticism. Additionally, “Readership-base” is distinct from “readership”, 
the term used by the IRS, which is also hard to estimate.30  
The fact that Roznama Rashtriya Sahara is still able to receive state advertising 
despite not meeting the usual criteria for DAVP empanelment perhaps indicates the 
indulgence with which the Urdu press is viewed. Historically, this seems to have been true 
                                                 
27 http://www.auditbureau.org/news/view/17 (accessed 10/03/2015).   
28 http://www.roznamasahara.com/abtusaspx.aspx (accessed 20/03/2015). 
29 http://www.newspaperadagency.com/rashtriya-sahara.htm (accessed 20/05/2015). 
30 See the controversy that has met recent attempts to improve the Indian Readership Survey‟s methodology 
(correlating census data and projections with “digitally captured” individual and household data). IRS note on its 
new methodology. http://www.mruc.net/?q=irs-methodology (accessed 20/03/2015). Times of India report on media 
houses‟ rejection of its findings: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/18-top-media-houses-rubbish-readership-survey-
findings/articleshow/29674900.cms? (accessed 20/03/2015). 
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for small and vernacular newspapers in general, with the two terms, according to Jeffrey, 
often being perceived as synonymous (2000: 55). He describes how in the “socialist” India of 
the 1950s to 1970s, proprietors of “small” newspapers viewed advertising as a “gift” 
bestowed upon “the newspaper industry’s deserving poor” (ibid), and the government 
rationale for this policy is expressed in the Report of the Second Press Commission:  
Among the Indian language newspapers, small and medium newspapers serving a district or 
a group of districts can play a more direct role in the process of democratizing 
communication than newspapers aiming at State-level or multi-State circulation 
(GI 1982, Vol. I: 21) 
 
By these means, the state would be able to control and channel socially disruptive market 
forces. In state hands newspapers would become an instrument to increase participation in 
the “public sphere” (Jeffrey 2000: 51).   
In practice this goal has been subverted by the phenomenon of ‘phantom 
newspapers’. Concessions for small, medium and vernacular papers have led to proliferation 
of newspapers which exist to cream-off state advertising, only publishing a nominal number 
of copies that are then distributed to and filed in government offices as all registered 
newspapers are required to be, in contravention of Clause 2 of the DAVP policy, which states 
that government advertisements are not offered as financial assistance for 
newspapers/journals. The existence of these papers was recorded in the Report of the 
Second Press Commission, in an appendix titled “Spurious Newspapers: The U.P. Experience”, 
which describes the “mixed consequences and unforeseen bad results” of help given to 
small newspapers (GI 1982, Vol. II: 75). It cites a report commissioned by the UP government 
which discovered the prevalence of spurious newspapers practicing the art of “Sam-Dam-
Dand-Bhed” (by hook or by crook), whose periodicity is determined by their need “to harass 
or oblige some individuals”, and whose circulation bears no relation to reality “although they 
are certified by their chartered accountants” (ibid). In the current day, I was surprised to 
read that 1040 Hindi papers are published from Lucknow (GI 2011: 10) given that only a 
dozen or so regularly appear on the market.  
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When I spoke to officials at the RNI and the DAVP about ‘file papers’ they wearily 
acknowledged the phenomenon, and said that they were unable to control it because of lack 
of resources, and in the case of Urdu papers (‘minority media’) minded to overlook it.31 
Frank Noronha, Director General of the DAVP, was moved to exasperation when I brought 
up a campaign by the Urdu Newspaper Editors’ Union to increase Urdu newspaper’s share of 
advertising revenue to 15%, as in his view they were hardly ill-served by the existing policy. 
Fifteen percent is commonly thought to be the percentage of Muslims living in India, 
although the main instigator of the campaign, Hasan Shuja, editor of Sahafat’s Delhi edition 
and President of the Union, denied that this was how he had arrived at the figure.32 
According to him, 15% is an accurate reflection of the number of people who read Urdu 
newspapers in India if one takes into account readerships rather than sales or circulation, 
the idea being that a newspaper is read by many people over the course of a day.  
However, the image of the chai shop adda in which men huddle around a single 
paper and discuss the day’s events is a bit romantic by now.  Most Indian newspapers are 
delivered to private homes, and, as mentioned earlier, Urdu literacy in north India being 
increasingly limited to certain demographic groups (the elderly, the madrassa educated) it is 
unlikely that all members of a household which receives an Urdu paper would be able to 
read it. This is reflected in the growth of Hindi pull-out supplements in Urdu newspapers, 
sections of Urdu newspapers that are written in Hindi, and even papers that publish dual 
Nastaliq and Devanagari editions or Urdu papers written in Hindi script entirely. The Hindi 
paper, Dainik Jagran, even publishes a tabloid supplement, INext, written in mixed Roman 
and Devanagari script, whose language is a combination of ‘Hindustani’ and ‘Hinglish’ (a 
Hindi rich in Persian and Arabic vocabulary written in Roman script, and English written in 
Devanagari). ‘Spurious newspapers’ succeed in not just evading ‘the immense writing-
                                                 
31 Interview with Frank Noronha, Director General of the DAVP, New Delhi, 26 August 2011. Interview with 
Manoj Roorkiwal, Registration Supervisor at RNI, New Delhi, 4 August 2011.  
32 Interview with Hasan Shuja, New Delhi, 21 August 2011.   
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machine’, but in using it to their own advantage. Conversely the state turns a blind eye to 
minor infringements in order to keep the peace, to avoid over-stretching itself and preserve 
communal harmony.  
Far from being motivated by a “biopolitical project of knowing the population to 
manage it better” (Gupta 2012: 43), the formulation and implementation of state policy in 
all three cases seems to have been characterised by blindness and inaction. In the first, we 
see constitutional and central state language and education policy subject to State level and 
bureaucratic implementation, which is in turn offset by extra-state forces (media, the 
confluence between spoken forms of Hindi and Urdu). Then, Hindu nationalist ideological 
opposition to Urdu language is checked at an early stage by national ambitions leading to 
the incongruence of an apparently ‘pro-Urdu’ policy. Finally, limited state and bureaucratic 
oversight of the press combined with Urdu’s status as a language of Muslims encourages the 
growth of ‘file papers’.  With the end result that on paper, and also in practice, Urdu 
continues to be a significant language in post-Independence India.  
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Chapter two: Impossible speech 
 
As a result of processes described in the previous chapter’s discussion of Urdu’s post-
Independence status in India, the Indian Urdu press has come to be seen as both marginal 
and the voice for an electorally significant minority, and not just within India. Wikileaks cable 
06 NEW DELHI 5470, “Indian Muslim Resentment Smoldering over Lebanon”, describes how 
“the Urdu press has devoted much more space to these issues than English and Hindi 
language newspapers” and concludes with a discussion of “The Muslim Factor” in Congress 
electoral calculations, in terms familiar from colonial-era police reports on the 
‘Mohammadan press’.33 In both periods, close attention to ‘Muslim’ press stemmed from 
anxiety about what was perceived to be the divided loyalties of Indian Muslims, and these 
debates were not confined to the state. Indian Muslims themselves engaged in charged 
discussions about the boundaries and nomenclature of various putative communities.  
During the Independence struggle, this was famously expressed in an exchange of 
words, conducted in the Urdu press, between Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madani (1879-1957) 
and the poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938), regarding the meaning of the 
terms: qaum, millat and ummat. Although the debate has come to be cast as a conflict 
between a “‘Muslim separatist’” and a “‘Muslim nationalist’”, Sevea convincingly describes it 
as an “intra-Islamic” dispute over the acceptability of nationalism, centring upon how it 
related to these “traditional categories” (2012: 151). Qaum, most often translated as nation, 
can variously mean “A people, nation; a tribe, race, family; sect, caste” (Platts 2006: 796).  
Millat can also mean nation, or, more generally, a society or a company, but is more strongly 
redolent of religious community and faith (ibid: 1064). Ummat (or, more commonly, ummah) 
has by now come to be associated with the international community of Muslims, but can 
also encompass “religious sect, people of the same religion; followers; race, nation; caste; 
creed, religion” (ibid: 81). The unfixity of these terms has led them to be used 
                                                 
33 https://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06NEWDELHI5470.html (accessed 01/09/2015). 
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interchangeably, allowing dispute over their meaning to become a means to delimit 
sociopolitical community. 
During a public meeting held in Delhi in December 1937, Madani is said to have 
asserted that in the current age “‘nations (qaumeen) are based on homelands (autaan, pl. of 
watn), not religion (mazhab)’” (Metcalf 2005: 37). Urdu newspapers reported Madani as 
claiming that the “millat” was based on territory, provoking Iqbal to write a Persian verse 
mocking Madani’s knowledge of Arabic. When Madani responded with a clarification of the 
terms he had used, Iqbal dismissed this as philological quibbling (ibid: 40). The main point 
was that territorial nationalism and Islam were incompatible. Thoughts of nationalism would 
only lead Muslims astray, onto the paths of “irreligiousness and scepticism” (Iqbal 1977: 
262). He had been opposed to nationalism since before the concept had become known “in 
India and the Muslim world”, he wrote, from early on identifying it as the most effective 
weapon of European imperialism, a means to shatter “the religious unity of Islam to pieces” 
(ibid: 252). This attitude he shared with contemporary Muslim thinkers such as Sayyid Abul 
A'la Maududi (1903-1979), who regarded nationalism as a modern form of kingship, and 
both as contrary to the Islamic principle of “equality of all men regardless of their birth” 
(Hartung 2013a: 117). But Iqbal’s scepticism about the nation-form involved more than 
‘Islamism’. He was also working within what Barbara Metcalf describes as a “minor strand” 
of international intellectual denunciation of “the ‘black’ side of modernity: competitive 
nationalism and its resultant militarism, imperialism and consumerism” (2005: 40-41). This 
strand, and the influence of Bergson in particular, is expressed in his assertion, in a lecture 
printed in the Report of the 1911 Census, that Islam is in its essence “non-temporal, non-
spatial” (1977: 104). As discussed in the introduction, through Walter Benjamin’s concept of 
‘empty homogeneous time’, Anderson would later go on to claim this as the ideal space time 
of the nation. 
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Conversely, Madani’s counter-arguments in favour of ‘composite nationalism’ were 
based in particular circumstances of discrimination and oppression rather than faith in the 
“open-to-the-world plurals” of capitalist modernity (Anderson 1998a: 117). Indians who 
travelled abroad were regarded as members of the same “qaum”, regardless of religion, and 
despised accordingly – hence it was a real category (Madani 2005: 55). If nationalism was 
such an effective weapon, why should Muslims themselves not use it to undermine the 
power of the British? Madani proposed an “Action plan for India”: a “composite nationalism 
on the basis of national unity” as a means to throw off the yoke of colonial rule (ibid: 106). 
Far from being irreligious this would be on the lines of the constitution of Medina, which the 
Prophet Mohammad had formed between Muslims and non-Muslims in that city. In this 
view, the nation form itself was a historically contingent ‘dispositif’ rather than an 
instrument of oppression, and one which was compatible with Islamic and pre-modern types 
of political organisation.  
Picking up on the concept of the dispositif of state and extending it to consider the 
nation state, this chapter deals with how the figure of the ‘qaum’ played out in the hands of 
two politically ambitious journalists: Abul Kalam Azad (1888-1958), during his editorship of 
the first iteration of al-Hilal (1912-14), and Aziz Burney (1952-), founder of the most widely 
distributed Indian Urdu newspaper, Roznama Sahara Urdu, who in 2013 started to publish 
his own newspaper, Azizul Hind. In Azad and Burney’s writings ‘qaum’ implicitly means 
Muslims in India. However, writing in a multilingual context, with high levels of illiteracy but 
strong “literacy awareness” (Bayly 2007: 39), they encompass a much wider audience than 
Urdu-knowing Muslims, with repercussions in turn for how this ‘qaum’ is configured. I have 
selected these case studies because Burney claims a genealogical relationship with both 
reformist and revolutionary traditions of Indian Muslim leadership, and with Azad in 
particular. They therefore offer a useful comparison of speech conditions in colonial and 
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post-independence India, as evidenced during moments when Azad and Burney’s writings 
were censored or censured.  
Through this comparison I will also engage with the continued salience of religious 
language and symbols in Indian politics as a paradoxical legacy of colonial rule. In extension 
of the previous chapter’s discussion of multi-symbol congruence, I argue against theories of 
symbolic instrumentalisation and ‘misrecognition’ of religious movements and symbols, and 
suggest that they could be better understood within the terms of a ‘performative politics’ 
and an aesthetics of politics. Sensitivity to the media, context and audience within which 
these performances are enacted, to what Butler describes as the “open temporality” of the 
performative, better reflects their contingent and therefore changeable nature.  
Thinking along these lines encourages closer attention to the media through which 
information and ideas are transmitted; in particular, their uneven translation within and 
across languages, and to the role of technology.  This chapter will elaborate upon the 
thesis’s overall heuristic of techno-politics and allied concern with the insurrectionary 
possibilities of speech/writing, by dealing with the significance of the word, written and 
spoken, and its interface with the printed image. In the first section, with reference to al-
Hilal and the Khilafat agitation in India, I will consider how a local politics existed alongside a 
revolutionary ‘cosmopolitan’ politics and was influenced by a Hindu nationalist ‘cosmo-
politics’, based in a changing understanding of the significance of the spoken and the written 
word, of the image, and accordingly of 'the people’. In the next, I will describe the more 
limited possibilities available to Burney, working with the legacy of colonial-era reformist 
and revolutionary Indian Muslim politics, but also in a post-Independence context of state 
nationalism and vote banks, and facing more severe techno-material constraints.  In this way, 
I pick up on strands contained in the previous chapter’s discussion of the circuitous workings 
of the state and markets in a multilingual context. This chapter’s discussion of censorship 
and representation also looks forward to subsequent chapters on the internal emergency of 
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1975-77 and electoral regulation. Its focus on censorship and spokesmanship relates to the 
thesis's overall concern with the role of the sending and receiving of messages in the 
formation of constituencies. 
 
Abul Kalam Azad: ‘Imam ul-Hind’ 
Bearing the title “The Indian People and the War”, a letter written by S.P. Sanyal to the 
editor of the Indian English language newspaper, The Pioneer, and published on 11 October 
1914, describes how the Great War “has taken hold of the Indian mind”. Even in villages 
people talk about it; and scores of newspapers, in English and vernacular languages, are now 
being bought and sold in small towns. He writes that he was surprised to hear from a 
newspaper vendor that illiterate men, “even sweepers”, have been known to buy penny 
newspapers (“paisa akhbar”) and “have the war news read”.  These, he claims, are sure signs 
that “the unchangeable East is moving and moving rapidly”, and in this connection notes the 
effects of the recent introduction of separate electorates for Muslims.  The principle of 
“separate representation” is said to have been carried so far that “non-English knowing 
Moslem readers read only Moslem papers in vernacular [languages] although non-English 
knowing Hindu readers read vernacular papers issued by the Moslem as well as the Hindu 
press”.  He draws attention to a “certain paper” published in northern India and 
commanding a large circle of readers, which is “well known to Government” and whose 
writings “need careful watching rather than censoring”, lest the “masses” start to see things 
from the German point of view. 
This paper is not named, but on the 2 November 1914 The Pioneer published an 
editorial titled “Pro-Germanism at Calcutta”, which describes the stance of al-Hilal, a widely 
circulated, illustrated Urdu journal edited by AbuI Kalam Azad. It claims that the paper has 
so far managed to avoid censorship because “the style of the most mischievous articles is 
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very allusive and full of veiled sneers and sarcasms and innuendoes, most of which either 
disappear or lose their effect when translated into English, and it is not likely that many 
European officials read the paper in the original”. For the benefit of such people The Pioneer 
describes sections of a recent double edition in which “the editor has gone much further 
than before in exalting the Germans and belittling and sneering at the British”. This attitude 
is most egregiously exemplified by a picture of Belgian soldiers resting under some trees, 
bearing the caption “these were the last hours of rest enjoyed by this luckless nation” (the 
context being the fall of Antwerp, during which Belgian troops had been pushed back to 
Ghent by German forces), and a quotation from the Quran in Arabic, Hud Verse No.101: “We 
wronged them not, but they wronged themselves”. A government which at such a time 
allows a British subject to publish such “malicious insinuations” must “lay claim to the 
possession of a most un-Germanic spirit of toleration”, the writer concludes.  
According to Barrier’s history of censored literature in British India (1974), a spirit of 
toleration had not informed the colonial state’s attitude towards the Indian press since the 
viceroyalty of Curzon (1889-1905). Whilst for much of the nineteenth century the 
Government of India is said to have preferred a “low-key policy of informal influence”, 
increasing demands made by groups organised on regional and communal lines led it to 
reconsider existing arrangements (ibid: 8). Having grown disillusioned with official channels 
these groups had become militant and adopted new means for achieving their goals. 
Increasingly “mass politics involved using printed matter to affect a widened audience”, and 
this was facilitated by the fact that printing technology had become cheaper and more 
accessible (ibid: 9). By 1905 publishing networks in both English and vernacular languages 
spanned every region; more than 200 newspapers commented on political issues, and were 
said by British observers to adopt a “disloyal” line, and for “less than 25 Rupees, a 
propagandist could publish a 16-page tract for distribution to the literate or to be read aloud 
to villagers” (ibid: 9-10). Hence the easily evaded requirement, introduced in 1867, that 
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books and newspapers bear the names of authors, printers, and publishers was made more 
stringent with the introduction of The 1910 Press Act.  
The Act rendered all registered publications liable to payment of a security deposit 
of up to Rs 5,000, unless exempted by a local magistrate.34 The deposit would be forfeited if 
a local government found that a document contained “any words, signs or visible 
representations, which are likely or may have a tendency, directly or indirectly, whether by 
inference, suggestion, illusion, metaphor, implication or otherwise” to incite sedition.  
Specifically, to incite murder; seduce an officer, soldier or sailor from his duty; force any 
person to hand over their property or commit an illegal act; bring the British government 
into hatred or contempt; threaten or injure a public servant.    
Images produced by the cow protection movement informed the 1910 Act’s 
inclusion under the term “document” of “any painting, drawing or photograph or other 
visible representation”, a move which in turn led Indian artist’s to move away from the more 
obviously allegorical and propositional style of earlier visual propaganda to a more “figural” 
style, from a “sphere of language-like knowability” to a zone of felt intensities (Pinney 2009: 
50). This could be expressed through depictions of apocalyptic devastation referring to 
events in Hindu mythology (ibid: 52-53), or scenes of abundance, “the richly watered, richly 
fruited, utopic space of a free India” (ibid: 54). In this way, increased surveillance of print 
culture can be seen to have encouraged “the expression of political aspirations through 
religious idioms” (ibid: 58). He argues that the intersection of religion and politics in 
contemporary India is partly a result of colonial and postcolonial censorship. 
Although Pinney’s examples mostly concern popular Hinduism and visual media, his 
argument is applicable to both of the case studies – al-Hilal’s evasion of colonial censorship 
through the deployment of religious symbols and references, and moments when Azad and 
Burney have made political capital out of their position as Indian Muslim ‘spokesmen’. But in 
                                                 
34 The 1910 Press Act: http://lawmin.nic.in/legislative/textofcentralacts/1910.pdf (accessed 24/09/2015) 
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this chapter I will extend this capacity for figuration and intensity to language, and pay 
attention to its interaction with the image. Azad and Burney’s sensitivity to these aspects of 
language partly emerges from their experience of Islamic practices of sermonising and 
Quranic recitation.  William Graham’s Beyond the Written Word reminds us that the Quran 
has been the subject of both “graphic/visual piety and attention” and “intense oral/aural 
piety and attention” (1987: 80). The meaning of recited scripture is said to inhere in 
something other than the literal meaning of a text, to encompass its “symbolic and affective 
force” (ibid: 114) and also the format in which it is expressed.  
As Pinney observes, the 1910 Act was hard to implement, precisely because 
demarcating where “seditious” began and the merely “religious” or “mythic” ended involved 
difficult encounters with “vernacular cultural production” (2009: 40-41); in the case of al-
Hilal, the allusive language, full of “veiled sneers and sarcasms and innuendoes”, referred to 
in the Pioneer editorial. There were also techno-material limits to its implementation, with 
artists and publishers evading regulations by disseminating their messages through more 
mobile and less easily tracked media such as lithography and word of mouth (ibid: 54). As a 
result, the Act mainly affected letterpress production, which had “a relatively immobile 
infrastructure of printing technology” (ibid). Hence both the delay in taking action against al-
Hilal, which combined political polemic and religious fervour in its coverage of the Balkan 
and first world wars, and the effectiveness of levying an additional deposit in forcing it to 
shut down.  
From its first edition onwards al-Hilal had adopted an openly partisan stance 
towards Turkey, and its editor’s partisanship was not confined to the pages of his newspaper. 
In February 1913 Azad raised Rs 30,000 in support of Turkey during a meeting held in 
Calcutta (Datta 1990: 73), and in the al-Hilal of 27 May 1914 he announced that out of the 
annual subscription of eight rupees and fifty paise of his newspaper, seven rupees and fifty 
paise would go towards a Turkish fund. In 1913, alarmed by the pro-German tone of its 
90 
 
editorials, the Government of India had demanded a security deposit of Rs 2,000 and in 
response to the double edition described in The Pioneer, forfeited this and claimed a further 
sum of Rs 10,000, causing al-Hilal to cease production. The last edition of its first iteration 
was published on 18 November 1914. Azad was to publish another magazine a year later 
under the name of al-Balagh, which had an even more pronounced religious emphasis. But 
this ceased publication within a year after Azad was expelled from Bengal and moved to the 
State of Bihar. Later, in 1927, al-Hilal resumed publication in Delhi, but it was to cease 
publication within six months, and neither of these later publications matched the success of 
the early al-Hilal.  
The sudden and expedient religiosity of Azad’s stance in the first outing of al-Hilal 
has encouraged scepticism about its sincerity. Douglas notes an abrupt shift in the tone of 
Azad’s writings, from the crisis of faith described in his autobiographical writing to the 
“intensely religious” al-Hilal, although he dismisses accusations that this was a result of 
opportunism on Azad’s part (1988: 102). Aijaz Ahmad has also remarked upon the 
discontinuities between Azad’s essay on the transgressive life of a Sufi saint in Hayat-i 
Sarmad in 1910 and al-Hilal in 1912, and dates the beginning of what he describes as Azad’s 
pious phase from the latter (2001: 125). Whereas Datta sees no contradiction between the 
two “phases” (1990: 50), and has a pragmatic view of his use of religion. When it came to 
the instrumentalisation of religions, Azad, like Gandhi, had no choice: 
The question was how to rally people for a cause and the use of religion was considered by 
far the easiest and most effective weapon for uniting people and making them fight against 
foreign rule. The religious idiom was a legacy of the nineteenth century Indian Renaissance, a 
consequence of the historical process which could not be reversed. An egg once scrambled 
cannot be unscrambled! 
(ibid: 84)   
 
In referring to the nineteenth century “Indian Renaissance”, Datta is speaking of socio-
religious reform movements, of all denominations, which developed as a result of the 
activities of missionaries and the colonial state. The Khilafat agitation was also a key 
moment in the rapprochement between these different religious groups in the Indian 
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nationalist movement. Both Hindus and Muslims came together in the space left to them by 
colonial restrictions on political activity, in order to oppose British rule through support for 
the Ottoman Caliph.  Various Indian rulers, from the Mughals to the British, had used the 
Caliph’s special significance as a “symbol of Muslim unity and the supremacy of the shari’a” 
(Minault 1982: 4-5) to galvanise support for their regimes. In times of strife, in particular, he 
was important as a source of legitimacy and solidarity between “the ruler, the ulama, and 
the nobility” (ibid: 5). This attitude had been encouraged by the Ottoman sultan, Abdul 
Hamid II (1876-1909) and his “chief propagandist” Jamal-uddin al-Afghani (1838-97) (ibid: 6), 
and taken on a revolutionary cast in recent times. 
The novelty and potential danger of these political realignments were noted by the 
writer of the Daily Report of the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, for 11 September 1914, 
which describes how apparent Muslim support for the Germans can only be understood by 
reference to events preceding the war; in particular, communal representation in the new 
Councils and drives to remedy the perceived educational “backwardness” of Muslims.35 This 
“awakening” is said to have produced a new generation of political leaders and primed them 
for a more radical politics. Provoked by “the troubles which have befallen the Muslim world”, 
they are said to be imitating “Hindu methods” in pressing “what they consider to be claims 
of the community by active agitation”. They are said to have acquired “a ready means of 
inflaming the masses” through the “new Muhammadan press”, and of these papers the tone 
of al-Hilal is said to be “particularly bad”. There is said to now be “a definitely acknowledged 
young party which seeks to thrust the older more cautious men into the background”.  
In the report’s reference to the older, more moderate generation can be discerned 
an allusion to the reformist tradition of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817 – 1898), who had been 
hostile to the pro-Khilafat sentiment in the late nineteenth century, responding with a series 
of articles written at the conclusion of the Greco-Turkish War in 1897. These were collected 
                                                 
35 National Archives of India, Home, Political A, November 1914, Nos. 33-38. 
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together and published by Siraj-ud-din Ahmed, an Indian Muslim Barrister, in 1916 and 1920, 
with the intention of refuting the messages of those who were seeking to “misguide the 
ignorant Mussalman masses of the country” (Ahmed 1920: ii). (His preface makes particular 
mention of a booklet by “Maulvi Abulkalam Azad of Calcutta” *ibid+.) Sayyid Ahmad Khan 
cautions Indian Muslims against overstepping the bounds of moderation in their joy at the 
defeat of Greece. They are to remember that as subjects of the British government they 
cannot act contrary to its wishes. He emphasises that “Khilafat” simply means successor, and 
does not carry the weight of the term “Pope” for Roman Catholics. Only a person who 
resembles the Prophet, spiritually and morally, and who is at the same time ruler of a 
country, can call himself an Imam or Khalifa, and even then his jurisdiction is limited to his 
own countrymen. Any other Muslim ruler is a mere “Sultan”. Therefore “Sultan Abdul Hamid 
Khan cannot be Khalifa for the Indian Mussalmans”, who are subjects of the British 
Government (ibid: 17).    
During this period, Ahmad Khan dealt with the problem of defining the boundaries 
of the people by upholding the colonial distinction between religion and politics, thereby 
delimiting the authority of the Ottoman caliphate and emphasising the subject position of 
Indian Muslims.  In this way he staked his claim to be an intercessor for the Indian Muslim 
community he was in the process of ventriloquizing for the colonial state. Building upon this 
legacy, Azad would go on to overstep these boundaries in his pursuit of a broader 
constituency as an Indian Muslim leader and a nationalist statesmen, an ‘Imam ul-Hind’. 
More generally, by mobilizing a “united, pan-Islamic Muslim constituency” (Minault 1982:  2), 
the Khilafat movement sought to reconstitute the nationalist movement by involving Indian 
Muslims in it on more equal terms. In the early twentieth century the increasingly embattled 
caliphate became not just a symbol of unity but of “Islam in danger”, with special 
significance for Muslims in India who identified with the declining Mughal ruling elite, and 
the leadership of the Khilafat movement came from this group. Support for the Khilafat 
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therefore marks a significant shift away from the reformism of an earlier school and towards 
a more militant type of political engagement, with ramifications for how the ‘qaum’ would 
be imagined.  
But the Khilafat leadership was not a homogenous group, and Azad, in particular, is 
something of an outlier within it, not being affiliated to any of the schools with which most 
of its leaders were associated; namely: the Aligarh Movement, the Dar al-Ulum Deoband and 
Farangi Mahal madrassas, and therefore not fitting within the pattern of those who entered 
politics because of “institutional rivalries and the quest for followers in that framework” 
(Minault 1982: 45). This ambivalent relationship with the ulama, and his own leadership 
ambitions can be discerned in both the style and content of his editorials in al-Hilal, written 
in prose laden with Persian and Arabic words, and sometimes even, in his fatiha (opening) 
editorials, entirely in Arabic. Douglas argues that this “stylistic affectation” was primarily 
addressed to the ulama, and indicates that he still identified with them. Although he was 
careful to distinguish between “the true and the false among them”, he continued to portray 
the ulama, of past times at least, as “profound scholars of philosophy and history” to 
western-educated readers (1988: 103). Minault has suggested that his accommodation to 
them arose out of a pragmatic assessment that he “had to be accepted among them in order 
to lead them along new intellectual and political paths” (1982: 41-42).  
He could be therefore be seen as working within the tradition of what Francis 
Robinson has described as “Muslim Protestantism”, for whom “the route to survival” in a 
colonial context was “scriptural knowledge, knowledge of the Quran, and the traditions, and 
how to be a Muslim” (1996: 73). This knowledge could be disseminated through a school 
system, such as Deoband, but it could also be individually accessed through print, with the 
latter eventually eroding the authority of the former by breaking “the stranglehold” of the 
ulama on the oral transmission of Islamic knowledge (ibid: 76). Because of his extra-mural 
position as a journalist/statesman, rather than a full-fledged member of the ulama, Azad 
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was open to diverse influences: reformist, revolutionary, English, non-Western and non-
Indian, and therefore capable of invoking both pan-Islamic and cross-denominational 
notions of ‘the people’. For this reason he is a key figure in the dawn of the non-cooperation 
movement, when the Independence struggle would become a mass and national movement. 
Through his deployment of print and prophetic speech, he participated in a shift from a 
reformist to a revolutionary Indian Muslim politics, and sought to position himself at the 
apex of this movement.  
Print, as has often been noted, came relatively ‘late’ to the ‘Muslim world’ and India 
(Carter 1925; Graham 1987; Robinson 1993 and 1996), and has even, contentiously, been 
described as a less significant innovation than the manuscript in South Asia (Pollock 2007). 
Its belated introduction in North Indian local languages has been attributed to the East India 
Company’s policy of non-interference in religious matters, which led it to forbid missionary 
activities within its territories until 1813 (Stark 2007: 37). Before the 1800s most Urdu books 
published in India were printed in Nastaliq (ibid: 38), but even after moveable type printing 
in the more adaptable Naskh character was introduced by the missionary press, lithographic 
printing and Nastaliq continued to predominate. Graham Shaw observes that whilst for the 
first two and a half centuries of its use, “typography had no impact at all upon the 
overwhelming majority of the population”, remaining almost exclusively the preserve of 
Europeans, within a decade of its introduction to India “widespread ownership of presses by 
Indians themselves began” (1998: 89). Cheap, portable and relatively easy to use, 
lithography played a significant role in “democratizing print in South Asia” (ibid).  
Lithography became “the printing medium par excellence of the Muslim communities in 
South Asia for its ability to make possible the ‘mass-produced manuscript’, which met the 
criteria of cultural authority which the type-set text could not” (ibid: 89). That is, a person-
to-person transmission, which would preserve the authentic meaning of a text in the 
absence of the original author. 
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But there were also technical reasons for this preference. Nastaliq, the cursive script 
in which Urdu is most commonly written, is hard to accurately typeset, meaning that most 
Urdu newspapers continued to be lithographed until Urdu InPage software was developed in 
1994. The first Urdu computer font was invented by Ahmed Mirza Jamil in 1981, who had 
been inspired by a Chinese character keyboard he had seen at an exhibition in Singapore 
(Kashfi 2008: 12). But a complicated user interface and incompatibility with standard word 
processing packages meant that it was not widely used, in India at least.  
A memorial volume on Ahmed Mirza Jamil claims that his invention brought about a 
revolution in Urdu printing. Whereas previously up to 100 calligraphers would labour 
through the night to produce a single edition of newspaper, now it could be produced 
digitally (ibid). The Pakistani newspaper Jang is said to have adopted this technology to print 
its Lahore edition, but, from what I have seen of newspaper archives in India, it does not 
seem to have been much used there before the invention of InPage. Even the Congress party 
paper Qaumi Awaz, one of the most widely distributed and best-resourced Urdu papers of 
its time, continued to be lithographed into the 1990s.  Azad was therefore making a 
statement in choosing to publish his newspaper on a type press in Naskh font in 1912, and 
this was partly because of his exposure to typeset editions of Sir Sayyid’s work, and also a 
response to what he had seen of the Arab press.  
Malihabadi’s as-told-to account of Azad’s life describes how Azad acquired a taste 
for type from reading printed editions of Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s collected religious writings as 
a boy. He is said to have made efforts to acquire these particular editions rather than the 
lithographed copies that were made after they were published (2008: 156).  With financial 
assistance from his father’s disciples he was able to set up a high quality type press, using 
technology imported from Turkey, capable of reproducing half-tone pictures on the “best 
quality paper”, which is said to have exceeded the standards of certain Indian English papers 
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in terms of production values, and the Urdu press, in its literary style (Douglas 1988: 99). In 
India Wins Freedom Azad writes:  
There were a number of dailies, weeklies and monthlies published in Urdu from the Punjab 
and the UP but their standard was not very high. Their get up and printing were as poor as 
their contents. They were produced by the lithographic process and could not therefore 
embody any of the features of modern journalism. Nor were they able to print half-tone 
pictures. I decided that my journal should be attractive in get up and powerful in its appeal. It 
must be set up in type and reproduced by the lithographic process. 
(1989: 8)  
 
This willingness to sacrifice mobility and ease of production for “attractive” and “powerful” 
presentation suggests that Azad may have been less interested in being read than in creating 
an impressive impact. 
The early editions of al-Hilal repeatedly draw attention to the magazine’s use of type 
and half-tone photography.  The first edition (13 July 1912) discusses at length the 
difficulties that have beset its production, and apologises for its poor quality. Due to 
production difficulties, the entire magazine could not be printed in the specially imported 
Turkish type, as had been promised in announcements for al-Hilal. But the editor promises 
that these faults will be fixed in the coming weeks. The second edition (20 July 1912) details 
the different formats of newspapers (daily, weekly, fortnightly and monthly) and provides a 
brief history of printing in eastern nations, in which the editor regrets that because of a 
lingering attachment to stone lithography, there is no Nastaliq equivalent to the beautiful 
Naskh type produced in Turkey and Egypt, in which Arabic and Persian newspapers are 
printed.  These discussions contextualize his choice to publish a weekly magazine rather than 
a daily newspaper, and to print it in Naskh type imported from Turkey. He draws attention 
to the superior type in which al-Hilal is produced, and claims it is much better than that 
produced from Allahabad and Calcutta.  
In an addendum to this edition, the magazine’s superior production values are said 
to justify its relatively expensive price, which he claims would be unexceptional for a similar 
quality English paper. If al-Hilal were in English, an annual subscription would cost one 
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guinea and be cheap at the price. Urdu readers have got into the habit of paying no more 
than three or four rupees for an annual subscription to a magazine, but most of these papers 
are printed using litho press and inexpensive paper, and are often un-illustrated. Although 
al-Hilal’s annual subscription is eight rupees, this is not excessive, given the expense and 
effort put into its production. With a cover price of fifteen rupees there would be some hope 
of recovering expenses, but because the real purpose of the magazine is to raise a 
countrywide movement, and without producing numerous editions this would be impossible, 
the additional expense has been overlooked.  
Although Azad’s name does not appear on the first page of these editions as it does 
in later ones, through the direct address of these editorials he makes his presence felt and 
conjures an audience, whom he addresses as “nazrin” (“viewer”) and “pablik” (“public”) 
rather than reader. Use of the former term indicates that he is keyed to the visual appeal of 
his journal as much as its written content. Discussion of letters he has received and editorials 
written in response to them further underline his presence; notably, in the editorial that 
appears in al-Hilal of 8 September 1912, written in response to a senior friend’s enquiries 
about the political purpose of the newspaper: “Al-hilal ki politikal ta’lim ki nisbat ek khat aur 
us ka jawab” (“With regard to al-Hilal’s political education: a letter and its reply”). The text of 
the letter is reproduced, accompanied by a lengthy reply by Azad, in which he both asserts 
and downplays his knowledge of Arabic, religious learning and possession of a good library, 
and emphasizes that the authority of his paper’s political policy is solely based in the 
teachings of the Quran. According to its teachings, there is no need to pay obeisance to the 
colonial state or submit to the Hindus.  
Through these interventions Azad attempts to retain something of the person-to-
person mode of transmission, and to thereby partake in some of the religious legitimacy 
associated with this mode of address. In his intellectual biography of Azad, Douglas 
describes how during the Khilafat struggle, from 1910 until his imprisonment in 1921, he had 
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thought of himself as “some kind of mujaddid or imam, whom God would vindicate in the 
way He vindicated the prophets” (1988: 97). The title of ‘Imam ul-Hind’ was semi-officially 
bestowed by the mysterious figure of the Sheikh ul-Islam, but its legitimacy (and, come to 
that, the legitimacy of Sheikh ul-Islam’s own title) was disputable, with it remaining unclear 
what binding force it would have at any level.  
Azad was more securely located in the emergent type of “the professional politician 
in India, part journalist, part orator, part holy man” (Minault 1982: 3), and in his childhood 
he had found a model in Sir Sayyid, whose works he had admired for both their modern 
format and unorthodox content. In India Wins Freedom he describes how Sayyid Ahmad 
Khan’s controversial commentary on the Quran, which had been condemned by much of the 
ulama, led him to question his traditional education, and it may well have influenced his own 
later Quranic commentaries in al-Hilal and the Tarjuman al-Quran.  But he would in turn 
become dissatisfied with Sir Sayyid’s political conservatism, and incorporate a wider range of 
influences, available to him through his background and residence in Calcutta during a time 
of political ferment.  
Born in Mecca to the Sufi pir, Shaikh Muhammad Khairuddin Dehlavi, and an Arab 
mother, he was fluent in Arabic and maintained a connection with the language and its 
literature even after his family returned to India in the mid-1890s. As a child in Calcutta he 
had come across works by Shaikh Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905) and the Egyptian journal 
al-Manar published by ‘Abdhuh’s disciple Rashid Rida (1865-1935), and in this way come to 
know about new religious and educational ideas in the Arabic-speaking world (Minault 1982: 
39). When Rida visited Nadwatul Ulama, Lucknow in 1912 Azad translated his speech into 
Urdu and afterwards published a series of articles in the first three issues of al-Hilal (al-Hilal 
13, 21 and 28 July 1912). In him, he found something of a model of a newspaperman/holy 
man, an alternative to the reformist legacy of Sir Sayyid.   
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The full-page portrait of Rashid Rida on the frontispiece of the first edition of al-Hilal, 
with further portraits of Jamal uddin al-Afghani and Muhammad ‘Abduh inside, establishes a 
lineage with thinkers who had earlier on and in different contexts grappled with the 
questions of religio-political reform. His early exposure to the work of Arab reformists had 
been reinforced by subsequent travels to the Middle East and Europe in the early 1900s, 
although the extent and even the precise dates of these have been disputed. Some writers 
have made much of Azad’s brief mention of them in his autobiography (1989: 6-7). Rajat Ray, 
for example, claims that their importance “cannot be emphasized too heavily”, and that 
after identifying himself “emotionally and intellectually with the Islamic world of the Turk, 
the Arabs and the Iranians”, Azad had brought back a message of national liberation for “his 
own people back in India” (1981: 89). Aijaz Ahmad has questioned the dates given in Azad’s 
account of them in his autobiographical writings (2001: 147-148), and Minault argues that 
most of his knowledge of these regions was derived from his readings of ‘Abduh, Rida and 
possibly Afghani (1982: 40). But in an essay on the difficulties inherent in writing Azad’s 
biography, she concludes that Azad did not have to visit the Arab world in order to become 
aware of the intellectual developments there (2001: 22). For his purposes an “imaginative 
journey was perhaps more useful”, as it would have allowed him to “synthesise” ideas from 
there with his own experience, to make analogies that would resonate with other Indian 
Muslims (ibid).   Notably this involved imaginative synthesis rather than simple derivation; 
assimilation of diverse influences would inform a shift away from the avowedly apolitical 
reformist tradition, towards a revolutionary politics that would include the ‘masses’ and 
non-Muslims.  
These images of Rida, ‘Abduh and Afghani are also significant because of their use of 
the leveling gaze of the camera. In the early editions of al-Hilal there is almost as much 
discussion of the journal’s use of half-tone photographic reproduction as there is of its use of 
Naskh type. The halftone, a printed image in which the tones of a photograph are converted 
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into a grid of high-contrast dots, helped facilitate mass production of photographic images 
around the turn of the twentieth century. These images were often disseminated through 
the medium of magazines, which, in terms of expense, longevity and reach, bridged the gap 
between the newspaper and the book. Whereas newspapers were “local events” and books 
were published in modest print runs, magazines could adjust the size of their runs “to a 
growing national audience” (Benson 2008: 224). Through the medium of weekly magazines 
in particular, the industrialized world was “quickly wrapped in cheap photographs printed as 
ink halftones” (ibid).  
The 4 August 1912 edition pre-empts assumptions that the mixed quality of the 
pictures in al-Hilal is a result of incompetence and inexperience. The editor assures the 
reader that whilst the production of al-Hilal has many shortcomings, which will hopefully be 
overcome in due course, the inconsistent quality of its pictures is not one of them. The best 
manufacturers of pictures in Calcutta have been entrusted with this job – and, needless to 
say, because Calcutta has the best in the country, this means the best in all of India. No 
trouble or expense has been spared. A special half tone printing machine has been 
purchased, one capable of the delicate task of printing photographs. More than this, what 
can be done? Nevertheless, it is undoubtedly the case that certain pictures have not come 
out clearly, and the reason for this is that the original itself was not good. For example, in 
the first edition the pictures of ‘Abduh, Afghani and Rida were of very good quality, because 
the originals were well prepared. But those of the battle of Tripoli were poor and therefore 
reproduced badly. There is no question of one being good and the other bad, although the 
viewer would not be aware of this, would have no idea of the time and trouble it takes to 
make these pictures print-worthy through retouching. As with the discussion of Naskh type, 
during such moments Azad steps beyond the proscenium arch in order to inform the 
public/viewer about the production process, and therefore encourage him to value the 
paper more highly. (This would also fit with the need to justify al-Hilal’s relatively high cost.) 
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Perhaps even to produce an ideal reader for the journal, one who would be attentive to 
details of tone and type and aware of the difficulties involved in the magazine’s production.  
Al-Hilal’s deliberate use of photography also partakes in the reimagining of 
collectivities and undoing of the self-presentations of the colonial state. The photographic 
portraits of Rida, ‘Abduh and Afghani, and depictions of the Balkan conflict and World War 
One, extend Robinson’s arguments about the “symbiotic relationship between the growth of 
pan-Islamic consciousness and the growth of the press” (1996: 73-74) into the area of visual 
media. The techno-material constraints of portrait photography, which best lends itself to 
“photographing individuals (or, at a pinch, couples)” shifted the focus away from the 
standard “collective expressions of social solidarities” of colonial taxonomy – caste, religious 
and occupational groups (Pinney 2008: 109-10). These portraits, instead, “reflected the 
aesthetic force that single bodies – as opposed to multiple bodies – were able to deposit in 
the image” (ibid: 110). Something of this force can arguably be seen in the portraits of 
‘Abduh, Rida and Afghani, who have been selected as exemplary Muslim leaders and 
reformists, their pictures, accompanied by detailed accounts of their well-travelled and 
interconnected lives and ideas, do more than illustrate a particular ‘type’; or at least, not a 
particular type of Indian Muslim.   
Hourani describes a photograph of ‘Abduh taken on the terrace of the House of 
Commons when he visited Britain in 1884, which shows “a handsome man, well built, dark 
of complexion, with a tranquil and almost melancholy charm that does not quite conceal the 
look of conviction in his eyes” (1983: 135), and Buessow (2014) has illuminatingly described 
the circumstances in which it was taken. ‘Abduh had been invited to London by the anti-
imperialist activist, Wilfred Scawen Blunt, to give a report on the political situation in Egypt. 
Blunt is said to have been concerned about ‘Abduh’s “Europeanized appearance” acquired 
during exile in Beirut and Paris, where he had lived “a cosmopolitan life as a high school 
teacher, journalist and intellectual”, growing his hair long and wearing a fez (ibid: 273). Blunt 
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encouraged him to present himself to the House of Commons in more appropriate attire, a 
blue gown and white turban, in order to create “a more persuasive appearance as a speaker 
for Egypt and the Muslim word” (ibid: 274). This strategy is said to have been successful, 
with ‘Abduh’s appearance causing “‘quite a sensation’ in the lobby of the parliament” (ibid). 
From this incident Buessow proceeds to outline his argument about the modern concept of 
“religions” only gaining currency in the Middle East during “the first modern wave of 
globalization”, along a “‘Protestant template’” transmitted to the Middle East through 
printed publications and interactions with European thinkers. This “globalization perspective” 
is said to be more adequate to understanding cultural transfers than the paradigm of 
“‘Westernization’” (ibid).  
But images of the turbaned ‘Abdu, Ridah and Afghani in the pages of al-Hilal also 
remind us of the ‘South-South’ aspect of these global transfers, and of the importance of 
visual media, exemplified by the different significance of this headgear in an Indian context. 
Whereas in other colonised countries the turban and the hat might have been effective in 
“demarcating a boundary between ruler and ruled”, they did not as easily serve this function 
in India, where Hindus also wore turbans (Pernau 2010: 262). The turban is said to have lost 
its status as courtly headgear during the reign of Akbar (1542-1605), and to have returned to 
prominence from the mid-eighteenth century, with the advent of a “new age of religiosity” 
based on “literal reading of the canonical texts” (ibid: 260). During the latter period, wearing 
a turban would demonstrate membership of the pious “new middle class” rather than hark 
back to a Central Asian homeland (ibid: 262).  
The fez may have originally been intended to obscure ethnic and religious 
differences within the Ottoman bureaucracy, becoming obligatory for its officers in 1829, 
but it was to acquire religious symbolism when the sultan began to assert his position as 
‘universal Caliph’ and claim allegiance from Muslims all around the world. Within India, the 
fez met the need for a type of headgear which distinguished Muslims from both Hindus and 
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the British, whilst being “close enough to the Western hat not to offend the colonizers’ taste 
and susceptibilities” (ibid: 264). It is thus said to have allowed them to participate in both 
“global modernity, epitomised by their British rulers”, and “an Islamic world-system”, albeit 
one centred in Istanbul (ibid). It was adopted as such by Sayyid Ahmad Khan and the Aligarh 
movement, and was later, for entirely different reasons, to become more widely diffused 
across India by the Khilafat movement, becoming the iconic headwear of Abul Kalam Azad 
himself.   
Post-Independence the image of a fez wearing Muslim was to become a cliché of 
national integration posters, despite the fact that it is rarely encountered in India. The 
historian Shahid Amin describes such stereotypical images as belonging to “a larger process 
of ‘fabrications’ of the past” by which groups make their history (2006: 7), and speaks with 
some ambivalence about this process. He acknowledges that “the man in the street is no 
less an abstraction than the one stuck on the billboard”, but also notes that the word 
‘fabricate’ contains a suggestion of forgery as well as, more neutrally, construction, 
manufacture and invention (ibid: 8-9).  Amin’s discussion of the ‘topoi of the topi’ highlights 
one of the strongest aspects of Anderson’s concept of imagined communities. Whilst 
Anderson also believes in the novelty of the nation, he differs from ‘blank-slate’ 
understandings of nation-state formation in ‘pre-modern’ cultures by arguing that it was 
imagined rather than fabricated, which allows greater scope for the creativity of national 
peoples. Indians who adopted the cause of the Khilafat movement may have been blind to 
developments in the Ottoman Empire – Arab nationalist and Kemalist Turk rejection of the 
caliphate which would result in its downfall. But, misguided as it was, the movement was to 
have profound political effects, and effects that were not confined to Indian Muslims. 
Returning to the photographs of the turbaned ‘Abduh et al, presented as potential 
models for emulation, they partake in what Pinney describes as the contrast between 
“photography as the documenter of what has already been achieved socially, and as a space 
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of experimentation where new identities can be conjured” (2008: 145). This is said to be 
made possible by “photography’s indiscriminating data ratio”, its capacity to record both 
equally well, and to therefore allow “powerfully different expectations”: 
Photography’s indexicality, its chemical trace, its data ratio, has underpinned the dualities I 
have elaborated here: cure and poison; network and individuation; the already existent and 
the future possibility. All these evolve from and return to photography’s inability to 
discriminate, its exorbitance.  
(ibid.)  
 
This exorbitance is said to be precisely what Sir Sayyid, by contrast, objected to about “the 
sumna bonum of nineteenth-century Indian colonial photography, The People of India”  (ibid: 
39), which he encountered in the India Office Library in London, as he was in the process of 
collecting material for a book on Islam. His response was not based in any objection to 
modern printing technology per se, which he had used to print his own works, nor to 
illustration. Cf. the more than 130 illustrations that accompanied the first Persian edition of 
his book on Delhi’s history, Asar-al-Sanadid (traces of the nobles), which according to C.M. 
Naim are the “most striking feature of the book” (2010: 7). He describes these as “among 
the first lithographically produced book illustrations in India” and as showing “how readily 
Delhi craftsmen of the time took up new techniques and soon excelled at them” (ibid: 7). But 
neither aura nor authority are threatened by these representations of Delhi’s monuments. 
In his famous 15 October 1869 letter from London, which was sent to the Scientific 
Society of Aligarh and published in the Aligarh Institute Gazette, Sayyid Ahmad Khan 
describes the objectionable work:  
In the India Office is a book in which the races of all India are depicted in both pictures and in 
letterpress, giving the manners and customs of each race. Their photographs show that the 
pictures of the different manners and customs were taken on the spot, and the sight of them 
shows how savage they are – the equals of animals. The young Englishman who, after 
passing the preliminary Civil Service examination, have to pass examinations on special 
subjects for two years afterwards, come to the India Office preparatory to starting for India, 
and, desirous of knowing something of the land to which they are going, also look over this 
work. What can they think, after perusing this book and looking at its pictures, of the power 
and honour of the natives of India?  
(In Graham 1974: 129) 
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Pinney points out that Sayyid Ahmad Khan would probably have agreed with the critical 
assessments of the declining Mughal elite in the captions to their photographs, and argues 
that his reaction “was a response not simply to the ideological slant of this or that caption, 
but rather to the systematic normalising and rendering visible of diverse communities within 
a unitary framework” (2010: 44). His opposition to this sort of photographic representation 
could be seen to be of a piece with his opposition to competitive examinations for 
government posts and elections to legislative assemblies on a proportional basis. All of these 
forms of representation partook of an ‘exorbitance’ which was potentially threatening to the 
colonial state and those who set themselves up in relation to it.   
But his response to these images is also the obverse of his admiring descriptions, in 
the same letter, of the maid-servant in his London residence, who is capable of reading a 
half-penny newspaper and enjoying the editorials in Punch magazine, or the coachmen who 
keep a book under the seat of their cabs to read during idle moments (in Graham 1974: 131-
132). He attributes the advanced state of England’s civilization to the uniformity of the 
language of the country, and recommends that Indians translate the whole of the arts and 
sciences into their own languages: “Until the education of the masses is pushed on as it is 
here, it is impossible for a native to be civilised and honoured” (ibid: 132).  His objection 
therefore also seems to be directed at the heterogeneous groupings of India’s diverse 
peoples within the pages of a book, to what Rancière has described as “literarity”: the 
disequilibrium induced by “word-islands” that “re-carve [redécoupent] the space that is 
between bodies and that regulates their community” (2004: 103). In this instance, a 
disturbing proximity which leads Ahmad Khan’s son, who has accompanied him to the India 
Office, to assert his foreign origins to a young Englishman who asks him whether he is 
“Hindustani”: 
Mahmud replied in the affirmative, but blushed as he did so, and hastened to explain that he 
was not one of the aborigines, but that his ancestors were formerly of another country. 
Reflect, therefore, that until Hindustanis remove this blot they shall never be held in honour 
by any civilised race.  
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(In Graham 1974: 129) 
 
Photography also played an important role in puncturing this myth of civilizational 
superiority. As cameras became cheaper and smaller, photography was decreasingly reliant 
on official support or financial investment. As a result its subject matter changed from “the 
Himalayan foothills”, which Pinney describes as the paradigmatic location of nineteenth 
century colonial photography, to the street (2008: 82). This mobile photographic technology 
was more easily able to document the “increasingly chaotic public spaces in which colonial 
hegemony appeared increasingly fragile” (ibid: 83). Pinney illustrates this with the example 
of the photographic depictions of the Amritsar massacre in India, but during the extensively 
reported and photographed Balkan and First World Wars these examples could be found 
further afield. Colonial hegemony was indirectly attacked by slurs cast against Britain’s allies, 
as exemplified by the photograph of the sleeping Belgian soldiers, which had been the focus 
of objections to the censored edition of al-Hilal. These sorts of images are foreshadowed by 
earlier unflattering depictions of European forces during the Balkan war. The 17 August 1912 
edition has a photo of pit-helmeted Italian soldiers attempting to push a recalcitrant horse 
and cart. A couple of soldiers are arranged outside the picture frame, which along with the 
deadpan caption (“In Tripoli: The Difficulties Faced by the Italians”) adds to the comedy of 
the scene. Elsewhere, photography is used to highlight imperial excesses in a story dealing 
with the hanging of two Turks by Bulgarian forces after the siege of Adrianople (al-Hilal, 8 
January 1913). Under the main title “Notable Events in the Balkan war” are two cameo 
photographs of the men, hooded and hanging by their necks. The article is said to be an 
eyewitness account of these bloody events by an anonymous correspondent, which has 
been translated into Urdu in London. The dignified and pious behaviour of the condemned 
men, whose last wish was to perform namaz, and the gruesome preparations for their 
deaths, illustrated by photographs in the right and left hand panels, are contrasted with the 
high spirits of the Bulgarian troops.  
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A great deal of space in al-Hilal may have been devoted to coverage of events in the 
Ottoman empire, but these reports were written with the concerns of Indian Muslims in 
mind, and therefore fit with Azad’s later nationalist political activity. His account of the 
Italian attack on Tripoli has clear parallels with imperial expansion in India, and connections 
between the two were sometimes made in his coverage of local issues. These are explicit in 
his coverage of local authority encroachment upon a mosque in the north Indian city of 
Kanpur. This local event acquired a wider significance because of the way it was written 
about in the Muslim press; that is, papers written in Urdu and English, produced by and 
addressing a Muslim audience (Lavan 1973). The story ran in al-Hilal for many months from 
11 June 1913 onwards. When police fired against demonstrators, killing several on 3 August 
1913, Azad responded in the 13 August 1913 edition of al-Hilal with an article titled “A 
Painful Glimpse of Edirne in Kanpur”, in reference to the Turkish town (Adrianople) which 
had been occupied during the Balkan war in that same year. In its report on this event, al-
Hilal weaves a local story which had gained national significance into the international: 
The earth is thirsty. It needs blood. But whose? That of Muslims. West Asia is adorned 
[rangin] with whose blood? Muslims. On the soil [khak] of Iran, whose bodies are writhing? 
Muslims.  In the Balkan region whose blood is flowing? Muslims. The soil of Hindustan is also 
thirsty. She needs blood. Whose? Muslims. At last, in the environs of Kanpur blood flows and 
the earth of Hindustan is intoxicated.  
 
Such passages seem to substantiate criticism of Azad of the al-Hilal period’s “thick streak of 
Muslim separatism” (Ashraf 2001: 108). Communal tensions do seem to have been an 
important context for the strong response to the demolition. (A temple had originally been 
scheduled to be demolished instead, but this decision had been revoked.) But the rhetorical 
devices in this passage bear comparison with the ‘cosmo-politics’ of the Hindu-nationalist 
inflected discourses of the Independence movement, as described by Pinney’s article on the 
unintended effects of the 1910 Press Act. Specifically, to its use of allegorical and 
mythological devices: 
The past became part of a present, and correspondences between past and present became 
significant. Coincidence and accident were replaced in this new historiography by resonance 
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and significance. History and present-day events became parallel systems with a converging 
significance. 
 (2009: 32) 
 
Pushed into the same socio-religious space, and into using the same tropes, those who 
opposed British rule were driven to be more militant and more indirect. Similarities with 
what the Calcutta Police Commissioner had described as “Hindu” methods of protest can be 
seen in both the demonstrations and the coverage of them in “the new Mohammadan 
press”, the allusive use of words and images as colonial censorship increasingly began to 
take its toll. 
There is also a strong chance that a number of the readers of al-Hilal would have 
been non-Muslim (a possibility expressed in S.P.  Sanyal’s letter to The Pioneer). Because of 
Azad’s subsequent involvement in the Indian Independence movement al-Hilal has come to 
acquire the status of a nationalist journal. Nehru writes in Discovery of India of how Azad 
addressed his Muslim readers in a “new language” and indirectly “attacked the stronghold of 
conservatism and anti-nationalism” by spreading ideas which undermined the Aligarh 
tradition (1959: 267-268). In India Wins Freedom Azad describes how al-Hilal intended to 
build up public opinion, which would encompass non-Muslims, and even speaks of a mass 
readership:  
The publication of Al Hilal marks a turning point in the history of Urdu journalism. It achieved 
unprecedented popularity within a short time. The public was attracted not only by the 
superior printing and production of the paper but even more by the new note of strong 
nationalism preached by it. Al Hilal created a revolutionary stir among the masses. The 
demand for Al Hilal was so great that within the first three months, all the old issues had to 
be reprinted as every subscriber wanted the entire set.  
(1989: 8)   
 
This does not accord with the chaste Urdu in which the paper was written, which would 
have been unlikely to have had mass appeal in this period of mass illiteracy. Even if the 
newspaper had been read aloud, as was common practice then and now, it is questionable 
how much of its language would have been understood by most Hindi and Urdu speakers. 
Nor does it reflect the Muslim readership addressed in editorials on the status of Muslims in 
India and around the world. Through his newspaper Azad stakes his claim as a mujtahid and 
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political leader of the largest ‘minority’ community in India. It is possible that these features 
and his position as newspaper editor would have earned some cachet amongst people who 
would have been unable to read his newspaper, but would have been aware of it, a group 
that could encompass Muslims who were not part of the ulama and non-Muslims.  
There is some evidence that even at this time he made attempts to reach out to 
Hindu militants. From Azad’s account of his involvement with these groups in his 
autobiography, Rajat Ray claims that he was able to span three types of underground secret 
political activity in Calcutta between 1905 and 1925, namely: “revolutionary terrorism, pan-
Islamic societies, and Bolsheviks” (1981: 85). However, as with his international travels, the 
extent of these links is unclear. According to Ray, “these activities were so carefully hidden 
from the public view that they have not left much trace in historical accounts of 
revolutionary nationalism in India” (ibid: 92). Azad himself writes that following the 
assumption of the pen-name “Azad” (“free”), he had experienced a severing of all 
conventional ties, and become politicized by the partition of Bengal in 1905, which he 
describes as a bid by Curzon to “create permanent division between the Hindus and Muslims 
of Bengal” (1989: 4). As a result, Bengal had become “politically the most advanced part of 
India, and the Hindus of Bengal had taken a leading part in Indian political awakening” (ibid).  
He claims to have joined one of these revolutionary groups and in doing so, to have 
overcome their anti-Muslim prejudice:  
I began to argue with them that they were wrong in thinking that Muslims as a community 
were their enemies. I told them that they should not generalise from their experiences of a 
few Muslim officers in Bengal. In Egypt, Iran and Turkey the Muslims were engaged in 
revolutionary activities for the achievement of democracy and freedom. The Muslims of 
India would also join in the political struggle if we worked among them and tried to win them 
as our friends.  
(ibid: 5)  
 
Again, this is inconsistent with his writings in the pages of al-Hilal.  In the earlier mentioned 
editorial of 8 September 1912, in which he outlines the political purpose of his journal, he 
urges Muslims to abjure the path of both moderate and extremist Hindus. They are not to 
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forget that a true Muslim holds the Quran in his hand, and a hand that holds a Quran cannot 
hold a bomb.  
Regardless of how retrospective these accounts of his involvement in revolutionary 
activity may be, they mark a shift from Sir Sayyid’s hostility to both Hindu and Muslim 
Bengalis. In a defensive review of Hunter’s Indian Musalmans: Are they bound in conscience 
to rebel against the Queen? he insists that Hunter’s argument is invalidated by a narrow 
focus upon “Bengal Mahomedans” (Khan 1872: 7). “As a cosmopolitan Mahomedan of India”, 
he writes, “I must raise my voice in opposition to Dr. Hunter in defence of my fellow-
countrymen” (ibid). Writing in English (“corrected by a friend” according to the title page) he 
uses the word “countrymen” to refer to co-religionists across India, and stakes his authority 
to do so in his “cosmopolitan” (foreign) origins.  
Ahmad Khan’s hostility is even clearer in his contemptuous references to the 
prospect of Bengali Hindu rule in the event of the introduction of competitive examinations 
for government posts, as demanded by Congress: “Over all races, not only over 
Mahomedans but over Rajas of high position and the brave Rajputs who have not forgotten 
the swords of their ancestors, would be placed as ruler a Bengali who at sight of a table knife 
would crawl under his chair” (Khan 1888: 11). In this speech, he dismisses the Congress 
agitation as a Bengali phenomenon, which in that province safely confines itself to “writing 
with the pen” and “mere talking”, to “giz, giz, giz, giz, giz” and “buk, buk, buk, buk”, as he 
expresses it for the amusement of his Lucknow audience (ibid: 18). Were it to spread to 
“Mahomedans and other brave races”, he warns, the Government would need “to pass a 
new law and to fill the jails” (ibid: 19).  
It is it notable that even here the term Ahmad Khan uses to refer to Hindu Bengalis 
in the Urdu original is “qaum” (Sevea 2012: 153), which, as discussed earlier, is potentially 
much more capacious than ‘race’. At the same time as expressing his prejudice he opens up 
the possibility of encompassing non-Muslims within a ‘qaum’, a manouevre whose 
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potentialities would be realized in the Khilafat movement. Even in the first iteration of al-
Hilal, published on the cusp of this movement, Hindu revolutionary activities form the 
context for Azad’s discussion of the necessity to adopt jihad in order to pursue 
Independence, when he criticises Muslim leaders, such as Sir Sayyid, who counseled 
quietism and loyalty, leaving Hindus to take the lead in the struggle for independence (al-
Hilal 18 December 1912). By fusing pan-Islamism and anti-British sentiment, and thereby 
extending the boundaries of the ‘qaum’ through deployment of cosmopolitics and 
cosmopolitan politics, Azad effects an innovation. He attempts to ventriloquise both a pan-
Islamic and pan-national community of readers by moving around various sociotechnical 
constraints, between a spiritual register and demotic concerns, a local and international 
politics, and even attempting to intertwine the two – Hind being an important component of 
the title ‘Imam ul-Hind’.  
 
Aziz Burney: Azizul Hind 
One hundred years after the first release of al-Hilal, a newspaper with the curious title of 
Azizul Hind came into publication in 2013, an Urdu paper for the most part, but with certain 
sections translated into Hindi. The title of the paper draws upon the meanings of its editor, 
Aziz Burney’s first name. “Aziz” is evocative of various kinds of love and esteem, and also 
indicates “a great man; a worthy or pious personage, a saint” (Platts 2006: 761); and “ul-
Hind” recalls Azad’s honourary title. When asked whether the last was a deliberate allusion, 
Burney smiled and allowed that it may have had some bearing upon the choice of name for 
his newspaper, but said its main purpose was to express his own love for India.36 Through 
the title of his newspaper Burney sets himself up in a line of Indian Muslim leadership, and in 
relation to Azad in particular. This is not the first time in which he has done so. His 2005 
collection of editorials on the Gujarat pogrom, India Lose Freedom (sic - 2005), directly 
                                                 
36 Interview with Aziz Burney, Noida, 4 September 2014. 
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alludes to Azad’s book on the Independence struggle with its title.  More than his writing 
style or subject matter, the example of Azad can be seen to have shaped Burney’s ambitions. 
As with Azad, these would seem to be quite grandiose, combining intimacy and prophecy: 
I talk with my readers. I don’t think of them as readers. I think of myself as a member of their 
family, and just as on a daily basis one interacts with one’s family members, in this way I am 
a family member who every morning over tea am with them…sometimes I will even be angry 
with them. Today itself I wrote that I am not participating in some mushaira [poetry 
recitation+ in which it is your responsibility to clap hands and ‘appreciate’ and that is it! I 
don’t need praise. I need revolution. If you are prepared to bring revolution then my writing 
is okay, it’s good that I bring out my newspaper and you read it. It is meaningless if my 
writing is merely good and you enjoy reading it.
37
 
 
Prior to setting up his own newspaper in 2013, Aziz Burney had been head of 
operations at Sahara Group Urdu Media. After joining its Hindi newspaper in 1991, he went 
on to launch monthly, weekly and daily Urdu periodicals in 1991, 1994 and 1999 respectively. 
Roznama Rashtriya Sahara grew to become the most widely circulated daily Urdu 
newspaper in India, and is now published in ten editions, including one as far south as 
Bangalore.  Burney is also a prolific writer in several languages and formats.  He has 
published novels and books of non-fiction in Urdu, Hindi and English, and keeps a regularly 
updated multilingual blog. When I first spoke to him in the spring of 2011 he proudly 
mentioned that the screenplay of his book about Saddam Hussain was due to go into 
production and described plans for a science fiction novel. But he is most famous for his full-
page Hindi and Urdu editorials on the second page of Roznama Rashtriya Sahara: the right 
hand columns in Urdu, the left in Hindi, the contents and language of the two varying slightly 
(i.e. the Nastaliq original is not transliterated straight into Devanagari). These editorials 
would be dictated to a sub-editor sitting in an adjoining office, and, when he was travelling, 
delivered via telephone. This woman would record his words in Urdu and then translate 
them into Hindi. The free-form structure and personal voice of these texts means that they 
convey a strong sense of the spoken word. These speeches/texts have attracted attention 
beyond the domain of Urdu newspapers as a result of being collected and published in book 
                                                 
37 Interview with Aziz Burney, Noida, 4 September 2014. 
 
113 
 
form. Even when published in the newspaper they carried a certain weight because of their 
prominent position within the paper, and their grand title of “Azad Bharat ka Itihas” (“The 
History of Free India”).  
Burney’s writings not only span borders between genres, formats, languages, the 
written and the spoken word, but also between the sayable and the unsayable. Most 
controversially, in a series of articles he wrote implicating the Hindu nationalist paramilitary 
organisation, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh in the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, which 
resulted in a public apology on the front pages of both Hindi and Urdu Sahara. On 26 
November 2008 gunmen attacked various landmarks in Mumbai, including Chhatrapati 
Shivaji Terminus and the Taj Mahal Hotel. One hundred and seventy four people were killed 
over the course of three days. The attacks were at least partly planned from Pakistan, and 
badly affected relations between the two countries.  
Aziz Burney wrote a series of editorials on these attacks, which were collected and 
put together in book form, and published conjointly in Hindi and Urdu in December 2010. 
The book attracted media attention because of the presence of Congress politician Digvijaya 
Singh at its New Delhi (6 December 2010) and Mumbai (27 December 2010) launch events. 
During both events Singh claimed that Hemant Karkare, head of the Maharashtra Anti-
Terrorism Squad, had rung him a few hours before his death in the Mumbai attacks to say he 
feared for his life because of threats from Hindu extremists. (Karkare had been heading an 
investigation into the 2008 Malegaon bomb blasts, in which Hindutva organisations had 
been implicated.)   
The book launch precipitated a legal case, and an apology published in both the 
Hindi and Urdu editions of Sahara. In the left-hand corner of the first page of the 28 January 
2010 edition of Roznama Rashtriya Sahara can be seen a short text in Hindi titled: “Aziz 
Burney ki taraf se saphai aur maphi: RSS ki Sajish 26/11 pustak ke sandarbh main” (“A 
clarification and apology from Aziz Burney with regards to his book RSS Conspiracy, 26/11”). 
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The fact that the apology was written in Hindi accentuates the impression of 
accommodation. “The story behind Aziz Burney’s unconditional apology to the RSS in Hindi” 
is the headline of a story on the website New Age Islam.38 The apology is not just written in 
Hindi script but, in parts, in a heavily Sanskritised Hindi, which is quite different from the 
language of Burney’s Devanagari editorials. This is especially evident in its closing lines: 
“hridya se ksama chahta hun” (“I seek forgiveness from my heart”). It was removed from the 
e-edition of Roznama Rashtriya Sahara, although it did appear in the Hindi online edition. 
When I asked staff in the Noida office about this they said the decision had come from 
above, but it was arguably equally a response to feared and actual responses from below, 
and both its inclusion and removal were facilitated by technology, the speed with which it is 
now possible to produce multilingual layouts and edit e-editions. 
This equivocal text is not quite the “unconditional apology” it was said to be. It starts 
in typically disorientating fashion by describing an editorial he wrote on 17 December 2010 
titled “Hafiz Saeed hamara aparadhi hai: usse hamare hawale karo” (“Hafiz Saeed is our 
criminal: hand him over to us”). Saeed was the founder of Pakistan-based militant group 
Lashkar-e-Taiba, and head of Jamat-ud-Dawa, which was seen by the Indian government as 
responsible for the attacks. So he begins his apology on the front foot by asserting his 
patriotism. He also avoids apologising to the RSS directly, instead addressing his apology 
more generally to any patriotic people who might have been hurt or offended by his writings. 
Burney writes that he does not connect the RSS to 26/11, and goes on to say that he is 
willing to change the title of his book RSS ki Sazish 26/11? (2010) if it has created this 
impression. This is an extraordinary statement as the book clearly does connect the RSS to 
the attacks.  On the title piece of the Urdu edition of the book “RSS ki Sazish” in red and 
“26/11” in black are superimposed onto and almost obscure a white question mark. Below is 
                                                 
38 “The story behind Aziz Burney‟s unconditional apology to the RSS”, New Age Islam, 12 February 2011: 
http://www.newageislam.com/islam-and-the-media/the-story-behind-aziz-burney%E2%80%99s-unconditional-apology-to-the-
rss/d/4113 (accessed 31/08/2015).  
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a photograph of the Taj Mahal hotel set ablaze, and the whole is framed by a black border. 
An RSS blog post concerning “the Islamic marauder Aziz Burney” declares that the “cover 
page itself and the title bring out the venomous diatribe that this Islamic traitor is launching 
against India”.39 There are echoes here of Azad’s controversial combinations of image and 
text in his coverage of the Balkan and First World Wars, provoking the same charges of 
sedition and denunciations from ‘loyal’  Indians.  
The 13 February 2011 edition of the RSS English language publication, The Organiser 
claims that Burney wrote his apology because of a lawsuit filed on 7 August 2009 by Vinay 
Joshi, a social worker with RSS connections (Kumar 2011). However, given the delay in 
publishing the ‘apology’ and the fact that the book compilation of his articles was published 
in the meantime, it seems unlikely that this was the only reason. Other reports speculated 
that Burney was made to publish it on the front page of both Hindi and Urdu Sahara, in an 
apparent attempt to appease his Hindu patron, Sahara Group chairman Subrato Roy, who 
was keen to maintain working relations with all political parties, and to avoid antagonising a 
powerful organisation such as the RSS. Quite a different kind of ‘reaching out’ to Hindu 
nationalists was going on here from that which characterised the Khilafat period; under 
direct external compulsion – pressure from a proprietor – and through means of a different 
language and technology.  
Burney’s position in Sahara continued to be precarious, and this forms the context of 
a series of editorials he wrote in response to the controversial 2010 Allahabad High Court 
judgement on the Ayodhya land title case. Disputes over who owns this plot of land, 
reputedly the site of a temple marking the birth of the Hindu deity Ram, came to a violent 
culmination in the 1992 destruction of the Babri Masjid, built upon the spot in 1528. In its 
2010 judgement the High court declared that Ayodhya is the birthplace of the Hindu deity 
Ram and that this was proven by a report of the Archaeological Survey of India. The land was 
                                                 
39 “Islamic terror spouting journalist called Aziz Burney”, Ennapadam Panchajanya, 3 February 2011: 
http://ennapadampanchajanya.blogspot.co.uk/2011/02/islamic-terror-spouting-journalist.html (accessed 31/08/2015) 
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divided three ways between two Hindu organisations, the Hindu Mahasabha and the 
Nirmohi Akhara, and the Sunni Waqf board. As an infant, Ram's claims could be represented 
by the Hindu Mahasabha, and as a deity any claims made on his behalf were not time-barred, 
unlike those of the Sunni Waqf board, which were dismissed on this basis even though they 
were allocated a third of the land. The judgement was met with both shock and relief, as 
anticipated communal clashes did not occur. But there were soon criticisms of it as a faith-
based judgement, and calls to take it to the Supreme Court and have it overturned. On 9 
May 2011 the Supreme Court stayed the judgement on appeal, describing it as “something 
strange”, given that no one had requested division of the land.40  
Aziz Burney had been in the habit of writing emotive editorials on the anniversary of 
the destruction of the mosque, and it might have been expected that he would respond in 
kind to the 2010 judgment, but this was not the case. After keeping his counsel for a few 
days, he responded with an editorial on the 2 October 2010, titled “Kya zaruri hai, suprim 
kort jana…zara ghor karen” (“What need is there to go to the Supreme Court…please reflect 
on this”). In this editorial Burney acknowledges that 30 September 2010 was a difficult day 
for the Indian people and the Indian state, and expresses gratitude that there have been no 
untoward incidents. He respectfully asks the Muslim leaders and members of the ulama who 
are wanting to appeal the judgement, whether, given that it is the state’s responsibility to 
maintain peace and unity, it is possible for a mosque to be built on this site. He offers an 
alternative scenario in which Muslims would ask their Hindu brethren to build a splendid 
Ram temple, whilst they themselves would build a mosque on the land allotted to them by 
the court. These two buildings would then become internationally renowned symbols of 
Indian traditions of communal harmony for coming generations.  
                                                 
40 “Supreme Court stays Allahabad High Court verdict on Ayodhya”, The Hindu, 9 May 2011: 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/supreme-court-stays-allahabad-high-court-verdict-on-ayodhya/article2003448.ece 
(accessed 01/09/2015) 
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The national perspective and ‘statesmanlike’ like tone he adopts in this text recall Sir 
Sayyid’s attempts to present himself as a loyal representative of disaffected Indian Muslims 
in his work on the 1857 revolution, written in Urdu and published in London for an exclusive 
audience of British readers.  They differ from Azad’s editorials on the Kanpur mosque 
incident, not just in their ‘moderation’ (harking back to a reformist rather than revolutionary 
style of Indian Muslim politics) but also in their relatively narrow frame of reference. Here 
the international merely figures as an imagined audience for the resolution of a local conflict 
(north Indian, but cast as national), rather than as a site of strong comparisons and 
connections.  
Over the following days (4, 8-15 October 2010) there followed more editorials on 
this theme. In these writings he presents himself in the role of a mediator between the 
concerns of the Muslim community and the needs of the Indian state, but with one eye on 
the proprietor of his newspaper, Subrato Roy, and another on the political parties. In 
particular, the Congress party, which was in power at the Centre at the time and preparing 
to contest the 2012 assembly elections in the state of Uttar Pradesh. Many Indian Muslims 
consider the Indian Congress party to have played a dishonourable role in this dispute. From 
the placement of Hindu idols inside the masjid in 1949, the unlocking of its gates in 1986, to 
its destruction in 1992 and the 2010 High Court Judgement, its most notorious episodes 
have occurred when the Congress party was in power at the centre. Despite its proclaimed 
secular identity, this correlation has encouraged speculation about a ‘soft Hindutva’ strain in 
Congress politics, which has been a factor in Muslim electoral disaffection from the party. 
Hence the periodic searches for ‘spokesmen’ figures, such as Burney, who could mediate 
between Muslim voters and Congress.  
Because Aziz Burney’s editorials are written in both Hindi and Urdu, they would have 
been easily accessible, and in the 22 June 2011 interview he mentioned that he was aware 
that they were being read by Congress politicians. During our first meeting in 2010 he had 
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shown me a letter from Sonia Gandhi thanking him for his support in the 2009 national 
elections, but in a subsequent interview he insisted that he had backed Congress because of 
its secular ideology and that he had no particular attachment to the party.41 He would 
support the BJP if they were to become secular, he declared. It was true that he worked as 
an advisor for the central government’s Human Resources Department, assisting the 
National Council for the Promotion of Urdu Language, but he emphasised that this was an 
honorary position. He had not taken any money from the Congress government. 
Nevertheless, rumours were circulating that the Congress was planning to re-launch its Urdu 
newspaper, Qaumi Awaz, from Lucknow in order to reach Muslim voters in time for the polls, 
and that Burney was slated to be its editor. Rumours were also circulating that he had 
ambitions for a Rajya Sabha seat on a Congress party ticket (seat in the upper assembly).  
His efforts, if that is what they were, appear to have been unsuccessful. Qaumi Awaz 
did not resume publication, no Rajya Sabha seat was in the offing, and in November 2011 
Burney was transferred to the corporate relations department at Sahara and his editorials 
ceased to appear. This was an important post, he assured me, with many responsibilities, 
but not in his line.42 He never actually worked there, although for about a year and a half he 
got a regular salary, “a car, driver, servants, everything”. He started his newspaper soon 
after he left Sahara, but said that he still maintained a close relationship with Roy, despite 
his current difficulties. Roy had been imprisoned in February 2014 on a Supreme Court 
warrant for failing to refund the 240 billion rupees he owed to investors. This relationship 
between the two men would last forever, Burney proclaimed. At first there was a 
relationship between an employer and an employee, now there was a love which was not 
limited to the period that he remained on the Sahara payroll. However, he had not visited 
Roy in jail because he was worried about what people would make of this.  
                                                 
41 Interview with Aziz Burney, Noida, 22 June 2011. 
42 Interview with Aziz Burney, Noida, 4 September 2014. 
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Soon after leaving Sahara, with the publication of Azizul Hind, Burney realised his 
ambition of becoming a “one man media house”.43 When I spoke to him following the 
launch of his own paper he expressed excitement at the possibilities offered by new 
technology. Newspapers used to reach a limited circle, but now social networking and 
websites had considerably broadened their reach and brought him closer to his readers. 
Previously he used to tour the country from Kanyakumari to Darjeeling in order to address 
hundreds of thousands of people, and now this is no longer necessary. Nowadays even a 
journalist shut up in a room is capable of being discussed in every State in the land, of having 
the state concerned about what he will publish in the morning. He writes his editorial at 
10pm and two hours later it reaches 130 countries, people run it through translation 
software and read it in various languages. What need for him to go anywhere?  
By means of the latest communications technology, Burney evokes ‘ancient’ forms 
of inscription, a writing “without Paper, without Pen” (Mignolo 1998: 76), which does much 
more than attempt to ‘represent’ speech. Through his online editorials he aims to recover 
both the authority and immediacy of the spoken word and avail of the insurrectionary 
possibilities of writing. He even attempts to expiate what Pollock has described as “the guilt 
of Babel” (2006: 504), to reach readers in distant lands speaking other tongues through the 
medium of this ‘ur-language’.  Again, comparison could be made with Azad’s ambitions in al-
Hilal, the prophetic pretentions of his Urdu and especially Arabic editorials, in which being 
read seems to be less of a concern than transmitting a message and literally creating an 
audience. 
But as well as being excited by the possibilities of electronic media, Burney seems to 
have been caught up short by buying into what Rancière describes as the “onto-
technological trick” (2010a: 78). Namely, the over optimistic prognosis of an actually existing 
‘communism’ created by de-territorialised and de-materialised forms of capitalist 
                                                 
43 An ambition expressed in the interview he did on 14 July 2011 and repeated in the interview of 4 September 
2014. 
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production, based in communication networks rather than goods for private appropriation. 
These are said to render the nation form redundant, allowing the ‘multitude’ to take its 
place as “the supreme manifestation of the History of Being” (ibid: 78). As well as being 
based in a misplaced faith in “the supreme manifestation of the History of Being”, they are 
said to falsely equate dematerialization and de-commodification:  
So long as we do not actually turn into immaterial beings, we will continue to consume food, 
buy clothes and use computers, that is, objects which implement the collective intelligence 
of capitalism much more than they do the form of immaterial communication - and 
implement it in the form of underpaid factory work, underpaid work at home, clandestine 
workshops of 'illegal' immigrants and so on.  
(ibid: 78-79) 
 
To return to the case in hand, as well as possibly over-estimating the computer literacy and 
technological resources of most Urdu readers (Amanullah 2009: 270), Urdu E-papers seem 
to be based on an unsustainable business model. Azizul Hind makes much of its internet 
presence whilst not revealing sales and circulation figures. The banner on the front page of 
its 1 May 2015 edition boasts that it reaches 150 countries and 1809 cities, and gives an 
estimated readership of 3,705,616 on the dubious basis of ‘hits’ received by its website.  
According to Burney’s son, Subrat Aziz Burney, who is executive editor of Azizul Hind, 
internet readership was more important for the newspaper than paper readership, although 
the paper edition is published in Delhi, the neighbouring National Capital Region, and the 
states of Uttar Pradesh and Haryana.44 I came across it in several parts of UP during my 
fieldwork in 2013-14, including, surprisingly, Muzaffarnagar, where Hindi papers 
predominate, and noted that it was unusually expensive for an Urdu newspaper (Rs 5 at a 
time when Rashtriya Roznama Sahara sold for Rs 3). 
According to Subrat Burney, this was because of the value and interest of his father’s 
editorials, which continued to be published under the title, “Azad Bharat ka Itihas” and 
numbered in a sequence starting from their first appearance in Roznama Rashtriya Sahara. 
He said the paper was in receipt of both central and local state advertising, but the editions I 
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saw only contained small-scale private adverts for Unani medicines and such like, and larger 
more prominent ones for the Samajwadi Party. (The paper had started publication the year 
prior to the 2014 Indian elections, and was taking a very strong pro-Samajwadi party line.) 
Direct appeals for reader donations, with Burney’s bank account details listed, seemed to 
reflect its poor financial condition. Subrat Burney insisted that the paper was doing quite 
well in UP compared to the two other main Urdu papers, Sahara and Inquilab, and that 
although the paper was not getting much advertising revenue “we are not in a high loss”. 
Azizul Hind was in the initial stages of its production, and not yet a profit-making concern: 
“it’s basically not a profit business in the beginning, but you get to know some people, you 
can meet politicians”. The paper was produced by a staff of 50, most of whom were based in 
Aziz Burney’s residence-cum-office, and printed from a press hired from the Indian Express. 
When I asked whether it was difficult to publish an Urdu newspaper from an English 
language press, Subrat Burney insisted that it was a “simple thing”; pages were sent to the 
press from the main office via the internet and then printed off. Uploading the paper onto 
the website was even simpler and cheaper.  
Like Azad, Aziz Burney displayed an unconcern for sales and profit margins, but this 
attitude was harder for him to sustain because of the different exigencies he faced, despite 
the relative ease of Urdu newspaper production and absence of strict censorship laws. On 1 
May 2015, a front-page editorial appeared justifying a doubling of Azizul Hind’s cover price 
to Rs 10. Like Azad, Burney addresses the reader directly to justify this decision, and in 
similar terms. Azizul Hind is a movement and not just a newspaper, he explains. But it cost Rs 
10 to produce the paper, and he breaks down its production costs: Rs 3.6 for paper, Rs 2.32 
for printing, Rs 3.18 (Rs 18.3 is given but I am assuming this is an error) for editorial costs 
and about Rs 1 for distribution; only through advertising revenue and the cooperation of 
those who keep the pain of the “qaum” in their hearts is the paper able to make up this 
deficit. He emphasises his principled line with regards to accepting advertisements from 
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substandard or communal elements, and expresses regret that in the two years the paper 
has been in publication no worthy personages belonging to the community have spoken of 
cooperating with the newspaper, even though it is the wealth of the “qaum”, which we 
know has need of its own media during this time when communalists have purchased Urdu 
media at a high price in an effort to reach Urdu knowing people. This is a reference to 
Inquilab, which had been purchased by the Dainik Jagran press group, an organisation that 
has strong Hindu nationalist associations – its former managing director, Narendra Mohan, 
was a BJP Rajya Sabha member.  (In a 10 October 2013 editorial Burney explains his 
intention to produce both Hindi and Urdu editions of Azizul Hind in order to save Hindi 
reading Muslims from the necessity of reading communal papers such as Dainik Jagran.)  
Burney says he started the paper in order to represent the community and its 
interests at the national and international level. Now he is faced with the choice of either 
shutting Azizul Hind or increasing its price, or, alternatively, switching to a weekly format, on 
the lines of the Urdu weekly Nai Duniya, or Hindi and English Outlook magazines. He asks 
readers to continue to buy the paper at the increased price, so that the movement can 
remain alive. This decision was not taken lightly. He knows that there are cheaper papers 
available on the market. Yet when one looks at the larger purpose this cost becomes 
meaningless. If it were our aim to get other kinds of benefit from producing a newspaper, 
then perhaps it would be possible to sell the paper for Rs 1. But this would not be true to the 
requirements of the community and of journalism. He ends by asking readers to advise him 
on whether they would prefer the paper to be produced weekly or bi-weekly, and lists his 
phone number and email address. The paper appears to have subsequently ceased 
publication; no further editions have been uploaded onto its website.  
Both Azad and Burney had ambitions to be ‘one man media houses’, involving 
themselves in all aspects of newspaper production and directly addressing the reader, 
transgressing various boundaries as they did so, and facing constraints upon these ambitions. 
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Both men also played with the range of languages available to them in their editorials, and 
were ‘early adopters’ of new communications technology: type printing, halftone 
photography and telecommunications.  But Burney seems to be stuck within narrower 
parameters, despite the greater speed and ease of new communications technology. 
Although both may have addressed themselves to Muslims in India, the expansiveness of 
Azad during the al-Hilal period is missing from Burney’s work. This is partly a result of more 
severe financial constraints than those experienced by Azad, who had chosen to publish a 
weekly magazine rather than a daily newspaper and was financially independent. But it is 
also, arguably, an indication of the relatively limited possibilities available to Burney as he 
works within the confines of established forms of state nationalism and identity politics, and 
of ‘vote bank’ politics in particular. These would seem to preclude another kind of 
impossible speech suggested by art historian Rosalind Krauss’s description of surreality as 
“nature convulsed into a kind of writing” (1985: 113); a use and an exceeding of 
sociotechnical constraints through a writing that would approximate unmediated thought, 
and a photography that would have the quality of writing (through automatic writing and 
deliberate captioning and arrangement of images); an ‘impossible speech’ that would allow 
for the re-imagining rather than fixing of ‘given’ identities.    
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Chapter three: Emergency pedagogy 
This chapter picks up on the preceding chapter’s discussion of state censorship during a 
‘special’ period (war time and a time of ‘terror’), and the thesis’s overall concern with the 
discursive construction of ‘the people’, by looking at another major instance of pan-national 
and cross-denominational populist mobilisation in India: resistance to the internal 
emergency of 1975-77. The emergency occurred during a particularly febrile period in South 
Asian history, a decade that commenced with a war (Bangladesh War of 1971) and was 
characterised by authoritarian regimes, mass movements, coups and assassinations. One 
way to reconcile the combination of authoritarianism and greater participation in the 
political process, social movements centred on charismatic individuals that characterized 
this era, is a particular type of populism encouraged by the intersection of mass media and 
ideas of democratic representation. This is how David Page and William Crawley, for 
example, understand it when they describe the heyday of populism in South Asia as 
coinciding with a boom in radio ownership, which enabled political leaders to integrate new 
classes into politics by allowing them to speak to them directly (2001: 52); or Ayesha Jalal, 
who locates populism in “the interplay between democratic politics and authoritarian states” 
(1995: 3), part of a balancing act between the need for a new social covenant to maintain 
the legitimacy of the state and old alliances with dominant groups (ibid: 89). The 
contradictory requirement for change and stasis, “of evolution in the name of revolution, of 
running furiously in the same spot”, is said to have given the “populist era” in South Asia its 
“duplicitous character” (ibid). 
By dealing with an event in Bangladesh, the assassination of President Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman (1920-1975), through its reception in neighbouring India, and the historic 
and geopolitical connections between the two countries, I work toward a different 
understanding of the movement of power and information within and across national 
boundaries. Towards this end I engage with Stuart Hall’s writings on the encoding and 
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decoding of messages in broadcast media (1972, 1973 and 1980), which privileges the 
discursive form in communicative exchange over its production process. I am drawn to his 
work because his description of the way in which “a ‘raw’ historical event” assumes a 
“message form” that enables it to pass from source to receiver through formal rules by 
which language signifies (1980: 129) offers useful directions for how a particular event might 
be used to understand a broader process, whilst retaining awareness of both the moment of 
articulation and the communication network as a whole. But I temper it with a stronger 
understanding of audience reception derived from literary theory.   
In describing the encoding/decoding process, Hall dismisses the ideal of perfectly 
transparent, unilateral communication as something that “can only exist in the (extremely 
rare) limiting case of the perfectly censored medium” (1973: 13).  But he is also critical of the 
“residual pluralism”, which underlies the concept of “selective perception”:  
 
Of course, there will always be private, individual, variant readings. But ‘selective perception’ 
is almost never as selective, random or privatized as the concept suggests. The patterns 
exhibit, across individual variants, significant clusterings. 
(1980: 135) 
 
The process of “encoding” is said to construct the limits within which “decodings” operate, 
and he enumerates three hypothetical positions for decodings of televisual discourse: the 
dominant-hegemonic position; a negotiated version, which mixes adaptive and oppositional 
elements; and an oppositional code in which a viewer understands both the literal and 
connotative inflection of a discourse, but decodes it in a contrary way (ibid: 137-138). A 
politically significant moment is said to be reached when events start to be subjected to 
oppositional reading, but this, too, exists within the parameters established by encoding: “If 
there were no limits, audiences could simply read whatever they liked into any message” 
(ibid: 135).  Despite his scepticism about transparency, these parameters therefore closely 
resemble the mathematical theory of communication systems developed by Claude Shannon 
at Bell Telephone Laboratories, in which messages move from source to intended 
126 
 
destination through a channel that is “merely the medium used to transmit the signal from 
transmitter to receiver” (1998: 33-34).   
In his essay “External influences on broadcasting”, Hall specifies these limits as being 
defined by the state: 
The broadcasting institutions exercise a wide measure of editorial autonomy in their 
programmes: but ultimately they operate within the mode of reality of the state, and their 
programme content is, in the last instance, governed by the dominant ideological 
perspective and is oriented within its hegemony. 
(1972: 1) 
 
As Hobart points out, in its reference to the structured totality of the discursive formation, 
Hall’s account of articulation amounts to “a social or political act of linking cultural elements 
and social forces into hierarchical structures” (1999: 21), with, it would seem, the state at its 
pinnacle. This is quite different from Laclau and Mouffe’s understanding of hegemonic 
articulation as made possible by the necessarily incomplete nature of the social (2014: 108).  
Proceeding from Althusserian notions of the state apparatus and ideology, Bourdieu 
does something very similar through his deployment of the rubric of ‘symbols’. Likewise, 
Hall’s determinism seems to result from his use of the heuristic of ‘codes’, which Bakhtin 
famously described as “a deliberately established, killed context” (1986: 147). Whereas a 
context is “potentially unfinalised”, a code, according to Bakhtin, is “a technical means of 
transmitting information”, without any “cognitive, creative significance” (ibid).  On this basis, 
Bakhtin distinguishes between semiotics, which deals with “the transmission of ready-made 
communication using a ready-made code”, and “live speech”, communication “created in 
the process of transmission” without any “code” (ibid). To the “code” he opposes the 
“word”, described as living on “the boundary between its own context and another, alien, 
context” (2006: 284). Context is said to enter the speech that frames it in a “chemical union” 
rather than a “mathematical bond” (ibid: 340). It therefore cannot be studied in isolation 
from its “contextualized (dialogizing) framing” (ibid). With its dialogic capacities, the living 
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word also stands opposed to authoritative discourse, which is said to be inert, finite, and 
permitting of no free stylistic development in relation to it (ibid: 344).  
I find this understanding of the “living word” useful for thinking about media 
practices during the Indian internal emergency of 1975-77, but that of “authoritative 
discourse” less so. My own working concepts of the dispositif of state and the 
insurrectionary possibilities of writing are informed by a different understanding of state 
power and political communication. More specifically, the monolithic operations of power 
Bakhtin describes do not speak to emergency-era repression, which, as Shiv Vishvanathan 
puts it, both “leaked like a sieve” and was of such a smallness and pettiness that it pervaded 
social relations and individual consciousness (1998: 45). It now seems preposterous to Sethi 
and Vishvanathan that the Defence Minister attempted to get his milkman an alcohol licence, 
or that the Information Minister locked up the staff of All India Radio and forced them to 
translate a Congress party document. “One is almost relieved at the petty-mindedness of 
those who hijacked the Indian state”, they conclude (1998: 10). These insights have been 
elaborated in work on the everyday state in India (Fuller and Bénéï 2000; Gupta 1995 and 
2012; Poole and Das 2004), including with specific reference to the emergency itself (Tarlo 
2003). This chapter hopes to contribute to this literature by looking at how gaps in the reach 
and purview of state repression help to make the state legible, and, in provoking opposition 
to its actions, to coalesce social and political groups. 
I have therefore been drawn to Wolfgang Iser’s reader response theory, in which he 
also sets himself against transmitter-receiver models of reading that presuppose “a common 
code”, and argues that in literary works “the message is transmitted in two ways” (1980: 
107). The reader ““receives” it by composing it” along lines suggested by pre-programmed 
gaps in the text (1980: 107).  Iser’s understanding of the interaction between a literary text 
and its readers partly derives from R.D. Laing’s dyadic model of interpersonal relationships, 
according to which people are unable to see themselves as others see them but act in light 
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of real or supposed views that others have of them all the same; but with the major 
difference that, in reading, there is “no face-to-face situation” (ibid: 109). A text cannot 
adapt itself to a reader, and a reader can never learn how accurate his interpretation of it is. 
Communication is said to be made possible and directed through this distance between text 
and reader:  
Communication in literature, then, is a process set in motion and regulated, not by a given 
code, but by a mutually restrictive and magnifying interaction between the explicit and the 
implicit, between revelation and concealment. What is concealed spurs the reader into 
action, but this action is also controlled by what is revealed; the explicit in its turn is 
transformed when the implicit has been brought to light. Whenever the reader bridges the 
gaps, communication begins.  
(ibid: 111) 
 
Although Iser emphasis the creative participation of the reader and textual indeterminacy, 
he persists in speaking of a “successful” reading of a text (ibid: 110). Even when applied to 
fiction that works within genre conventions, this phenomenological approach to literature as 
a “sense-making activity” provokes questions about the possibility of “idiosyncratic” 
realizations of a text and the status of the reading subject (Suleiman 1980: 23). Susan 
Suleiman observes that the reader that emerges from his theory is not a “historically 
situated individual” but a “transhistorical mind” whose activities are the same everywhere 
(ibid: 25).  
I take on board such criticisms, and Suleiman’s suggestion that we “focus on the 
actual reading experiences and responses of specific individuals to specific works” (ibid: 27). 
But I still find something valuable in Iser’s description of the “virtual character” of any 
literary work, situated between but irreducible to the “reality of the text” and the 
“subjectivity of the reader”, and from this deriving its dynamism:  
As the reader passes through the various perspectives offered by the text, and relates the 
different views and patterns to one another, he sets the work in motion, and so sets himself 
in motion, too. 
(1980: 106) 
 
This seems like a more promising way to understand what goes on in the ‘reading’ of a 
text/message than the sender-message-receiver model, because of the greater attention it 
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pays to audience response, which, as has often been observed (Nightingale 1996: 31), is 
under-theorised in this model. Applied to the realm of political communication, it could even 
be used to describe a virtual space in which ‘the people’ might momentarily come into being.  
In thinking about the last point, I have been inspired by Robert Darnton’s reworking 
of reader-reception theory to understand state censorship. From the perspective of a 
comparative study of censorship in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and pre-
revolutionary France, Darnton comes to the conclusion that reading “is a mystery 
everywhere” (Darnton 1995: 55); at one and the same time an individual activity and a social 
one, spanning agency and structure, making reader response hard to predict and a 
dichotomous understanding of the relationship between censorship and free speech hard to 
sustain. Darnton tells the story of how “the Enlightenment penetrated cracks in the system 
and spread through French society” (ibid: 45), cracks that had been created by the legal 
system itself through a series of categories that allowed books to appear on the market 
without official permission.  Superficially these “obscure, gray areas where orthodoxy shades 
off into heresy” seem to have been in the realm of James Scott’s “shadow state” (Scott 
1998), but this was not simply a case of a discrepancy between state policy and actual 
practice, or of real knowledge and meanings being concealed – the “hidden transcript” 
(Scott 1990). Rather, an account of “hidden complicities” (Darnton 1995: 55) between 
readers and writers, and between writers and censors. Complicities running in all directions, 
the push-pull of multiple agencies and constraints produced new practices and knowledge.  
In the GDR, it is said to have encouraged new types of writing (official propaganda, 
subversive literature), which in turn encouraged new ways of reading. When confronted 
with censored literature readers became attuned to tone and typographical features, 
scanning up and down texts in search of irregularities. When dealing with official messages 
they read “critically, aggressively, with a combination of sophistication and alienation 
unimaginable in the West, even among our hardiest deconstructors” (ibid: 57-58).  In both 
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instances “East Germans not only read between the lines; they also controlled the meanings 
in the blank spaces” (ibid).  
It may be debatable whether all East Germans responded to censored media with 
this level of sophistication. Nevertheless, Darnton offers useful directions for going beyond a 
dichotomous understanding of ‘passive’ or ‘active’ audience reception. He emphasises that 
meanings were made through these interfaces rather than simply hidden and found. Groups 
and subjects articulated in this way were hard to fix, a difficulty that went beyond individual 
reader response or linguistic indeterminacy – the necessarily incomplete task of 
subjectification. Censorship seems to have articulated subjectivity and sociality, although 
not in the way intended by the Censor. By linking individual readers and writers through 
illicit circulation of books and particular modes of reading and writing it produced a sense of 
community that was provoked by but outside the direct control of state regulation. 
 I will therefore adapt and adopt both transmitter-receiver and reader-response 
communication models to look at reception of an event occurring in one context through its 
reception in another, with special focus on the role played in its dissemination by yet 
another, hoping to remain attentive to the media in which it was transmitted all the while. 
Specifically, through its reception in the prison writings of two political leaders arrested in 
connection with the emergency in India, who mostly learnt of Mujib’s assassination through 
foreign print and broadcast media - Jayaprakash Narayan (1902-1979), leader of the anti-
Congress movement for Total Revolution, and L.K. Advani (1927-), Jana Sangh and later 
Bharatiya Janata Party politician.  I have chosen to look at Advani’s A Prisoner's Scrap-Book 
(1978) and Narayan’s Prison Diary (1977b) because these books were written and published 
in the 1970s and presented as a response to events as they unfold: Advani and Narayan 
describe day-by-day transformations in their understanding of what happened as they learn 
about it from a range of sources. This means that they are relatively free of retrospective 
justification for actions at the time in light of subsequent events that are a feature of later 
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publications. For example, books by Narayan’s doctor (Chhuttani 1995) and jailor 
(Devashayam 2006), and even B.N. Tandon’s PMO Diary (2003), which claims to be a diary 
kept during this period by a member of the Prime Minister’s secretariat but was published 
later.  
Their accounts are also valuable precisely because they were produced in a 
particular context for a purpose - in emergency-era prisons as underground literature, and 
therefore offer insights into the workings of repression and censorship and the underground 
press.  Additionally, they were written by articulate, well-informed and well-connected 
figures who between them span the entire period of post-Independence politics. Narayan 
had been active in the Independence movement, Advani was to become a prominent BJP 
politician, and both men had privileged access to information because of their social status 
and political connections.  
I will begin with a brief overview of the geopolitical dynamics within which the event 
took place, then consider conditions of reception for this event in India generally, and for 
the prison writers Advani and Narayan in particular, with special focus on the ideological 
underpinnings and effects of differential treatment of print and broadcast media. I will go on 
to analyse the way their books deal with this event and conclude with tentative outlines for 
an alternative understanding of the dissemination of power and information, that is, 
‘emergency pedagogy’. I use this term not in its usual sense, as a description of trauma relief, 
but to describe a process of knowledge transmitted will-to-will rather than brain-to-brain, 
through spatiotemporal disordering rather than the progressive, unilinear model of state 
development programmes and censorship. I will conclude by looking at Congress’s defeat in 
the 1977 election as ‘reader response’ to emergency-era censorship and repression.  
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Chaos in the air 
Democracy, by organising human community without reference to any entitlement to 
govern, may signify “a rupture with the order of kinship…a structural heterotopy between 
the principle of government and the principle of society” (Rancière 2006b: 45). But states, as 
Forsyth observes in his study of confederation, are “inherently ‘social’ beings…they define 
themselves in relation to one another” (1981: 10). This was keenly felt by new states, such 
as India and Pakistan, which emerged from anti-colonial struggle, and even more so by what 
might be called the ‘new new’ states that broke off from them, such as Bangladesh, which 
was initially something of a pariah state. Bangladesh only gained admittance to the United 
Nations in 1974; UN members, however sympathetic they might have been to East Pakistan, 
being reluctant to legitimise an act of secession given that many of them faced separatist 
movements within their own borders (Baxter 1997: 145-146). 
Disquiet with the formation of Bangladesh also related to changing geopolitical 
dynamics. Briefly: a further twist to US-Soviet antagonism was provided by deepening Sino-
Soviet rivalry, which led China to seek rapprochement with the United States, leading the 
latter to tilt towards Pakistan, and encouraging closer relations between India and the Soviet 
Union in turn. These realignments were given concrete expression in the Indo-Soviet Peace 
Treaty of 1971 and US support for Pakistan during its war against India in the same year. This 
tangle of relations produced “dizzy eventualities” such as the possibility of “Chinese nuclear 
threats in defence of West Pakistan”, leading to counter-threats from the Russians and the 
Americans, which are said to have pulled Delhi and Islamabad “back from the brink” (Jackson 
1975: 160). The 1971 war was quickly concluded by a bilateral agreement between India and 
Pakistan, according to which India accepted the surrender of Pakistani forces in the East and 
offered a ceasefire in the West. Occurring soon after this conflict and involving one of its 
main protagonists, the assassination of Mujib was variously interpreted as a global, regional 
and domestic event. Rumours regarding the role of the US in the assassination, and anxiety 
133 
 
about global realignments that might result from it, were, as I will go on to discuss in more 
detail, significant features in its reception.  
Global connections were also important in the dissemination of the event. Within 
Bangladesh, the majors who organised the coup were prompt to get their version out, taking 
over the national radio station on the morning that it occurred (Lifschultz and Bird 1979: 
2001). Those responsible were protected by an Indemnity Ordinance passed in September 
1975, which was only repealed after Sheikh Hasina Wajed, Mujib’s eldest daughter, came to 
power in 1996.45 News of Mujib’s assassination was initially withheld in India, occurring as it 
did at the inopportune moment of Indian Independence day, when Indira Gandhi was due to 
make her first public address since the proclamation of emergency. Full details of the 
massacre (the killing of most members of Mujib’s immediate family) were also censored.46 
But attempts to withhold news of it within India were rendered futile by unimpeded foreign 
radio broadcasts. Some of these international radio broadcasts were in regional languages 
and Urdu, and therefore capable of reaching mass audiences.   
The important role played by international radio seems to have been strangely 
overlooked in accounts of the emergency. Even Weiner’s (1978) valuable first-hand account 
of the 1977 election does not mention it, choosing to focus instead on more visible 
manifestations of dissent: large public meetings, graffiti and handbills. He argues that in a 
country with low literacy rates and a radio and television network that is controlled by the 
government and only reaches a fraction of the population, election campaigns mainly take 
the form of public meetings (ibid: 21). Page and Crawley, in their book on broadcasting in 
South Asia, describe the 1977 election result as occurring despite “censorship of the press 
                                                 
45 Sheikh Hasina Wajed was one of two daughters spared during the family massacre because she was not in 
Bangladesh at the time. The instigators of the coup were only arrested in 1996, put to trial in 1997 and some of 
them executed in 2010 (see Amnesty International reports for 1997 and 2010). 
46 The Pen in Revolt, a compendium of literature produced during the emergency, compiled by the Press Council 
of India, reproduces the text of a letter sent by Indira Gandhi apologizing for censoring the publication of his 
obituary of Mujib (Anon 1978: 16). The writer, an elite civil service officer, had known Mujib personally, and 
written to the Chief Minister of West Bengal to protest. Gandhi writes in response that she was moved by the 
translation of his article and valued his analysis. Nevertheless, public reactions to an event in a neighbouring 
country must be modulated with the utmost care: “What a person of your position in the literary world says will 
have far-reaching impact, and I am sure that you would not like to cause us any embarrassment” (ibid: 16). 
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and the tightest possible regulation of All India Radio and Doordarshan”, the two state-
controlled broadcasters (2001: 53). Both analyses ignore the significance of international 
media and the way various formats intersect, particularly in a context of low literacy levels 
but high levels of literacy awareness and multilingualism.  
There was a historical precedent to this in the role radio had played during the 
independence movement; directly as a propaganda tool via Congress radio and Indian 
National Army radio, which broadcast during the early 1940s, but also indirectly through 
foreign broadcasts.  In the first listener research survey conducted by All India Radio (AIR) in 
1940 it was discovered that Indians were listening to news from Germany that was hostile to 
Britain, and that the Hindustani news bulletin from Berlin was “widely listened to” and 
regarded as “more truthful” than the English version (Gupta 2001: 469). On another front 
there was the threat to empire posed by Radio Moscow. An Intelligence Bureau report from 
16 March 1932 described how Indians were picking up its English language broadcasts on 
favourable conditions in the USSR, and expressed concern about what would happen were it 
to start broadcasting in other Indian languages (ibid: 460-461). 
The political potential of radio was even greater following the arrival of “the 
transistor revolution” that occurred in the 1960s, when radios became ubiquitous even in 
remote and rural areas: “From five million licenses in 1965, the number rose to twenty 
million licences in 1977, the year Congress lost power for the first time after Mrs Gandhi’s 
Emergency rule” (Page and Crawley 2001: 51-52). During this period radio was not just a 
medium of propaganda but also a weapon of war. In the early 1970s the Congress-led Indian 
government had lent support, through AIR, to the pro-Awami League Swadhin Bangla Betar 
Kendra, which aired from Calcutta during the 1971 war (ibid: 57). Bangladesh’s 
independence was first declared via radio on 26 March 1971, and its new government 
initially operated from a station in Chittagong (Baxter 1997: 87). 
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The Indian government had attempted to control foreign radio by subjecting the 
work of its local correspondents to pre-censorship, and, when this did not work, by expelling 
foreign journalists. Mark Tully, who was the BBC correspondent for India at the time, 
described having to submit broadcasts for monitoring to the censors at All India Radio, who 
would interpret “virtually anything that was not effusive praise as criticism”.47 Following 
complaints about the erratic nature of this censorship, journalists were presented with a list 
of rules. When the BBC and other foreign broadcasters refused to comply with these, they 
were duly expelled. Despite these expulsions foreign radio stations continued to broadcast 
into India for the duration of the emergency, gathering news from local sources by 
telephone and telex, and Tully reports that listenership for the BBC service went up during 
this period when official media in India was heavily censored.  
Getting foreign broadcasters stationed abroad to comply with Indian regulations and 
submit their material for censorship might not have been possible, but it would have been 
technically feasible to jam their broadcasts. During the colonial period this appears to have 
been attempted with Congress Radio in Bombay. An article by one of the broadcasters 
describes “the mischief played by the A.I.R (Anti India Radio)”, which would jam their 
broadcasts.48 However, limitations in the technology available prevented it becoming a 
general policy of the central government, with an engineer in the colonial administration 
warning that British communications being “strung out all over the world”, they stood to 
lose more than they would gain by creating “chaos in the air” (Gupta 2001: 470).  
Later, during the cold war period, the USSR adopted a policy of jamming foreign 
radio broadcasts, but it remained an ineffective technology despite the fact that the Soviets 
apparently spent the equivalent of billions of US dollars on it (Schmemann 1988). It was 
reportedly most effective in densely populated urban areas, and even there easily 
                                                 
47 Interview with Mark Tully, New Delhi, 13 September 2014. 
48 “Congress Radio Calling”, copy of an undated and unattributed article relating to the 1942 movement, Nehru 
Memorial Museum and Library, Miscellaneous Items, Accession No. 99 
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circumvented by listeners who would take their shortwave radio sets out of city limits to pick 
up broadcasts in areas where jamming was less intense. Hence it was particularly ill suited to 
a large country with a predominantly rural population and several international borders such 
as India. The White Paper on misuse of media during the internal emergency describes a 
meeting between ministers and broadcasters regarding coverage of events in India by 
foreign radio, which led to recommendations that the Director General of AIR should 
prepare a weekly bulletin of trends in reporting “in English and Indian languages”, and 
discuss the technical implications and feasibility of jamming foreign broadcasts with the 
Defence Ministry (GI 1977: 11). From prisoners’ accounts of listening to international radio 
during the emergency it would seem that there was no concerted attempt to jam signals. 
The imperative to censor seems to have been counterbalanced by the desire to disseminate 
a message and monitor how it was being received internationally.   
One effect of this was to encourage a form of circulation in which print, radio and 
the word of mouth were imbricated; most strikingly, in the format of the underground news 
sheet: handwritten, typed or cyclostyled documents containing on-the-fly translations and 
transcriptions of foreign newspapers and radio broadcasts, distributed by hand or post, and 
bearing the slogan “Read, reproduce and circulate”.49 The logics and logistics at work in this 
underground form of circulation were made explicit in an alternative Independence Day 
address sent out on the same day that Mujib was murdered. In a public letter addressed to 
“comrades”, located “somewhere underground” and dated 15 August 1975, the union 
leader George Fernandes lays out his instructions for the conduct of media satyagraha (Anon 
1978: 13-14). These include appeals to boycott “All Indira Radio”, as AIR came to be 
described during the emergency-period, and listen to “BBC, VOA, even the Pakistani and 
Peking Radio” instead; to duplicate, copy and translate underground news bulletins, and to 
encourage others to do these things (ibid: 14).  The logic of circulation is concentrated in the 
                                                 
49 Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Jayaprakash Narayan Papers, IIIrd Instalment, Subject file no. 315 
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formula “three raised to the power of eighteen”, whereby if three people tell a story to only 
three others “in eighteen operations the whole country will have heard the story” (ibid). He 
ends with the injunction: “Learn the power of the spoken word” (ibid).  
In its dialogism, Fernandes’s “spoken word” would seem to closely resemble what 
Bakhtin designates as “the living word”, the smallest linguistic unit of his theory of 
heteroglossia, or “social diversity of speech types” (2006: 263). The living word is opposed to 
the “sacred” word, which “demands reverent repetition and not further development, 
corrections, and additions” (1986: 133). It is also distinct from the “authoritative” word, 
described as prior to discourse and resounding from “lofty spheres, not those of familiar 
contact” (2006: 342). More clearly than either of these, it participates in what Bakhtin 
describes as “the social life of discourse…discourse in the open spaces of public squares, 
streets, cities and villages, of social groups, generations and epochs” (ibid: 259).  
But in the closed spaces of emergency-era India, the power of the spoken word 
seems to have been underlined by the attempt to silence it, and to have acquired greater 
potency through being dispersed, translated and mixed with other media; notably print and 
broadcast media, both of which are technically mediated rather than ‘social’ in the sense of 
involving face-to-face interaction. For this reason Bakhtin writes with ambivalence about the 
early impact of print and with hostility about technology. He describes the printing of 
chivalric romances as bringing about “social disorientation” by displacing its audience and 
shifting its discourse into “a mute mode of perception” (2006: 379). He dismisses the “entire 
methodological apparatus of the mathematical and natural sciences” in similar terms as 
“directed toward mastery over mute objects, brute things, that do not reveal themselves in 
words, that do not comment on themselves” (ibid: 351).  
At these moments, Bakhtin expresses an ancient suspicion of writing, which can be 
traced back to Plato’s Phaedrus, where Socrates famously likens writing to painting, in its 
‘muteness’ and inability to distinguish between whom it should or should not address (Plato 
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2005: 63). Rancière, in his reading of this text, emphasizes that Socrates does not simply 
criticise writing as inferior to speech, but for its “particular staging of the speech act” (2011b: 
93-94: 94): 
Writing always traces much more than the signs it aligns; it also traces a particular relation of 
bodies to their souls and to other bodies, and of the community to its soul. It is a specific 
distribution of the sensible, a specific structuring of a common world. For Plato this 
structuring appears as the undoing of any regulation of the legitimate order by which the 
logos distributes itself and distributes the bodies of a community.  
(ibid) 
 
Because the written word overturns the relation between a discourse and the person to 
whom it might legitimately belong, to whom it is addressed and the way it should be 
received, it “muddles the way in which knowledge and discourse order visibility and 
establish authority” (ibid).  By extension, democracy is described as “the regime of writing”, 
an anarchic regime in which the law is given by “the wanderings of the orphaned letter, in 
which it occupies the place of living discourse, the place of the community’s living soul” (ibid: 
95). 
The dissonance between doing, being and saying induced by writing is said to inhere 
in the form of certain texts. Rancière pays particular attention to the “topos of the found 
book” or the “book in pieces” (ibid: 90), in which a narrative is retrieved from scattered 
sources. He gives the example of Jean Paul’s Life of Fibel, which purports to be reconstructed 
from remnants found in a book store and scraps used to make “coffee filters, kites, dress 
patterns, pipe lighters, chair covers, and herring wrappers”, retrieved and reassembled, 
page by page, by village urchins hired by the narrator (ibid: 87). Fibel’s “novelistic fancy” is 
traced back to the myth of Gyges the shepherd, who finds a golden ring that renders him 
invisible and allows him “to seduce the queen of Lydia, kill the king, and take his place” (ibid: 
89). This primordial fable is related to the entry into writing, and said to suggest its 
insurrectionary possibilities.   
Derrida, in his reading of Plato’s Phaedrus, argues that these possibilities are 
suggested by the text itself. Drawing particular attention to the section in which Socrates 
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compares the written text that Phaedrus carries with him to the “pharmakon”, a “medicine 
and/or poison” that leads the reader away from his “general, natural, habitual paths and 
laws”, Derrida observes that only words which are “deferred, reserved, enveloped, rolled up, 
words that force one to wait for them in the form and under cover of a solid object” can get 
Socrates moving (2000: 70-71).   
There are clear resonances here with the format, distribution, contents and 
ambitions of the underground press during the Indian emergency. But these often seemed 
to be encouraged by, rather than existing in simple opposition to, the flat-footed operations 
of state censorship, which in a period of low literacy levels was disproportionately 
concerned with print media, and print media in English at that. (In the 1971 census an 
overall literacy rate of a mere 34.45% had been recorded.) Indira Gandhi even claimed that 
opposition to her rule came from the newspapers alone:  
While explaining the reasons for the imposition of Emergency, Smt. Gandhi had said that it 
was the newspapers which were inciting the people and creating a terrible situation. 
According to her, the agitation was only in the newspapers and once the newspapers were 
placed under censorship there was no agitation.  
(GI 1978, Vol I: 33) 
 
According to this view it is readers who possess a critical intellect and are therefore capable 
of threatening state projects; whereas in a September 1975 address to Directors of AIR, V.C. 
Shukla, Minister of Information and Broadcasting, described radio as “the most potent 
medium that the Government has at its command” (GI 1977, Appendix 7: 15). This is 
qualitatively different from Nehru declaring that the Independent, the nationalist newspaper 
founded in 1919, would “‘think aloud for India’” (Israel 1994: 1). In contrast to the way in 
which Indira Gandhi worries about the unruliness of print, broadcast media is viewed as an 
instrument over which the state is imagined to have control.  
The Indian government famously offered transistor radios as an inducement for men 
to undergo sterilization during the emergency, and there is arguably a similar kind of logic to 
this. Both initiatives configured listeners as passive (‘silent’) recipients of state programmes 
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and messages. Underlying this attitude is the standard theory of communication, which 
privileges the spoken over the written word because of its immediacy, and a hierarchy that 
places speakers and writers over readers and listeners.  
As discussed in the introduction, this has been countered by other conceptions of 
the contingent nature of the relationship between the written and spoken word.  This view 
seems to correspond better to the communication processes at work during the emergency, 
which seemed to benefit from ‘quirks’ in implementation of state censorship compounded 
by the interface between the spoken and written word in a multilingual context. This is how 
George Fernades’s alternative Independence Day message came to be widely disseminated 
through the written word, existing in a state of “radical contingency” (Gupta 2012: 197) with 
the spoken word in various languages. Moreover, in an age of broadcast media dissent did 
not have to remain local, reaction was rendered ineffective on a national scale by 
international radio working in conjunction with modern telecommunications and the simple 
cyclostyle technology of the local underground press. By these means it also elided Bakhtin’s 
distinction between the “living word” and “technical means” by combining the properties of 
both. 
 
Prison writers 
Prisons were a state-level rather than Central subject, meaning that detention conditions 
varied from state to state, in accordance with classifications established in colonial era 
legislation on the categorisation and separation of prisoners. Specifically, the 1894 Prisons 
Act and colonial-era prison manuals, which divided prisoners on the basis of social and 
educational status and ethnicity. The Maintenance of Internal Security (Conditions of 
Detention) (Mysore) Order, 1971 (MISA), under which L.K. Advani was detained in Bangalore, 
states that “security prisoners” will be divided into two classes, “Class 'A' and Class 'B' having 
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regard to the state of health, education, status and mode of living of such security prisoners 
prior to detention”. The race bar may have been lifted (categories such as European and 
Indian which were a feature of colonial manuals), but the reference to education and social 
status remained – “habit of life” as it is expressed in the early jail manuals.50 Plus there was 
the significance of unofficial status, which meant that even when Advani was briefly 
transferred to Rohtak jail in Haryana, where there was only one class of MISA prisoner, he 
continued to have company and access to media. 
With figures such as Advani and Narayan who had been arrested under MISA, there 
was a further complication in that they were being held in preventive rather than punitive 
detention, and therefore “detenus” rather than convicts. Although this, too, was 
inconsistently applied with the Shah Commission observing in its state-wise survey of jail 
conditions that except for food, clothing and reading material, those detained under MISA 
were often lodged in the same conditions as other inmates (GI 1978, Vol. III: 135). Many of 
the “senior and respected leaders” arrested were also elderly and in need of specialist 
medical care (ibid), the terminally ill Narayan being the most famous example.  
With Narayan and some of the other senior movement leaders there was the 
additional awkwardness that many of them had been heroes of the Independence 
movement. The last time they had been imprisoned was by the colonial state. The Shah 
Commission points to anomalies in the situation: 
At no time since Independence was such a large scale detention of senior and respected 
leaders ordered simultaneously all over the country and no notice whatever was given to the 
authorities concerned for being prepared to receive the large influx of respected leaders as 
detenus. A large number of those who were detained, were fairly advanced in age and many 
of them were in need of constant and specialised medical attention for which the jail 
hospitals were totally ill-equipped.  
(GI 1978, Vol. III: 135) 
 
                                                 
50 In the "The Maintenance of Internal Security (Conditions of Detention) (Mysore) Order, 1971" this is expressed 
as “mode of living”. Security prisoners are divided into class A and B on the basis of “health, education, status and 
mode of living” prior to detention. (National Archives of India, Home List No. 180; 1287 5. 41011/9/KNT/77-T-4 
– “Replies received from Karnataka on Questionnaire reg. treatment in Jails.”)  
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Unsurprisingly, both Advani and Narayan draw historical analogies with colonial repression 
in their prison writings, describing Indira Gandhi as even more tyrannical than the colonial 
state, which is said to have left some room for criticism. Narayan observes that it is only in 
independent India that he has experienced “tear gas, lathi blows” and solitary detention 
(1977: 6). Advani claims that nothing “the British did in 1936 in the matter of civil liberties 
can match the crimes against democracy by the present government” (1978: 77). 
But in many ways Narayan and Advani appear to have received preferential 
treatment from the prison authorities. Fear of the repercussions of his dying in custody led 
to Narayan being shifted to hospitals in Delhi and Chandigarh and eventually released on 12 
November 1975.  Conditions seem to have been particularly favorable for Advani, arrested 
as part of a parliamentary delegation, kept in Class A conditions in the south Indian state of 
Karnataka for the most part, allowed regular family visits and able to send and receive 
letters and telegrams. In the Scrapbook he describes Bangalore jail, where he spent most of 
his time in prison, as having “the best jail library I have ever seen”, containing English and 
Hindi books as well as a wide range of Kannada literature, and benefiting from being 
maintained as a sub-branch of the Central Library, Bangalore, rather than run as part of the 
jail administration (1978: 16). Unlike other categories of MISA detainees there were no 
restrictions on his use of the library (ibid: 18) and a transistor radio (ibid: 103). In Rohtak jail, 
where he stayed from 15 July – 23 September 1975, he continued to read newspapers and 
listen to the radio, and was also able to watch television.  In Ahmedabad, where he was 
briefly transferred in March 1976, he was able to receive news reports and to convey 
information about his movements to family members and party workers through a co-
detainee who maintained “a very active communication link with those outside” (ibid: 131). 
Both Advani and Narayan could send and receive letters, access national and international 
media, and had the opportunity to write about their response to them. Advani mentioned 
143 
 
not being able to use a typewriter when in prison, but experienced no other restrictions on 
writing materials.51  
 Narayan’s Prison Diary covers the period from 21 July to 4 November 1975, and 
according to its editor, A.B. Shah, is presented with minimal editing (1977b: viii). The first 
edition had been printed in small installments at night, under conditions of censorship. A 
second edition, published in 1977 soon after Indira Gandhi’s election defeat, added a few 
appendices to this text. It is written in English for the most part, but includes sections in 
Hindi when calling for total revolution (7 August 1975, pp.9-10 and 7 October, pp.87-88); 
celebrating Republic Day (15 Aug 1975, pp.15-16) and the 106th birthday of Gandhi (2 
October 1975, p.82); and discussing the Bhagavat Gita and its commentaries (16 August 
1975, p.17; 15 October, p.92). Hindi seems to be the medium chosen for expressions of 
political idealism, patriotism and religious faith – for addressing ‘the people’. English is used 
for analysis and addressing the state: his analytical notes on the people's movement are in 
English, as are his open letters to Indira Gandhi. 
Advani’s book covers a longer period of imprisonment, includes entries for 26 June 
1975 – 12 March 1976, is written in English and described as a “scrapbook” rather than a 
diary. Its first part, titled “A view from behind bars”, resembles the diary format in that it is a 
chronological reflection on events as they unfold, but at various points Advani distinguishes 
between the text we are reading and the diary he kept during this period by referring to 
occasions when he wrote in the latter (1978: 15). Sections from this diary do appear in the 
book, but it is not a verbatim reproduction of it. The book has been compiled at a later date; 
content may have been added, removed and edited.   Part two is a collection of five 
pamphlets written by Advani and distributed from jail by the Lok Sangharsh Samiti (the 
people’s struggle committee), an underground resistance organisation headed by former 
RSS full-timer Nanaji Deshmukh (Basu 1993: 52). Part three consists of letters and notes sent 
                                                 
51 Interview with L.K.  Advani, New Delhi, 20 September 2014.  
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from jail. Part four includes three appendices: a synopsis of legal proceedings against Advani 
et al. and an enumeration of the likely course of events over the next six months, as seemed 
likely to Advani on 31 October 1975.  
In his preface to A Prisoner's Scrap-Book, Moraji Desai, the then prime minister, 
describes its title as an example of “Shri Advani’s modesty”, and says he is sure it “will prove 
to be an important addition to the Library of our second liberation” (Advani 1978: vi). Prison 
literature had become a familiar genre by the mid-seventies, and both men would have 
been aware of colonial-era examples of it. Indeed, Narayan had earlier contributed to it with 
Inside Lahore Fort (1959). The significance of the moment both men are living through is 
underlined by parallels between the emergency and earlier periods in Indian history, and 
also international history and politics. As Advani notes, these analogies were a common 
feature of journalism during the emergency. Precluded from criticising the government 
directly, writers took to “historical narratives and references which have a moral for the 
present” (1978: 51). Prison writers who were not submitting their material for censorship in 
private writing, at least, were operating from different imperatives when drawing parallels 
and making comparisons.  Through analogy and contrast they attempt to discern rather than 
conceal the outlines of their current experience, and also to assert its world-historical 
significance.  As I will go on to elaborate in my reading of Narayan’s text, in this way they 
also draw upon the “the virtual relevance of the past in refiguring the prevailing forces of the 
present” (Grosz 2004: 252).  
The virtual and the past were both available to them because of the storage 
capacities of the media through which the messages they receive were transmitted. From 
his emergency-era writings it is clear that Advani in particular was attuned to changes 
wrought in the scope, reach and form of messages disseminated by new technology in a 
post-Independence political context, and able to place them both historically and 
internationally. Familiar with the ways of modern day politics and media, Advani draws 
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parallels between Indira Gandhi’s actions and those of Richard Nixon. The new style of 
politics in India is said to be based on the same principles, with “political manipulation 
becoming the substitute of political policy, and invention of bogeys to mobilise mass support” 
(Advani 1978: 268).  
In making the comparison with Nixon, Advani was also possibly thinking of his 
televised appeals for support for the Vietnam War from what he described as “the great 
silent majority of my fellow Americans”. Underlying this invocation of a “great silent majority” 
is both what Rancière describes as “the ‘liberal’ opposition of the enlightened individual to 
the stupid mass” (2011a: 239), and also “the paradox of the spectator”: there is no theatre 
without spectators, but spectatorship is a “bad thing” because viewing is the opposite of 
knowing and acting (2009: 2). The dangerous crowd and the audience are configured as 
close cousins in their imagined amenability to manipulation by leaders/spokesmen.  
Advani, reflecting on Indira Gandhi’s audacity in “lying” in her first formal address to 
the nation since the emergency, writes that “this outright lie…must have given to the 
thinking sections of our people a measure of the deceit and untruth which marked Indira 
Gandhi’s campaign of calumny against the opposition” (1978: 38). As a journalist and 
politician, someone professionally qualified to decode state messages, he implicitly includes 
himself in this category. By writing about his response to media and distributing this writing 
through the underground press, he establishes ‘voice’, asserts a capacity to both know and 
act despite his consumption of censored media and confinement in a state jail.  
Narayan’s account also demonstrates awareness that he is writing a historically 
significant document, not just responding to the exigencies of the moment in producing 
documents for the underground press. Both men are transmitters and receivers of 
emergency-era messages. Rather than being a passive audience for news of a ‘raw’ event, 
they construct meanings from information they receive from a variety of media, which they 
interpret through their awareness of a host of Cold War and postcolonial contexts, and from 
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within a ‘special’ context.  But I argue that whilst their position and location may have been 
‘special’, far from being unique it was shared by many Indians both within and without the 
walls of emergency-era prisons. This is sweepingly expressed in the RSS history of this period, 
which declares that “Mrs Gandhi transformed the whole country into a huge jail by 
proclaiming the emergency” (1991: 89). Congress’s defeat in the 1977 election has also been 
described as something of a ‘jail break’, in its apparent affirmation of liberal, democratic 
values (Rudolph and Rudolph 1978). The cases of these ‘Prison Writers’ are therefore 
presented with a view to understanding the wider dynamics of media production and 
reception during this period, which will culminate in a consideration of the ‘Reader Voters’ 
who participated in the 1977 election.   
 
“Back to the barbaric feudal days” 
Detention conditions for Narayan may have been relatively favourable, but he seems to 
have experienced them as being far from ideal, and to have particularly resented being kept 
in solitary confinement. Every day there is something in the papers that upsets him, he 
writes, usually Indira Gandhi’s “half-truths and lies”, and wishes that there was another 
political detenu with him with whom he could talk and vent his feelings; this would be worth 
“many tablets and sedatives and tranquillisers” (1977b: 14).  
Being kept in solitary confinement seems to induce a particular kind of introspection 
in Narayan. The very first entry in his Prison Diary, dated July 21 1975, establishes the tone 
of self-recrimination and regret that pervades the book: “My world lies in a shambles all 
round me…I must bear the full, the whole, responsibility” (ibid: 1). Later he goes on to 
describe how “every nail driven deeper into the coffin of Indian democracy is like a nail 
driven into my heart” (ibid: 4), which is not an empty simile given the state of his health. His 
visceral response to politics oddly recalls a period when the emperor’s physical person was 
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the locus of the state. From the controversy over purchase of his dialysis machine (Narayan 
1977a: 97-98), through to postmortem examinations to determine whether he had been 
medically injured in jail by not being given appropriate treatment, his imprisonment during 
the emergency and death soon after were to become a part of “socio-political-medical 
history” (Chhuttani 1995: viii). Narayan himself draws these parallels in his empathetic 
response to the account of Aurangzeb’s death in Ishwari Prasad’s History of Muslim Rule, 
which he describes reading on the eve of Mujib’s murder. In the entry for 14 August 1975, 
he draws parallel between his own situation and Prasad’s account of Aurangzeb’s lonely final 
days: “What the Emperor felt, a humble person like me could be allowed to feel” (1977b: 15). 
But the example of Aurangzeb, under whose rule the Mughal Empire reached its 
greatest extent before falling apart, also encourages more impersonal reflection on 
antecedents to the emergency.  He observes that there has never been a successful attempt 
to govern India from a single centre and heavily centralised states have not lasted long. The 
borders of various empires have expanded and shrunk with the passing of time and all of 
them have eventually disintegrated. This was case even when there was “no concept of 
democracy based on adult franchise, or of civil liberties and rights of every common citizen” 
(ibid: 16). Thinking about Indira Gandhi’s action in stark historical perspective, without 
reference to specific rulers and periods, allows Narayan to abstract out the dynamics that he 
perceives to be at play. From this he draws the hopeful lesson that the emergency period 
will also be short-lived. 
In less general terms, this response fits within Narayan’s longstanding interest in 
nationalism and federalism. His attitude changed over the decades from hostility to States 
reorganisation to participation in peace missions in Nagaland and Kashmir, which led him to 
advocate for smaller and more autonomous states. But he remained concerned with how to 
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reconcile the right to self-determination and the need for overall unity.52  With reference to 
events in Bangladesh, this is evident in his entry for 18 August 1975, which expresses relief 
that Bangladesh will retain the name of the “People’s Republic”, that there will not be “any 
constitutional links forged with Pakistan - confederation, association or anything else like 
that,” and “Bangladesh is not going to become anyone's satellite” (1977b: 19-20). Despite 
his empathy with Aurangzeb, there is evidence here of unease at the prospect of a latter day 
example of ‘Muslim rule’, another Islamic state on India’s borders. The reference to satellites 
expresses the same concern in the idiom of geopolitics. At the international level his support 
for national self-determination is part of his support for non-alignment, which leads him to 
view both the USSR and US with suspicion. This attitude is manifest in an elaborate 
conspiracy theory about the emergency being a Soviet take-over plot. In the entry for 22 July 
1975 he predicts a time will come when “having squeezed the juice out of Mrs Gandhi, the 
Russians through the CPI and their Trojan horses within the Congress will dump her on the 
garbage heap of history and install in her place their own man” (ibid: 3-4). He also writes of 
the role of the Americans in spreading disinformation. False rumours that Bangladesh will be 
renamed the Islamic Republic are revealed to originate from a US news agency, leading him 
to wonder why the Americans are “always up to this kind of mischief” (ibid: 20).  
His awareness of a range of competing perspectives during the cold war era informs 
his analysis of the international coverage of the event, which he receives prior to the Indian 
press commentary. Because of the wide range of media from distant countries that he refers 
to, some in languages he could not read or even understand, I am assuming that he came 
across their contents through news digests on international radio, but this is not specified. 
                                                 
52 In a press statement released on 5 November 1956, he declares that “the conception of India as a Union of States 
is entirely wrong and contrary to fact and historical development. The analogy neither of USA nor of USSR 
applies to our country. India is one nation and one country and therefore one state” (Narayan 1970: 213). In 1968, 
during a speech on “Kashmir and India” (ibid: 304-305), he was claiming to be no admirer of the “outmoded and 
outdated” concept of the nation-state and describing the Indian version as “a haphazard creation owing to the 
tragedy of partition”, albeit one whose geographical borders must be respected now that they have been 
demarcated. Narayan‟s interest in Kashmir dates back to the pre-Independence period when he had supported the 
Quit Kashmir movement launched by Sheikh Abdullah‟s National Conference, and was in keeping with his 
opposition to princely states and monarchical rule generally (Puri 2005: 15). 
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He mentions coverage in Russia, France, Yugoslavia and the US specifically, and makes 
vaguer references to the European and Western press in general (ibid: 20). Russia and the 
Russian press are said to be predictably silent or noncommittal, whereas the communist 
press in Europe sees the hand of the CIA in the event, L'Humanité being the most explicit in 
making this claim. Non-communist European papers are apparently divided, some viewing it 
as a US-backed rightist coup, others discerning the support of China. Only Yugoslavia 
“regrets the eclipse of the policy of non-alignment for which Mujib stood” (ibid). 
All these readings are ultimately rejected as Narayan decides that the “affair was a 
domestic event” (ibid).  When further details of the killing emerge on 22 August 1975 (ibid: 
27-28), he identifies it as an assertion of oligarchic power in accordance with a familiar 
pattern. The precautionary murder of all available members of Mujib’s family is said to be a 
return to the “barbaric feudal days…when brother killed brother to seize the crown” (ibid: 
27). Nevertheless, he struggles to reconcile the barbarity of this act with the military 
regime’s continued espousal of the tenets of ‘Mujidabad’ (nationalism, socialism, secularism 
and democracy): “His (Mushtaq Ahmed) taking over supreme martial law power while still 
talking of democracy, I can understand. All dictators talk like this. We have our own Mrs 
Gandhi. But why destroy the entire Mujib family?” (ibid). He leaves open the possibility of 
third-party involvement and concludes “the truth will only emerge from the passage of time” 
(ibid). In a context of censorship and distortion of information, all received accounts are 
refused, past, present and future elided.  
 Although Narayan may have be sensitive to both “the literal and connotative” levels 
of the accounts he receives, his response to them does more than simply engage in an 
“oppositional reading” along lines delimited by the process of “encoding” (Hall 1980:137-
138). By reading various “hegemonic codes” against one another, he effects something like 
the “contraction or distention of temporalities”, which Rancière specifies as necessary for 
thinking and writing democratic history (2011c: 65). With reference to the novels of Virginia 
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Woolf, Rancière speaks of the “liberating political possibilities” of modes of individuation 
and the interlinking of sequences, which challenge “the formatting of reality” of state-
controlled media, by “undoing the relations between the visible, the sayable, and the 
thinkable”, thereby establishing a grid that makes it possible to think of “political 
dissensuality” (ibid: 65).  
This ‘grid’ was outlined in one of the J.P. movement’s most famous slogans: 
“sampoorna kranti ab nara hai, bhawi itihaas hamara hai” (Narayan 1977b: 128 – “total 
revolution is now the slogan, future history belongs to us”), conveying a sense of what 
would be the retrospective historical significance of this ‘second Independence struggle’. In 
Narayan’s prison writings it seems to be expressed in two registers. Listening to radio 
reports of the massacre brings up the suggestion of ‘eternal recurrence’ and even 
‘regression’ – back to the “barbaric feudal days…when brother killed brother” – thus 
punctuating the ‘progressive’ pretensions of the new regime. Reading about those days 
allows him to invoke the ‘future anterior’, to kick the traces of the present to reveal the 
pattern of the past, in order to evoke a different distribution of power and demarcation of 
territorial boundaries.  
 
“We, representing the entire political spectrum in the country” 
Unlike Narayan, Advani was always in the company of other detenus, and at various points 
in his book he refers to the political leaders with whom he has been arrested as friends and 
colleagues, a comradeship that extends across party lines. This is of a piece with the 
composition of the Janata Party itself, which was formed out of a conglomeration of parties 
opposed to Indira Gandhi’s Congress. Advani describes all party discussions on what stance 
to take towards Narayan, whose call for the police and army to revolt alienated some 
detenus (1978: 50-51), and of how and to what extent to form a coalition with left parties 
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that oppose the emergency (ibid: 48). These ties would be stretched to the limit in later 
discussions over whether it is possible to be a member of the party and the Hindu nationalist 
paramilitary organization, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). Arguments over dual-
membership of the RSS would eventually lead to the break-up of Janata, but during this 
unusual time, and in these extreme circumstances, affiliations seemed to extend across 
ideological lines.  
Both the Jammat-i-Islami and the RSS were banned during the emergency, and 
Advani recounts strategic political alliances and improbable friendships formed in the 
common space of the jail. In an entry for 5 July 1975 he tells of how the jail authorities had 
separated the RSS members from “the Jamaat people”, who were being detained alongside 
those held on smuggling charges, “obviously prompted by considerations of religious 
homogeneity” – the smugglers presumably being Muslim (ibid: 17). The Jammat detenus are 
said to have protested against the classification, which led to “political prisoners” (an 
unofficial but respected status) being housed with those suspected of criminal activity (ibid: 
17-18). Advani reports that “adjustments were accordingly made” and remarks upon the 
hypocrisy of an apparently secular government perpetuating “religious and other 
denominations by every one of its acts” (ibid: 17).  
It was during the emergency itself that the word ‘secular’ was added to the 
preamble of the Indian constitution, in a rebuttal of the ‘non-secular’ forces that had 
opposed Indira Gandhi.  These forces were to meet in emergency-era jails and unite in 
opposition to Indira Gandhi’s rule, a manoeuvre which strongly recalls the cross-
denominational alliances encouraged by colonial repression during the Khilafat movement. 
In both instances religion may have served to mobilise resistance to state repression, but 
religious differences had to be spanned in order to do so on a national scale.  
Another similarity with the Khilafat movement was the ‘cosmopolitan’ aspect to this 
reaching beyond the confines of given identities and political positions.  Advani describes 
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reading media in various languages and coming from national and international sources 
against each other, and doing so in the company of other detenus who act as a fact-checking 
and critical chorus. Early in his book Advani describes how censorship of the press had 
meant that “the Indian student of public affairs has no option but to tune in to foreign 
broadcasting media. I took it upon myself to keep track of reports regarding India relayed by 
the BBC, Voice of America, Voice of Germany and Radio Australia…Radio Moscow, Peking 
Radio and Radio Pakistan.” (Ibid: 17). On a previous occasion, in the entry for 4 August 1975, 
he describes an instance when someone in the News Services Division of All India Radio had 
“bungled” and allowed the Punjabi and Urdu divisions to report on proposals to amend the 
Representation of the People Act, information that had been removed from the English 
bulletin (ibid: 32).  
Both aspects come together in his account of Indira Gandhi performing the flag 
hoisting ceremony on Independence Day, which he was able to watch on a television set 
kept in the canteen of Rohtak jail. Advani describes how “we, representing practically the 
entire political spectrum in the country”, could not comprehend an allusion in Indira 
Gandhi’s speech to an opposition ruler who had ridiculed the tricolour as a “rag” (ibid: 38). 
This leads to an excursus on Dalit politics in Maharashtra from Socialist Party leader Madhu 
Dandavate, who explains that a member of the Dalit Panthers, a faction of the Republican 
Party in Maharashtra, had made this remark, and that ironically he is a supporter of Indira 
Gandhi.  
The detainees also comment upon the otherwise mellow tone of the speech and 
Indira Gandhi’s unconvincing performance of anger. She is said to be “making a special effort 
to look enraged” when referring to the opposition at the beginning of her speech, but her 
“worked-up wrath” fails to impress (ibid). (With a television broadcast there is also the 
opportunity to read a speaker’s physical expressions against his words.) The mystery is 
resolved when Advani listens to the Voice of America morning news bulletin and hears about 
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the military coup in Bangladesh and the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. He shares 
the news with the other inmates, who react with shocked disbelief. A few days previously 
Dandavate had heard a radio broadcast announcing the resignation of eight Cabinet 
ministers and relayed the information to the other prisoners, who only realised later that 
this had occurred in Argentina and not India. Advani’s report of a coup in Bangladesh is met 
with doubt by the others, and this makes him wait for confirmation of what he has heard.  
Advani begins trying to get reception of a medium wave radio station to see if any 
regional language broadcast might be available. He finally gets a Marathi news bulletin, 
which declares that Mujib had sent an Independence Day greeting to the Indian President. 
But he soon comes across Voice of America and BBC reports which give “full accounts of the 
gory events in Dacca that morning” (ibid: 39).  He also listens to Dacca Radio, which 
broadcasts the swearing in of the new Head of State (ibid: 40). All India Radio, meanwhile, 
takes five hours to report that a coup has taken place (ibid), and a full account of the killings 
does not appear until much later.  
“Clog the openings and you run the risk of explosions”, Advani concludes (ibid: 39), 
referring to events occurring in both Bangladesh and India. A kind of structural-functionalism 
informs this image of power and information as self-determining forces, substances that 
burst through repression, and Advani was aware of its theoretical underpinnings. According 
to him this episode corroborates the thesis of an article by Ashis Nandy that was amongst 
some books and journals sent by friends outside. Titled “Invitation to a beheading: A 
psychologist’s guide to assassinations in the third world”, the article predicts that Indira 
Gandhi will be murdered if she persists with her current course of action. Assassination is 
described as one of four available means of political competition in closed regimes: 
“revolution, rebellion, coup and assassination” (ibid: 170), and said to be the cheapest of the 
four, as it requires the least organization, planning and popular assent. Therefore it is at “a 
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premium in the Third World”, in some parts of it, such as Latin America, becoming “a 
standard means of deciding political succession” (ibid: 171).  
But all of the above suggests that repression also encouraged a search for 
alternative news-sources in other media and various languages, encouraged reading across 
this media, alliances across previously existing lines and critical reception of both official and 
unofficial information. Obstructions, gaps and misunderstandings in the information matrix 
encouraged readings in an oppositional code and the coming together of previously 
antagonistic groups in opposition to the emergency regime.   
As with the ‘first’ Independence movement, this was an ambiguous and volatile 
process. Because of its incorporation of elements from across the political spectrum, from 
Naxalites to Hindu nationalist organisations, around the amorphous goal of ‘total revolution’ 
and under the charismatic leadership of Narayan, the J.P. movement has sometimes been 
labelled ‘fascist’. (A pamphlet collected in part two of Advani’s Scrapbook, “Anatomy of 
Fascism”, reverses this accusation *ibid: 249-269]). Even those who participated in it have 
subsequently expressed the possibility that it was ‘regressive’. In an interview given in 2000, 
Socialist Party politician Dandavate questions the inclusion of the Jana Sangh.53  Narayan is 
said to have believed that only the total mobilisation of forces opposed to the emergency 
could have brought about its revocation, and, given the 1977 election results, he may well 
have been justified in his belief. But, speaking to an interviewer in the Jawaharlal Nehru 
Memorial Museum and Library, during a time when a BJP government was in power at the 
centre, Dandavate regrets the long-term repercussions of this move. Communal forces such 
as the Jana Sangh are said to have gained respectability during the Janata period, whilst the 
Socialists fell into decline.  
                                                 
53 Madhu Dandavate.  (interviewee), recorded by Smt. Usha Prasad (interviewer), 12th December 2000, Nehru 
Memorial Museum and Library, Oral History Project (778) 
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Dandavate may well have been thinking about the career of former prison-mate L.K. 
Advani, who had risen to the position of Home Minister in the BJP government. Advani had 
come to political prominence a second time in the 1990s, as one of the leaders of the 
campaign to build a temple on the site of the Babri masjid, culminating in the violent 
destruction of the mosque in 1992. Advani had launched the campaign to rebuild the temple 
with a procession from Somnath, site of a temple repeatedly destroyed by Muslim rulers and 
controversially renovated by the Congress government in 1951, to Ayodhya, the north Indian 
town in which the Babri Masjid was located. Through “nine states over thirty-six days” he 
travelled across India in a vehicle modelled on a chariot: 
The image of chariot helped convey the idea that here was a righteous mission undertaken 
by a spiritual figure, somewhat like the mythological epics shown over the last three and a 
half years in weekly television serials. Advani disclosed there had been some pressure on him 
to put on saffron robes, and said that as a political rather than religious figure, it was against 
his beliefs to do such a thing. Whatever his beliefs were, the elaborate paintings of Ram and 
the proposed Ayodhya temple, Advani’s wayside pujas which he performed wearing a crown, 
the slogan-shouting, saffron-bedecked volunteers swarming around the procession, and his 
speeches themselves left no doubt about the campaign’s appeal to religious sentiment. 
(Rajagopal 2001: 193) 
 
Coming from someone as avowedly political and reputedly secular as Advani (a 
Sindhi Hindu un-associated with the north Indian Hindu identity at play in the Ayodhya 
movement), the opportunism of his actions seemed blatant. It also seemed to contrast with 
his liberal emergency-era politics, which in his prison writings is expressed in a concern with 
civil liberties and human rights. Opposition to the death penalty in India is occasioned by 
inspection of a gallows (Advani 1978: 58). Discussion of a UN General Assembly resolution 
prohibiting torture, unlawful arrest and detention, follows a meeting with a school teacher 
who has been badly beaten by police officers (ibid: 88).  The resolution had been supported 
by the Indian representative at the UN during the emergency itself, and in the English 
translation of the RSS history of the period, in an illustrated chapter titled “Atrocities”, this is 
likened to “the Devil quoting the scriptures” (Sahasrabuddhe and Vajpayee 1991: 242). 
Advani’s account is drier. Displaying a stronger sense of the international, of history, and, 
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arguably, with an eye on future and foreign readerships, he leaves out the detail that India 
had signed the resolution and focuses instead on the role played by Greece in sponsoring 
the motion (1978: 88).  
Across the Scrapbook as a whole Advani’s references are often non-Indian (Thomas 
Jefferson, Cesare Pavese, Solzhenitsyn), and the political ideology that comes across most 
strongly is a liberalism with few local inflections. The single extended religious reference 
stands out because of its incongruity. The “sins of these past few months are not Indira 
Gandhi’s alone”, he writes, but the “collective guilt” of all Congressmen, regardless of 
whether they actively supported her or merely acquiesced:  “Bhishma and Drona were as 
much responsible for the outrageous disrobing of Draupadi as were Duryodhana and 
Dushasana”(ibid: 78). This is footnoted as an allusion “to an episode in the Mahabharata” 
(ibid), which says something about whom Advani imagines his readers would be. These 
liberal attitudes therefore seem to be no less of a ‘performance’ than his later actions in 
Ayodhya: a response to a particular context and imagined audience – a future Anglophone 
readership, in India and elsewhere, rather than a national electorate. 
 Religious references were to return in his next book, The People Betrayed (1979), 
which deals with disintegration of the Janata Party on the, in his view, pretext of joint 
membership of the RSS. Advani describes the RSS as the “hobgoblin” of Indian politics, a 
scare figure that other parties could draw upon to frighten Muslim voters (ibid: 80-81), and 
elaborates on this insight with reference to the war diary of Joseph Goebbels, Minister of 
Information and Propaganda of National Socialist Germany, said to be one of the “precious 
documents” recovered by the Americans from post-war Germany:  
Analysts of Nazi propaganda techniques are all agreed that one of the cardinal principles of 
their strategy was: there must always be an enemy for the people to identify as the cause of 
all their problems; all propaganda must be keyed to ensuring that hatred against the enemy 
does not sag. The Bolsheviks and the Jews were favourite hate-objects of Nazi propaganda  
(ibid: 80) 
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During such moments Advani demonstrates an awareness of what Laclau, in his work on 
fascism and ideology, has described as the importance of “an antagonistic relationship with 
a dominant bloc” in the process of popular-democratic interpellations, which produce the 
subject known as the “people” (1979: 107). These are independent of any precise class 
content and therefore available to “quite distinct political discourses”, including fascism (ibid: 
111). Hence the difficulty in identifying the politics of the J.P. Movement on a right-left 
spectrum, because of its use of such a wide range of popular-democratic interpellations to 
oppose Indira Gandhi’s regime – variously appealing to liberal ideas of civil liberties, socialist 
ideals, revolutionary notions of non-violent struggle and religious beliefs. In this way, it 
seems to bear out political theorist Ernesto Laclau’s criticism of the assumption that “the 
‘people’ as a historical actor will be constituted around a progressive identity (from the point 
of view of the Left)” (2007: 246). Rather than embracing emancipatory politics, 
supplementary subjects may well construct their uncountability in what he describes as a 
‘fascist’ direction, but this, too, is not an inevitable process.  Even with reference to a single 
figure, Advani, and a single party, Janata, affiliations can be seen to shift according to 
audience and context.  
 
Reader voters 
One of the notable features of the emergency was the apparently comprehensive but 
transitory nature of its acceptance, making it hard to tell how state messages were being 
received. In their essay on the period, Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph note how “opportunism 
and fear, joined with conventional prudence and apathy”, combined with state and party 
influence on the economy and associational life to produce “many of the outer signs of 
totalitarianism” (1978: 386). Congress’s defeat in the March 1977 election is said to have 
revealed this to be a “temporary adaptation rather than adherence based on conviction” 
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(ibid).  But if the 1977 election result was, as they claim, an endorsement of “a liberal state 
and a democratic regime” (ibid: 399), what to make of Indira Gandhi’s re-election just a few 
years later in 1980, which aroused concerns that Indians were “indifferent to the dangers of 
authoritarianism and more concerned with the price of onions” (Weiner 1983: 134)? These 
fears have been periodically revived – they were an aspect of the response to Modi’s 
election victory in 2014, which I will go on to discuss in the next chapter – and significant 
areas of Indian territory continue to be subject to emergency ordinances, but an internal 
emergency on the scale of that which was proclaimed in 1975-77 has not been attempted 
since.  
In a recent book on liberalism in India, Christopher Bayly attributes Indians’ 
apparent resistance to totalitarian ideologies to the radical individualism of a strain of 
Hinduism, which is said to have prevented “the creation by the state or political leaderships 
of an Indian ‘socialist man’ or ‘fascist man’” (2012: 24).  But accounts of media reception in 
China (Latham 2000) and of the double-lives led by citizens of the German Democratic 
Republic (Darnton 1995) suggest that such adaptive behaviour is not the preserve of any 
particular religious or cultural tradition. Rather, it would seem to result from the double-
edged instrumentality of the modern state, closely intertwined processes of increased 
education and control of populations.  
The paradoxical operations of this dynamic can be seen in the fact that an election 
was called and held during the internal emergency itself, and also, as already mentioned, in 
the ‘progressive’ agenda that was its ostensible justification, as expressed in Indira Gandhi’s 
Twenty Point Economic Programme. The autocratic actions of this ostensibly socialist 
politician closely resembled the attitude of British liberals during the colonial period who 
espoused the principle of liberty but believed it did not apply to childlike barbarians “in need 
of direction by benign imperial authority” (Bayly 2012: 13). Despite different “core notions” 
regarding the relationship between individual and community, they shared what the political 
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theorist Michael Freeden, in a discussion of eugenics and progressive thought, has described 
as an “idea environment” (1983); specifically, a “developmental” concept of history rather 
than a “cyclical or accumulative” one (Freeden 2013: 960). 
Successive decisions to declare emergency and elections seem to result from a 
tension between what Freeden has described as the two defining axes of liberalism: 
“horizontal-spatial and vertical-temporal” (ibid: 236-237). Along the horizontal axis, rights 
and duties are ascribed to individuals, and the role of the state is limited to that of “harm 
preventer” and “boundary policer” – maintainer of “space and separation” between the 
public and private domains (ibid: 237). Along the vertical, a “secular gospel of humanity” is 
promoted, aimed at “individual progress and fulfilment, as well as emancipating peoples at 
earlier stages of advancement” (ibid). The state is tasked with fulfilment of this “temporally 
oriented creed that elicits the march of civilisation on the macro-level, and individual 
flourishing on the micro-level” (ibid). Where the two ‘axes’ intersect is in their attribution of 
an ombudsman position to the state. In both, it decides upon the direction of development 
and what Rancière describes as “the distribution of the sensible” (2011c: 12)). That is, the 
simultaneous disclosure and delimitation of “something in common” through a “system of 
self-evident facts of sense perception” (ibid).  Concretely, on the ‘need’ for temporary 
suspension of civil liberties and the redefinition of the private-public boundary that occurred 
during the Indian emergency of 1975-77 – incursions into dwelling spaces and bodies 
involved in ‘slum’ demolitions and forcible sterilisation programmes, which were justified as 
being in the ‘public’ interest.  
The developmental mandate for emergency-era repression has come to be judged 
as spurious, and to have been based on a faulty pedagogic model, encapsulated in the first 
point of Sanjay Gandhi’s Five Point Programme: “each one teach one”. Frankel in her book 
on India’s post-Independence economy attributes the un-success of the Twenty-Point 
Program to the “quixotic” nature of its attempt to establish “grass-roots organization for 
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popular mobilization by fiat from above” (2005: 549). She concludes that the emergency was 
less remarkable for its excesses against individuals, which followed a familiar pattern of 
“corruption and abuse of authority associated with unrestricted power”, than for its failure 
to use absolute powers to bring about basic social change (ibid: 564). In a comparative study 
of emergency regimes in India, Korea and the Philippines, Das Gupta describes how even 
according to its own limited understanding of economic development as productive growth, 
the emergency regime in India was a failure, as the ambitious Twenty Point Programme was 
whittled down to Sanjay Gandhi’s Five Points, which were further collapsed into two: 
“voluntary tree planting and involuntary sterilization” (1978: 335). Das Gupta also points to 
the wider context that emboldened the rulers of these countries to take this action: talk of 
the need for a “Strong will, strong discipline, and a strong state”, which evoked support from 
“advocates of liberal models of development for poor countries who would be noticeably 
suspicious if these same terms were to be applied at home” (ibid: 325).  
Such attitudes were informed by a colonial legacy of “constitutional autocracy”, 
whereby emergency powers were used to limit democratic self-governance, understood to 
be a potential threat “as dangerous as war, rebellion or internal disturbance” (Kalhan 2010: 
120). This legacy enabled both Indira Gandhi and Mujib to use constitutional provisions to 
centralise power in their own hands: Mujib in 1975 passing the fourth amendment to the 
constitution of Bangladesh, Indira Gandhi in 1977 passing the forty-second amendment to 
the Indian constitution. Its persistence in the post-colonial period, adoption by democratic 
states rather than empires, suggests an even more fundamental tension inherent in what 
Jacques Rancière has described as the oligarchic tendencies of all states (2006b: 73).  
This dynamic can be perceived in the history of democratic struggles in both 
‘undeveloped’ colony and metropole, with liberals’ faith in their own “civility and 
reasonableness” making them resistant to extending political rights to those without 
property, religious and racial minorities, women and colonial subjects (Mitchell 2011: 14). 
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These qualities were believed to qualify them “to act as spokespersons for the interests of 
those who were not yet ready to speak for themselves”, be they national peoples or colonial 
subjects (ibid). As well as being grounded in faith in their own superiority, this “not yet” was 
derived from a theory of learning in which the movement from ignorance to understanding 
is brought about through external intervention. It is this concept of understanding, according 
to Rancière, which “causes all the trouble”, brings a halt to the movement of reason (1991: 
8). Through their preoccupation with making things understood, “men of methods and 
progressives” are said to bring about stultification (ibid). Rancière’s own pedagogical model 
proceeds from assumptions about “the irreducibility of equality” (2006b: 48) and the value 
of distance in setting off the “poetic labour of translation”, which is said to be at the heart of 
all learning (2009b: 10). These assumptions form the basis of his own ideal of the “ignorant 
schoolmaster”, from whom the student learns something that he himself does not know as 
an effect of the mastery that forces him to search and verify this research (ibid: 14).  
Something along these lines was exercised by people engaged in democratic 
struggles against the colonial state in India, who preferred to look to non-British theoretical 
models, “to the liberalism of France, Spain or Italy, or to American republicanism” (Bayly 
2012: 4), or who otherwise picked and chose aspects of British liberalism that suited them. 
Say, in adhering to the principle of liberty, overlooked the fact that many of its British 
advocates such as John Stuart Mill believed it did not apply to colonial subjects. Through 
these means Indians during the colonial period are said to have been able to “excavate, 
appropriate and cannibalise the thought of European and American liberals in their search 
for a modicum of freedom” (ibid: 11).  
In the postcolonial period, something along these lines also occurred during the 
Indian emergency of 1975-1977, during which the pedagogic operations of the state taught 
the populations so invoked something that it, the police order, did not itself know, and as a 
result momentarily coalesced groups in ways that it did not anticipate. This process could be 
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perceived in the cross denominational alliances forged in prisons, but also in the 1977 
election result, which saw Muslims support the Janata Party in large numbers despite its 
incorporation of former members of the Hindu nationalist Jana Sangh. The Janata party and 
its allies won 328 seats out of 542 whilst Congress only gained 153 (Weiner 1978: 67). 
Almost all of the leaders of the Janata party were elected, and often by large margins. The 
union leader George Fernandes won his seat with a margin of 330,000 despite being in jail 
during the entire election campaign (ibid). Congress won only two seats in north India (ibid: 
69), historic centre of Congress party power, but also site of some of the worst excesses of 
the emergency, many of which disproportionately affected Muslims.  
Weiner describes scenes in the streets of Delhi as the results came in: 
People seemed elated by the knowledge of what their votes had done. At the large billboard 
on Parliament Street a group was asked who they thought would be India's next prime 
minister. Did they prefer Morarji Desai, Jagjivan Ram, or Charan Singh? "It doesn't matter," 
said one of the men. "If we don't like the prime minister we can always replace him.” 
(ibid: 60) 
 
Voters seemed to be voting not so much for a particular party or programme, but against an 
autocratic regime, and in affirmation of what Rancière has described as the democratic 
scandal: the “drawing of lots” which is the essence of democracy, with its scandalous 
revelation that “the government of societies cannot but rest in the last resort on its own 
contingency” (2006b: 47).  A form of community, approximating ‘the people’, seems to have 
been momentarily coalesced through the anonymity of the voting process and the shared 
experience of reading competing hegemonic articulations against the grain. (“As the reader 
passes through the various perspectives offered by the text, and relates the different views 
and patterns to one another, he sets the work in motion, and so sets himself in motion, too” 
[Iser 1980: 106]). But this grouping was based in the substitutability of persons rather than 
co-presence, and forged through the alienability of the word rather than ‘transparent’ 
communication.   
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Chapter four: The model code of conduct and the scandal of democracy 
This chapter picks up on the preceding discussion of the 1977 election and the thesis’s 
overall concern with state regulation of public communication during special periods, by 
examining the workings of electoral law. In its report on the Third General Elections in India, 
held in 1962, the Election Commission of India (ECI), the constitutionally established body 
that administers elections in India, mentions a code of conduct evolved just prior to the 
1960 legislative assembly elections in “the politically conscious State of Kerala” (ECI 1965: 
58-61). The code covered campaigning activities, and its emphasis was on maintaining public 
order and respecting “the right of every individual for peaceful undisturbed home life”. 
Meetings and processions had to be planned and approved well in advance, with a view to 
avoiding disruption to members of the public and clashes with other political parties. 
Speeches and slogans delivered from public platforms were required to observe a “high 
standard of decency and decorum”. Derogatory remarks about “the private lives, personal 
habits or physical peculiarities” of individuals, or their “religion, caste or community”, were 
to be avoided. Likewise posters and placards that sought to humiliate individuals or ridicule 
“the beliefs and practices of the followers of any religious or political thought”. The burning 
of effigies of political rivals would not be countenanced. 
Judging the exercise to have been a success, the ECI decided to circulate this code to 
political parties and state governments during the 1962 election, and in 1968 framed its own 
Model Code of Conduct for the guidance of Candidates and Political Parties.54 The Model 
Code had, and continues to have, non-statutory force, is dependent upon the cooperation of 
the political parties. But over the years it has moved beyond its original emphasis on 
preserving public order to creating a level playing field of political competition. As a result it 
has evolved into “a terrain of contest” between the political parties and the Election 
                                                 
54  Text of the Model Code of Conduct available from: http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/modelcodeofconduct_noticies.aspx 
(accessed 19/09/2015). 
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Commission of India, which, the political scientist Ujjwal Kumar Singh argues, has allowed 
the ECI to entrench its position as a “rule-making and rule enforcing body” (Singh 2012: 150). 
Singh identifies two phases during which this happened: after the internal emergency of 
1975-77 and during the 1990s. The Election Commission had played a significant role in 
encouraging Indians to vote without fear in the 1977 election conducted during the 
emergency itself. Afterwards, in 1979, it added an extra section to the Code, curtailing the 
power of the ruling party to avail of state resources for electioneering purposes. Building on 
a post-emergency vision of the Election Commission as the protector of the voice of the 
people, the Code was further strengthened following the appointment of T.N. Seshan as 
Chief Election Commissioner in 1990. Seshan introduced new restrictions on campaign 
expenditure and publicity, intended, he claimed, to curb the corrupting effect of “the three 
Ms: Minister-Power, Muscle-Power and Money-Power” (1995: 264). His efforts often 
involved him in direct confrontations with the government, politicians and the press, and the 
Model Code of Conduct was an important weapon in these battles.  
Situated at the crossroads of law, politics and society, the Code offers a useful 
vantage-point for exploring the relationship between the principle of popular sovereignty 
and the practice of conducting elections.  This chapter will focus this discussion on tensions 
inherent in the idea of elections conducted in society and overseen by the state as free 
expression of the voice of the people. These tensions are often thought to be particularly 
acute in post-colonial states with multicultural societies such as India. In their introduction 
to a special edition of Election Law Journal, for example, Gilmartin and Moog attribute the 
difference in the way in ‘the “voice of the people”’ is conceptualized in the US and the Indian 
system to their different histories and social structures (2012: 147). In the US this concept is 
said to be rooted in a market model view of society according to which the people’s voice 
emerges from a marketplace of choices made by individuals between “competing ideas and 
interests” (ibid). As a result regulation of elections is viewed as necessary but limited in 
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scope. In post-Independence India, on the other hand, voting has been linked to a vision of 
national citizenship, which seeks to transcend the structures of an authoritarian colonial 
state and a society segmented by “caste, region, religion, community, and patronage” (ibid). 
Electoral regulation is seen as more than a necessity, and the Election Commission of India, 
positioned ‘apart’ from government and ‘above’ politics, is tasked with and authorized by 
realization of this vision.   
I hope to extend this discussion by looking at the metropolitan precursors and 
colonial precepts of electoral reform in India, and data I collected during fieldwork in the 
north Indian State of Uttar Pradesh in the run-up to the 2014 national election (from 
December 2013 – May 2014). The popular mandate for the winning Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP) and its Prime Ministerial candidate, Narendra Modi, in the 2014 Indian election would 
appear to have been unequivocal. The BJP won the election with an outright majority (282 
seats out of 543), the first achieved by a single political party since 1984, when Congress had 
swept polls conducted after the assassination of Indira Gandhi. Together with its coalition 
partners in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) the BJP garnered a total of 336 seats to 
the Congress-led coalition’s 60. (Congress itself won only 44 seats, well short of the 55 
needed to form an official opposition.) The people had spoken and chosen, it seemed, in 
what has come to be seen as one of the most significant post-Independence Indian elections.  
A fairly typical version of this opinion is expressed by an editorial that appeared in 
the British newspaper, The Guardian, which hails the result as a second, real Independence 
Day for India. “Today, 18 May 2014, may well go down in history as the day when Britain 
finally left India” (Anon 2014). Up until now, it claims, for much of the time universal 
suffrage had given Indians a vote but not a voice.  The 1977 post-emergency election is said 
to have been an exception, and what it indicated about the “volcanic capacity” of this voice 
to have been realized by the 2014 result. The voice of the people had endorsed a new kind 
of political leader in Modi (lower caste, non-Anglophone) and thereby ushered in a new 
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India, which rejects an older politics of state patronage and vote banks.  Alongside 
references to anti-colonial struggle, in these comments one sees vestiges of what Chatterjee 
has described as “the old liberal paradigm of civic pedagogy” (2011: 145) that allowed John 
Stuart Mill to recommend paternal British rule for India until its people became mature 
enough to govern themselves. Finally, according to this British newspaper, Indians had 
obtained the political maturity required to participate in representative democracy. 
In this chapter I will counter claims that the 2014 election marked a break with an 
older politics of caste and religion through reference to the history of electoral reform in 
India and an account of the communally charged Uttar Pradesh phase of this election. More 
generally, I will take issue with theories of mediation that equate voting with speaking. I do 
not do so out of faith in the possibility of “authentic democracy”, based in “an ideal 
democratic decision-making situation” in which decision makers and citizens are “co-present” 
(Young 2000: 126), and to which any general election would fall well short. (Certainly the 
2014 Indian election, in which the BJP won only 31% of the vote, the lowest ever share of 
any party to win a majority.) Nor do I proceed from a more modest concern to separate 
speech from acts, which moves the literary critic Stanley Fish when he writes against 
extension of the First Amendment to cover expression of opinion through the act of voting 
(2011).55 Rather, out of scepticism about the transparency of all speech and action. I have 
therefore been drawn to theories that approach representation from the perspective of 
science and technology studies and aesthetic theory, which are more attuned to its 
contingent nature. 
Scepticism about the transparency of communicative action is of course not new to 
political theory. By transposing Habermas’s ideal speech situation to the practice of 
democratic representation, the political theorist Iris Marion Young underscores its 
contradictions. Elections, as opposed to town meetings, do not easily lend themselves to his 
                                                 
55 In Fish‟s opinion a vote‟s meaning is “exhausted by its function in a procedure (to say yes or no)”, therefore 
someone who has been denied exercise of a vote “has not been denied the expression of anything” (Fish 2011). 
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model of un-coerced participants freely evaluating one another’s assertions. Young uses the 
Derridean concept of différance to acknowledge the impact of “intervals of space and time” 
and the necessary separation between constituents and representatives in mass democracy 
(2000: 127). In order to dissolve the paradox of how one person can stand for many she 
rethinks representation as “a differentiated relationship among plural actors” (ibid). The 
Habermasian ideal of democracy as a “reasonable” communicative process between citizens 
and public officials is tempered by a pared-down definition of the “reasonable” as a 
willingness to be accountable to others (ibid: 52). The potential for exclusion of 
disenfranchised groups and unorthodox modes of expression is mitigated by deployment of 
three modes of communication: “greeting, rhetoric and narrative” (ibid: 53). This approach 
is sensitive to the hazards of mediation and attempts to address them by leaving scope for 
the non-cognitive, the rhetorical and symbolic, but it does not pay much attention to the 
technical means by which elections are conducted. Human beings and human speech remain 
central to its normative account of deliberative democracy. 
Other more empirically based, historical and ethnographic studies of elections have 
paid closer attention to their material aspects, looking at them in terms of rituals and 
practices, techniques and technology (Hauser and Singer 1986; Banerjee 2007 and 2011; 
Bertrand et al 2007; Coles 2004; Garrigou 2002 and 2012). The historical ethnographies 
contained in The Hidden History of the Secret Ballot (Bertrand et al 2007), for example, 
combine these approaches to deal with “the material mediation of such forms of 
subjectivation in different cultures of voting by the secret ballot as a technology” (Bertrand 
et al 2007: 8). In their introduction to this volume, Bertrand et al urge social scientists to see 
through the “fetishism” of electoral technologies by “electoral engineers” (ibid), say, 
assumptions about the secret ballot as a democratic ideal, and to carefully study the social 
relationships and material practices in which they are implicated. They describe the ballot as 
something that oscillates between the material and the social, between being a technique, 
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defined as ‘“matters of practical construction”’, and technology, ‘“a system of such means 
and methods”’ (ibid, both definitions are attributed to Raymond Williams). The relative 
autonomy of ballot technology combined with its dual material and social nature is said to 
explain why it is able to both discipline voters and allow for subversive action. Combining 
Foucault’s theories of subjectification with Michel de Certau’s work on the practice of 
everyday life, subversive action is described as “creative performance”, tactical 
appropriation of a technological device “leading to unpredictable but long-lasting changes in 
its functioning” (ibid: 11).  
This account goes beyond the “traditional definition of technique as the imposition 
of form consciously planned onto shapeless matter” (Latour 1994: 52-53) by being more 
attentive to the unpredictability of their performance and reception. However, a tautological 
view of techniques/technology as socially constructed persists and is accompanied by an 
Althusserian notion of the state apparatus, in which the state imposes its rigid order on 
society; or, in this case, attempts to, with its “‘secret ballot is freedom’ ideology” (Bertrand 
et al 2007: 3), but does not quite succeed.  As Latour observes, in claiming that forces of 
domination and exclusion work through the medium of artifacts to disguise themselves as 
natural and objective, critical theory adds conspiracy theory to a tautology and leaves 
unexplained why artifacts enter social relations in the first place (Latour 1994: 53). He argues 
that rather than reflecting or hiding these relations artifacts help to “remake” them, and 
substitutes “collective”, the co-mingling of humans and nonhumans in a corporate body, for 
what he describes as “the tainted word society” (ibid: 46, italics in the original). For 
subversive action or resistance he posits technical action/mediation (the two terms are used 
interchangeably), meaning the ability to mobilise “moves made elsewhere, earlier, by other 
actants” (ibid: 52). The co-presence of the past and the distant, of non-human characters, is 
said to free us from social interactions, “what we manage to do, right away, with our humble 
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social skills”, and in this way set us apart from other socially complex animals: “That we are 
not Machiavellian baboons we owe to technical action” (ibid). 
With regard to the notion of the state apparatus, Rancière questions the idea of a 
state-society binary by emphasising that the distribution of roles and spaces results as much 
from “the assumed spontaneity of social relations as from the rigidity of state functions” 
(1998: 29). He speaks instead of an opposition between politics and the police, meaning by 
the latter an order of bodies that allocates ways of doing, being and saying, which does not 
“discipline” those bodies so much as govern their appearance. The “police” would turn the 
workplace into a private space, where a worker’s part is defined by remuneration of his 
work rather than regulation proper to the public domain. All states are “police states” in that 
they are informed by a “state logic” which seeks to fix and control “identities, spaces and 
movements”, but this logic is not exclusive to the state (Rancière 2010b). In his “Ten Theses 
on Politics”, politics is specifically opposed to the police because it “makes visible that which 
had no reason to be seen” (Rancière 2001). It is therefore distinct from a model of 
communicative action that assumes its participants are pre-constituted. Those who would 
make visible an unseen world cannot rely upon a “pragmatics of communication”. The 
essence of politics is instead said to lie in “dissensus”, a type of political argument that does 
not involve conflict over interests or opinions but “the construction of a paradoxical world 
that relates two separate worlds”. For example, a worker who seeks to make a “domestic” 
wage dispute public has to demonstrate the world in which his argument counts as one to 
those who do not possess a frame of reference to conceive of it as such.  
The intervention of subjects supplementary to the figure of the citizen voter, in 
places outside those designated by executive and representative power (the workplace, the 
school, the street), is described as democratic action. Democracy itself is said to be founded 
upon the seventh title to rule, in reference to the seventh qualification to govern 
enumerated in Book III of Plato’s Laws: “‘the choice of God’ or, otherwise said, the ‘drawing 
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of lots’” (Rancière 2010a: 31). That is, it is based in the absence of any entitlement to govern. 
As a result it is opposed to the oligarchic principle that those who rule do so by virtue of 
some special qualification (birth, wealth, education etc.) It is also distinct from, if not always 
opposed to, the practice of elections.  
In both accounts human agency is de-centred and made possible by non-human 
intervention – through technical mediation, by the intercession of ‘divine’ chance. These 
interventions have the salutary effect of preventing power from being the preserve of those 
who want it. This is implicit in Latour’s reflections on what is specific to human action in 
response to biological anthropologist Shirley Strum’s descriptions of primate “soap opera” 
(Latour 1994: 52). It recurs explicitly in Rancière’s thought, for example, in an interview 
given on the occasion of the 2012 French Presidential elections (Rancière 2012).  
Both theorists also refuse what Iris Marion Young describes as “a metaphysics of 
presence” that assumes citizens to be pre-existent and would have rulers and ruled be co-
identical (Young 2002: 126).  In addition to being impractical in mass democracies, this ideal 
has often worked to favour the interests of representatives over and above those of the 
people they claim to represent. In his history of the rise of popular sovereignty in England 
and America, Edmund Morgan highlights how by claiming power in the name of “the people” 
they were able to shed “the local, subject character that made them representatives of a 
particular set of people” (Morgan 1989: 50).  
Viewing ‘the people’ as a construct, Latour and Rancière are aware that 
representation involves a great deal more than “simple transmission” (Disch 2008: 91). As 
Lisa Disch notes in her essay on Latour’s political theory, for Latour “a spokesperson is a 
‘mediator’ rather than an ‘intermediary’” (ibid). In contrast to a porte parole who simply 
transports a message or force without transformation, a mediator translates, distorts and 
modifies the elements he carries. His models for this type of mediation are the 
microprocesses of negotiation involved in the construction of facts in a laboratory (Latour 
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and Woolgar 1986); and also their subsequent dissemination, along the great chain of 
translation, through “drift, betrayal, ambiguity” (1988: 253). Similarly Rancière describes 
politics as the manifestation of dissensus (“the presence of two worlds in one”) rather than 
the exercise of power (2001), and identifies an “aesthetics” at the heart of politics, a “system 
of a priori forms determining what presents itself to sense experience” (2011c: 13). He 
describes representation as a set of relations between “the visible and the invisible, the 
visible and speech, the said and the unsaid”, exemplified by film and photographic 
reproduction, in which an image is not a duplication of a thing but “an alteration that occurs 
in a chain of images which alter it in turn” (Rancière 2009b: 93-94). A truly ‘faithful’ 
representation is ‘promiscuous’, it enrolls more actors and makes things public (Latour 
2005a), renders the unseen visible (Rancière 2011c).  
This seems to me like a more useful way to think of popular sovereignty in mass 
democracies than attempts to reify ‘the people’ and sacralise their ‘power’, because of its 
location of the legitimacy of popular sovereignty in prevention of oligarchic concentration of 
power rather than the popular exercise of it (‘people power’). Its awareness of 
representation as work, an act of creation, also more accurately reflects the instability of the 
democratic subject than notions of an “enchanted individual” voter, who by standing 
outside the world, as an observer, is the “bearer of an almost mystical autonomy” (Gilmartin 
2012: 411).   
Proceeding from the post-sovereign understanding of human and non-human 
agency outlined in the introduction, I argue against this tendency to sacralise the voting 
process by underlining tensions between democracy as an ideal and elections as a practice, 
which underline what Jacques Rancière describes as the paradox amounting to scandal 
inherent in the idea of democracy; namely, the absence of “a single principle of community 
that legitimates the actions of those who govern on the basis of laws inherent in the coming 
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together of human communities” (Rancière 2006b: 297). This absence makes representation 
a creative act, lends it an aesthetic and techno-political dimension.  
I will look at how the dispositif of suffrage has played out in the hands of different 
actors, through an exploration of some aspects of the history of electoral reform in India, 
and an account of the 2014 Indian general election. The latter will focus on the communally 
charged elections in the north Indian state of Uttar Pradesh in 2014, during which the BJP 
was able to profit from the unfixity of ascriptive identities and a particular reading of the 
Code by election officers. I will conclude by reflecting on the implications of this kind of 
right-wing populist mobilization, which would seem to test Rancière’s theory of the 
supplementary subject and democratic action, and broach the possibility that the 
“supplementary legality” (Singh 2012: 150) of the Code could enable “democratic ‘anarchy’” 
(Rancière 2001).  
 
The ‘sacred’ time-space of popular sovereignty 
In an essay on the history of election law in India, David Gilmartin quotes a Supreme Court 
Judgment on an appeal case presented in Andhra Pradesh and published in 1981:  
In a democracy such as ours the purity and sanctity of elections, the sacrosanct and sacred 
nature of the electoral process must be preserved and maintained. 
(Quoted in Gilmartin 2007: 78) 
 
He emphasises that this is not a reference to sanctity in a strictly religious sense but an 
appeal to the concept of a sovereign authority located outside state and society. A sacred 
space, founded in the free will and conscience of the individual voter, defines the presence 
of the people. This sacred space and the “powerful, sovereign fiction” (ibid: 77) of the 
people it contains, lie at the heart of India’s electoral system. Gilmartin claims that the 
tripartite conceptual distinction between state, society and the people on which it is based, 
originates in eighteenth and nineteenth century Britain (ibid: 56). He also describes 
numerous contradictions in the application of electoral law in India (ibid: 78). These would 
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have been apparent to the Supreme Court itself, which issued its judgment soon after the 
most notorious election case in Indian history, The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain 
(1975).56 On being convicted by the Allahabad High Court for misuse of government 
resources in her 1971 election campaign, Indira Gandhi had proclaimed internal emergency 
in June 1975 and pushed through amendments to the Representation of the People Act and 
the Indian Constitution. The former retrospectively redefined election offences and the 
latter exempted the President, Vice President, Prime Minister and Speaker of the Lok Sabha 
(lower house) from judicial jurisdiction.  
But for Gilmartin these contradictions are inherent to the electoral system 
developed in Britain rather than the result of an unsuccessful transplantation of European 
ideas onto non-European soil (ibid: 57). The case of Indira Gandhi exemplifies a general 
difficulty in maintaining, through reference to the law, an image of the electorate “free from 
coercion” in elections conducted in society and overseen by the state (ibid: 77).57  The image 
of the electorate is said to be a substantiation of the concept of the people which is central 
to the “universalist imaginings of modernity”, the idea of “a community of equal human 
beings living in what Anderson calls homogenous empty time” (Gilmartin 2007: 55). 
Gilmartin argues that viewing this concept more “concretely”, through the law and the vote, 
reveals how the tension intrinsic in the idea of the people as a fiction substantiated through 
the act of voting is “critical to the structuring of sovereignty” (ibid: 56). Gilmartin describes a 
tension that resembles a paradox and a structure riven by an internal contradiction, 
expressed in an image arguably no less abstract than Anderson’s invocation of empty-
homogenous time:  
Only by standing apart from both state and society, could the people serve as sovereign. And 
yet, only by making their voices heard through elections, could the people rule. 
                                                 
56  “State Of U.P vs Raj Narain & Others”, 24 January 1975: http://indiankanoon.org/doc/438670/ (accessed 
23/09/2015) 
57 He also insists that the Supreme Court did manage to maintain the fiction of popular sovereignty when it heard 
this case on appeal. “Even as they overturned Gandhi‟s conviction and bowed to the realities of political power, 
the majority of the court struck down key portions of the Thirty-ninth Amendment as unconstitutional (or, as 
violative of the constitution‟s „basic structure‟)” (Gilmartin 2007: 77). 
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(ibid)  
 
Significantly, in a later work Anderson does deal with what Gilmartin describes as two 
concrete manifestations of the concept of the people, the law and the vote. His ideas on 
these topics suggest directions for thinking about this concept through the numerical and 
temporal properties of elections. Furthermore the relationship between the notion of 
popular sovereignty and practice of majoritarian democracy, between empty homogeneous 
time and electoral time, suggests not that one is more concrete than the other, or even that 
they are in contradiction, but that both are imbricated; a metaphysical concept runs through 
a normative framework.   
In The Spectre of Comparisons (1998a) Anderson reiterates the importance of 
seriality in the modern imagining of collectivity, expressed as a distinction between two 
types of serialization describing different kinds of political practice. One, “figured by the 
newspaper”, is “unbound and unenumerated”, and the other, by the census, “bound and 
numerated” (1998a: 40).  In his description of “electoralism” he consigns the practice of 
elections to the latter, describing the ballot as “isomorphic” with the census in its anonymity 
and “finite numerology” (ibid: 42).  For Anderson the consequences of this for development 
of collective subjectivities are twofold: proportional entitlement on the basis of the total 
number of those entitled to vote, and a reinforcement of ethnic politics on the basis of this 
entitlement. This starkly numerical mode of representation is said to both harden ascriptive 
identities and lend them political efficacy, as a result opening them up to contestation. As 
“notions of popular sovereignty spread, as the state acquired a welfare-and-development 
mission, and as the suffrage widened”, voters began to influence the categories of census 
enumeration (ibid: 39), which suggests these categories are not as bounded as all that, and 
the numbers are multivalent.  
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Conversely, on closer inspection homogeneous empty time seems to closely 
resemble what American political scientist Dennis F. Thompson has described as “the special 
character of election time” encouraged by the practice of simultaneous voting (2004: 51):  
In an ordinary election, each voter acts as if he or she is voting at the same time as every 
other voter. No voter knows how others have voted until everyone has voted. No one can 
change a vote in response to how others have voted. And everyone votes with at least 
potential access to the same information. 
 (ibid: 57.) 
 
Simultaneity is said to have a normative rationale with two different aspects. Firstly, to the 
extent that they take place simultaneously, elections are said to allow for the expression of 
the will of a “determinate majority”, allowing the outcome to be seen as the result of a 
single decision rather than  a series of decisions made by different majorities (ibid: 58). This 
helps create “a more coherent popular sovereign” (ibid).  Secondly, by ensuring that voters 
make their choice with equal access to information it rests upon “the democratic value of 
fairness” (ibid).  
The origins of this ideal would probably be Mill’s “one man, one vote; one vote, one 
value”, but there are also strong echoes of Anderson’s evocation of the unbound serialities 
and universal consciousness produced by the daily reading of a newspaper written in a single 
language describing events happening all over the world. Both activities are characterized by 
periodicity, simultaneity and finality. As with Anderson’s account of monolingual mass 
reading publics, most aspects of this description run contrary to actual practice in India. The 
2014 Lok Sabha election was particularly long-drawn-out, leading it to be described as one of 
the longest elections in Indian history. The entire polling process, from announcement of the 
election dates on 5 March 2014 to the announcement of the election result on 16 May 2014, 
lasted 63 days. Polling itself took place in nine phases over 36 days, from 7 April to 12 May, 
and all of this was done in the interests of fairness.  "The integrity of elections is paramount”, 
former election commissioner, SY Qureshi, is quoted saying in a BBC News article on the 
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2014 election: “Since we've had phased elections, they have definitely become freer and 
fairer" (Biswas 2014). 
Perceptions of police partisanship necessitated the deployment of federal forces and 
led to 120,000 paramilitary troops being moved about the country to secure polling stations, 
counting centres and electronic voting machines. This was a costly and time-consuming 
process, especially in large states with bad infrastructure and poor law-and-order such as UP. 
Whereas in Kerala and Gujarat polling occurred in a single day, in Uttar Pradesh it was 
carried out in six phases from 10 March to 12 May 2014. The polls swept across the state in 
a roughly west-east direction.  This was the opposite direction to the 2009 polls and 
inadvertently ended up favouring the BJP. Polling began in a part of the state where the BJP 
had made inroads through post-riot communal polarization, and ended in the east, where 
there was a much-publicised contest between Modi and the Aam Aadmi Party candidate, 
Arvind Kejriwal in the symbolically important seat of Varanasi.  
As I travelled across the state during the elections, visiting Muzaffarnagar, Lucknow 
and Varanasi in turn, I heard plenty of speculation about the outcome of elections in UP and 
other parts of India. Under the Model Code of Conduct results of exit polls could not be 
released prior to the 12 May, but opinion polls were not so tightly restricted, and there was 
sometimes an overlap between the two forms.58 Intimations of the results also came via 
party workers who moved across the state to canvass in different areas after polling had 
finished in their own constituencies. Reports of BJP successes in the earlier phases of the 
election and predictions of its success in subsequent ones certainly seemed to affect the 
morale of workers belonging to all parties. In a first-past-the-post system, where candidates 
win by a simple plurality of votes, it is also likely to have affected the choices of voters. Pre-
                                                 
58   ECI Guidelines for Publication and Dissemination of Results of Opinion Polls/Exit Polls (1998): 
http://eci.nic.in/archive/instruction/recent/media/pnxitpoll_FINAL.html (accessed 21/09/2015) 
ECI Communication dated 16 April 2014 on “Opinion Poll & Exit Poll – Distinction Between – Commission‟s 
advise [sic] regarding”, which observes that news channels have been broadcasting opinion polls on the basis of 
concluded polls, and requests them to desist from this practice: 
http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/current/Exit%20Poll%20&%20Opinion%20Poll%2016_4_14.pdf 
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election discussions conducted in party-offices, on the streets and in private homes, 
centered on which parties were in front, the electoral preferences of different caste and 
religious groups, and therefore which candidate was a good bet in that particular seat. A fug 
of rumour and speculation shrouded these deliberations, which created talk of a Modi ‘wave’ 
and even Modi a ‘tsunami’ long before results were out.  
The implications of all of this might seem to be grave. However, Thompson himself 
acknowledges that his description of what he describes as an “ordinary election day” runs 
contrary to actual practice in the US (2004: 57). The drawing up of electoral districts, 
scheduling of polls and loose separation between elections and other periods of political 
activity, often violate this norm (ibid: 51). Like Anderson he is untroubled by these 
discrepancies; they are anomalies rather than counterevidence and result from incorrect 
understanding of “the special character of election time” (ibid). The main difference in the 
two systems therefore seems to be one of inflection rather than category. Both are founded 
in the ideal of a level playing field; in the US this is the starting point, in India, something yet 
to be achieved. Significant differences are engendered by that ‘yet’, notably, the pedagogic 
function of a body such as the ECI, but the ideal remains the same. Thompson’s description 
of the special character of election time in the US electoral process does not seem to 
fundamentally differ from Gilmartin and Moog’s description of the “strong cyclical, temporal 
structure” of Indian election administration (2012: 146). At first this seems like a reiteration 
of over-familiar notions about the cyclical nature of time in India (as taken apart by Thapar 
*1996+). But the idea of election time as distinct from “the “normal” temporal realm of 
everyday politics”, requiring “special rules” so that “the free voice of the individual can be 
heard” is also familiar from democratic theory in both India and the US.   
Mukulika Bannerjee, for example, expresses it in her description of “the communitas 
of election time” in India (Banerjee 2011: 88). In this essay she depicts a reverse carnival, 
encouraged by strict enforcement of the Model Code of Conduct, characterized by “hyper-
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structure”, when things are more structured and efficient than normal (ibid: 84). During this 
period the Code is said to be so thoroughly introjected by voters that bureaucratic 
intervention is no longer required to uphold it. Communitas suspends the rules of normal 
social order and brings about “a rare flowering of egalitarianism” (ibid: 94-95). Ultimately, 
the rationale behind mundane details of election procedure in both countries seems to rest 
upon the ideal of the ‘sacred’ space-time of popular sovereignty.  
Gilmartin makes this explicit in a subsequent essay, when he uses Carl Schmitt’s 
assertion that all major modern theories of the state are secularized theological concepts 
(Schmitt 2005: 36) as the first step in his own global history of voting, albeit acknowledging 
limits to its universal applicability given that it is “deeply embedded within the specific 
history of European Christianity” (Gilmartin 2012: 409). Whether it be the concept of 
kingship in premodern India, sovereignty in the Safavid and Mughal empires, or the divine 
right of kings in Europe, the same underlying tension between worldly politics and a divine 
seat of authority is said to characterize them all. This tension is said to provide the 
background for the modern idea of popular sovereignty.  
However, the paradoxical nature of sovereign power seems to be heightened when 
it is vested in ‘the people’ rather than the person of a king, especially when indirectly 
expressed in the velleities of an anonymous voting process or located in impersonal 
institutions. In the eyes of Carl Schmitt, it transforms it utterly: 
The sovereign, who in the deistic view of the world, even if conceived as residing outside the 
world, had remained the engineer of the great machine, has been radically pushed aside. The 
machine now runs by itself. The metaphysical proposition that God enunciates only general 
and not particular declarations of will governed the metaphysics of Leibniz and Nicolas 
Malebranche. The general will of Rousseau became identical with the will of the sovereign; 
but simultaneously the concept of the general also contained a quantitative determination 
with regard to its subject, which means that the people became the sovereign. The 
decisionistic and personalistic element in the concept of sovereignty was thus lost.  
(2005: 48) 
 
Again we come across this image of a ‘machine’ of state, mindless in its operations (“the 
machine now runs by itself”) and unspecific in its authority (“the people”). In the face of this 
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‘loss’ the only solution is “decisionism”, which in a post-monarchical age is said to be best 
represented by “dictatorship” (ibid: 66) – Schmitt’s theories also being embedded in his 
active support for National Socialism.  Whereas for Morgan (1983) the internal tension 
within this concept is something that can be discerned even in its monarchical version, and 
he finds remnants of the theory of the king’s two bodies in the ideal separation between 
legislative and executive power. In this updated version of the division between the king’s 
body politic and body mystic (Kantorowicz 1981), there is a divide “between the power to 
govern and the power to determine the form and limits of government” (Morgan 1989: 83). 
Rather than negating the concept, its extension reveals its structure and utility. In both 
monarchical and popular versions, a ‘split sovereignty’ prevents oligarchic concentration of 
power by impeding ‘decisionism’.  
 In this chapter I explore the tensions inherent in this ‘split’, and its anarchic potential, 
through the awkward position of the constitutionally established and ostensibly politically 
independent ECI: its struggles with political parties and executive power, and to enforce its 
Code through functionaries that are subject to local influence. I argue that these strains 
result from two profane scandals, which I will now begin to outline: the absence of a single 
principle of community legitimizing the Indian nation-state (void), and its obverse, a 
multiplicity of possible identifications which sometimes result in communal politics (excess).  
 
The scandal of democracy: void  
The most immediate context for introduction of suffrage to India is the history of electoral 
reform in nineteenth century Britain. In this section I will look at some aspects of this history 
in order illuminate distinctive aspects of the electoral system as it has developed in India. 
The history of the suffrage in Britain and India are of course very different, but I argue that a 
similar dynamic can be discerned in both. That is, governmental action (extension of the 
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suffrage) inadvertently encouraging the intervention of supplementary subjects in a context 
of severe inequality. I will discuss this with reference to how the introduction of separate 
electorates for Hindus and Muslims influenced the creation of reserved constituencies for 
Scheduled Caste and Tribe candidates, which are a distinctive feature of Indian democracy.  
According to Gilmartin, Britain’s electoral system was not just the closest model 
available to India but a paradigmatic example of a non-revolutionary transition to universal 
suffrage, albeit one marked by “bitter conflict” (2007: 57). In nineteenth century Britain an 
old regime based in influence and status apparently survived and even flourished “in 
interaction with the operation of a reformed electoral system” (ibid). Reform is said to have 
been an important “mechanism” whereby “an emerging regime of legal egalitarianism and 
mass citizenship was reconciled with a continuing politics of inequality and influence” (ibid). 
The reference to a “mechanism” initially suggests something like an Althusserian 
understanding of the state apparatus, but the actors involved are unclear and the outcome 
paradoxical: an emergent “regime” of equality effects “reconciliation” with continued 
inequalities.   
The ‘mechanism’ of reform described by Gilmartin therefore seems to more closely 
resemble Foucault’s use of the term ‘dispositif’. Thinking of electoral reform in both Britain 
and India along these lines encourages closer attention to the context in which it was 
introduced and its reception by highly stratified societies. In both countries a carefully 
restricted extension of the suffrage can be seen to have had unintended consequences. In 
nineteenth century Britain, the cautious nature of the 1832 Reform Act catalysed a militant 
reform movement, which radically transformed perceptions of politics and produced new 
political actors. Limiting the suffrage to property-owners and those who earned more than 
£10 per year excluded the mass of wage-labourers, ensuring that any movement to extend 
the suffrage would “divide the country on class lines” (Thompson 1984: 5). According to the 
historian Dorothy Thompson, the resulting assumption of an interest in politics by a 
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“hitherto non-political crowd” was the most alarming aspect of Chartism for conservative 
members of the upper-classes (ibid: 12).  
There was obviously no movement exactly equivalent to the Chartists in India, but 
the growth of the Congress party was viewed with similar alarm by some members of the 
indigenous elite. In a speech delivered in Lucknow in 1887, Sayyid Ahmad Khan focused his 
attention on the demand of its National Conference that there should be elections to a 
section of the Viceroy of India’s Council. 
And let us suppose first of all that we have universal suffrage, as in America, and that 
everybody, chamars [a Dalit caste] and all, have votes. And first suppose that all Mahomedan 
electors vote for a Mahomedan member and all Hindu electors for a Hindu member, and 
now count how many votes the Mahomedan member has and how many the Hindu. It is 
certain that the Hindu member will have four times as numerous. Therefore we can prove by 
mathematics that there will be four votes for the Hindu to every one vote for the 
Mahomedan. And now how can the Mahomedan guard his interests? It would be like a game 
of dice, in which one man had four dice and the other only one. 
(Khan 1888: 12) 
 
Ahmad Khan’s words express an age-old horror of what Rancière describes as democratic 
anarchy – horror that everybody, Chamars and all, should have the vote and decide the 
distribution of places. The well-to-do inevitably resist the idea that “their birth, their age, or 
their science has to bow before the law of chance” (Rancière 2006b: 40).  But he also speaks 
of a second scandal; that in a context such as India communal loyalties would load the dice, 
making its outcome anything but arbitrary.   
The colonial state responded to the push-pull of centrifugal and centripetal impulses 
with the Indian Councils Act of 1909, also known as the Morley-Minto reforms, which 
introduced elections to posts in Imperial and local legislative councils, but with distinct 
representative mechanisms for Muslims. Through reserved seats and separate electorates 
(seats in which Muslims would vote for Muslim candidates) they would be represented 
beyond their numerical proportion. The Liberal government elected into office in 1906 
provided the main impetus for the Councils Act, just as the Whig government had been for 
the 1832 Act in Britain.  But it did so in response to the unrest provoked by the partition of 
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Bengal, not least the Congress-led swadeshi (home rule) movement, and also as a result of 
pressure from ‘ashraf’ Muslims, those of ‘noble’ birth (Platts 2006: 57), who were uneasily 
watching these developments.  
The historian Farzana Shaikh argues that “weightage” for ashraf Muslims was 
introduced in order to spare these “gentlemen of the East” the humiliation of having to seek 
the consent of the peasantry and the proletariat before taking part in government 
deliberations (1991: 159). By these means colonial officials were able to propound a view of 
representation as a “descriptive activity”, a matter of “accurate correspondence between a 
representative and his constituency”, and avert the possibility of “representation as a 
substantive, creative activity” (ibid: 138). This perceived conflict between descriptive and 
substantive understandings of representation falls back on the ideal of ‘co-presence’ 
between rulers and the ruled. As Iris Marion Young points out, such objections to 
representation on the basis of gender or ethnicity can be extended to all representation in 
mass democracy: “It is perhaps even more difficult to imagine a shared will for the residents 
of a metropolitan legislative district than for members of an ethnic group” (Young 2000: 126).  
The main novelty then seems to have been the introduction of non-territorial 
representation. Representation in England and America may have been justified as a means 
for different economic and social interest groups to have a voice in government, but in 
practice it had always been based on geographically defined communities. Even when, in 
seventeenth century England, special seats had been created in the House of Commons for 
“gentlemen” who lacked the means or status to get a seat in the House of Lords, these were 
created on the basis of locality rather than class (Morgan 1989: 41-42). This innovation was 
born of an ancient concern to balance “arithmetical equality” against “geometrical 
harmony”, with the aim of preserving stability, which in practice often exposes something 
“essentially uncountable” that “distorts the very principle of counting” (Laclau 2007: 244-
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245, italics in the original). In response to Rancière’s ideas, Laclau identifies this as “the 
demos – the ‘people’ – which, while being a part, also claims to be the whole” (ibid: 245). 
At the time this innovation was not seen as a particularly radical one. The more 
militant section of the Congress party rejected the Act for falling short of the goal of 
independence and was particularly hostile to separate electorates, viewing them as a 
continuation of the divide-and-rule policy it believed had motivated the 1905 partition of 
Bengal. It was only much later that it was adapted by members of Depressed Class groups 
(now known as Dalits or Scheduled Castes) to advocate for separate electorates on a caste 
basis in their testimony to the Simon Commission between 1928-29 (Zelliot 1972: 84). 
Pouring new wine into old bottles they attempted to fill-out the colonial understanding of 
“descriptive” representation to allow for it to become “a substantive, creative activity”, to 
transform a mechanism designed to protect an elite minority into a means to allow for the 
fuller participation of Scheduled Castes in political life.  
This demand was taken up and pushed through by Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar (1892-
1956), the Dalit leader who drafted the Constitution of India. Ambedkar had originally 
supported universal suffrage, but when this was rejected by the British he changed his 
position to promote separate electorates for members of the Depressed Class along the 
lines of those provided for Muslims. His stance hardened as a result of clashes with Gandhi 
on this issue, but his attitude to what Anderson describes as “numerical politics” remained 
ambivalent. In the early 1940s, Ambedkar complained of how politics in India had “become a 
matter of numbers” advantaging one community over another on a numerical basis and 
resulting in the Census being “deliberately cooked for securing political advantages which 
numbers give” (1943: 9). As a result, members of the Scheduled Castes, or Untouchables, as 
he called them, were “quartered, cooked and served” at every Decennial Census as various 
caste and religious groups sought to incorporate them (ibid). Although this might render the 
census unreliable, Ambedkar argued, it does not invalidate its findings: “one cannot be far 
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wrong if it was said that the present number of the Untouchables in British India is round 
about 60 million people” (ibid: 10).   
His reasons for accepting this figure are not hard to guess – 60 million was a lot. 
According to census findings Scheduled Castes made up about a sixth of the then total 
population of British India, enough to make a difference to “electoral arithmetic” in areas 
such as Bengal and the Punjab where Hindus and Muslims were closely balanced (Bayly 1999: 
261). This group was also a product and beneficiary of colonial processes of classification, 
enumeration and representation. Subordination pre-dated British rule, but it was colonial 
taxonomy that transformed “highly fragmented congeries of subordinated communities” 
into a unitary and trans-regional category, and electoral reform that gave it political clout 
(Mendelsohn and Vicziany 1998: 2).  
Ambedkar was consistent in extending this theory of representation to Muslims and 
supporting the creation of Pakistan. His Thoughts on Pakistan (1941) describes the ideal of 
an integral India as incompatible with the goal of independence, and Hindus and Muslims as 
not merely different from one another but antagonistic and therefore unable to live 
together in one nation. It did not follow from this that he was happy to accept Hindu religion 
as a basis for nationalism in India. Hinduism was disqualified as a unifying national identity 
because of its association with the caste system, and also popular traditions of worship 
which have come to be seen as egalitarian. He argues that veneration of bhakti sants, in 
particular, one context for the Gandhi-cult, encouraged a personality worship that had 
retarded political progress in India. “The nation does not exist”, Ambedkar writes, it “is to be 
created” (1943: 26). Adapting and transforming aspects of constitutional democracy to suit 
the needs of Indian society, separate electorates would be a means to reconfigure society 
and thereby create a nation. The poison of caste would be used to cure the evils of division 
and inequality.  An institution he identified as anti-national would help counter inequalities 
and bring about unity. The paradoxical nature of this solution was necessitated by 
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contradictions inherent in the introduction of democracy to India, the “life of contradictions” 
he famously announced in his address to the Constituent Assembly, in which political 
equality would coexist with social and economic inequality.  
Post-Independence, tainted by their association with the communal divisions that 
had led to Partition, separate electorates were abandoned by the Congress government and 
replaced with reserved seats for Scheduled Caste candidates, which would be elected by 
mixed constituencies. Fifty years after Ambedkar’s death, by the time of the 2014 elections, 
things had come to such a pass that the Hindu nationalist BJP was able to shake off its 
reputation as the ‘Brahmin party’ and capture a state such as Uttar Pradesh, which has one 
of the highest proportion of Scheduled Caste voters in India, even managing to win all 17 
seats reserved for Scheduled Caste candidates in UP. Meanwhile the Bahujan Samaj Party, 
which claims to continue Ambedkar’s legacy, failed to win a single seat anywhere. This was 
despite winning 19.6% of the total votes in UP and coming third nationally with a vote share 
of 4.1%, and was interpreted by some as evidence of the BJP’s shrewd manipulation of the 
first-past-the-post electoral system.59  
There is, however, a precedent for smaller Dalit castes, such as Pasis, to be targeted 
by the BJP for support, the numerically preponderant Chamar caste being closely associated 
with the BSP (Narayan 2009). During conversations with Dalits in western Uttar Pradesh I 
also observed the coexistence of sympathy for the BSP, respect for Ambedkar, reverence for 
the bhakti sant Ravidas and, sometimes even, the stated intention to vote for the BJP. These 
attitudes and actions did not seem to be held contradictory. Dalits of all castes self-identified 
as Hindu, some would even describe themselves using the label ‘Harijan’, meaning ‘child of 
God’, a term popularised by Gandhi and now almost obsolete, having been rejected by Dalit 
activists for being patronising.  
                                                 
59 Mallikarjunan (2014) outlines the statistics for Scheduled Caste support for the BJP in India. A description and 
partial rebuttal of these views on the role of first-past-the-post in the BJP victory can be found in Mukherji (2014). 
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These convolutions reflect the multiple, changing and conflicting principles of 
community, which result from the entanglements of the dispositif of suffrage, in which both 
the electoral mechanism and those who operate it are subject to cross-influence and 
transformation.  They also point to what Rancière, in an interview, has described as the dual 
nature of the demos: its basis in both a “system of forms” designed to substantiate the 
power of the people (texts, institutions and institutional practices), and which have “a 
certain sovereignty” akin to that of a monarch or superior class (May 2008: 173). But he also 
speaks of the supplementary subject, who “undermines the idea of sovereignty by 
undermining the principle binding it to specific positions of a specific population” (ibid). The 
only constant being the demos, the void at the fulcrum of democracy, a dual subject which 
both works within and exceeds the bounds of arithmetical equality and geometrical 
harmony, the norms of liberal democracy and the hold of ascriptive attachments, old and 
new.   
 
The scandal of democracy: excess  
The very first rule of the Model Code of Conduct states that no party or candidate should 
engage in any activity which might encourage communal disharmony. Yet despite the fact 
that the 2014 election in Muzaffarnager district was openly fought on the basis of communal 
polarization resulting from riots that took place there the previous summer, only one 
instance of inflammatory speech was reported during it. Amit Shah, head of the BJP’s 
campaign in UP, was criticized by the Election Commission for describing the election as an 
opportunity to exact revenge for the riots, during meetings in Muzaffarnagar, Shamli and 
Bijnor districts, and temporarily barred from campaigning in UP under the Model Code of 
Conduct.  
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On one reading the election could be seen as another example of the perverse 
effects of normative frameworks which exceed real world conditions; as a return of the 
primordial repressed, with electoral appeals on the basis of religion, region and caste. You 
could further specify this as a deficiency in Indian democracy. I would argue that something 
else was at work here; that such anomalies were a result of the BJP’s use of the unfixity of 
ascriptive identities. Rather than a failure of a state-instigated process of rationalization and 
modernization, I view it as an effect of an attempt to regulate into existence a level playing 
field within a narrow view of what constitutes that field and the elements that could 
potentially skew it, informed by a kind of “low-flying behaviourism” (Hall 1980: 131) that 
besets understandings of elections and media reception alike.  
A theory of action in which certain inputs (words, formulas, images) produce definite 
outcomes underlies Shah’s own “badlaa” (revenge) comments, in which a motor response is 
invoked and an emotional appeal is made. Most notoriously, during an address to an 
audience in Shamli district on 3rd April 2014:  
The honour of Western Uttar Pradesh is in question. The time for taking revenge has now 
come. This is not the Mughal-era, when revenge would be taken with swords and arrows. 
The 2014 election is facing [us]. By pressing a button [on an electronic voting machine] you 
can take revenge.
60
 
 
Wielding a sword, shooting an arrow and casting a vote are here presented as equivalent 
activities. (So much for deliberative democracy it would seem.) But it is significant that the 
age of swords and arrows is said to be over, confined to the dark Muslim past – the 
“Mughal-era”.  The electronic voting machine is proposed as an appropriately modern 
means for Hindus to take revenge. As well as playing upon Hindu nationalist notions of 
Muslims as barbaric, his provocative words also reference the principal of popular 
sovereignty. The Election Commission’s response to his speech involved a bureaucratic 
                                                 
60 From the ECI notification against Shah dated 7 April 2014, quotes from his Hindi speech translated by me. 
http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/current/Notice_07042014.pdf (accessed 23/09/2015). The Mughal reference seems to have 
been tailored for the Jat mahasabha that he was addressing; in popular histories, Jats are depicted as bravely 
resisting Mughal invasions.  
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application of deontological ethics, expressed through the ideal of a level playing field of 
political competition, which in its own way references this principle.  
Both emerge from what Latour has described as two symmetrical myths of 
technology: “The myth of the Neutral Tool under complete human control and the myth of 
the Autonomous Destiny that no human can master” (Latour 1994: 32). A “sociological” 
theory of tools as neutral objects and techniques as “nothing more than pliable and diligent 
slaves” (ibid: 31) underlies Amit Shah’s description of the voting machine/sword/arrow as 
interchangeable means of revenge. The means change according to the political system 
prevailing at the time, democracy as opposed to feudalism, but the cause and outcome 
sought remain the same: to avenge an outrage against female honour and therefore that of 
the whole community. Whereas the EC through its code proceeds from what Latour 
describes as a ‘materialist’ view of technology in which the mere presence of an outsized 
election poster can exert ‘undue influence’ upon a voter, and a written apology from Shah is 
enough to allow him to resume campaigning in UP. In this section I will begin by sketching 
out the way these riots were politicized, and also the background of Amit Shah whose 
appointment to in-charge of BJP’s election organization in UP was seen as controversial at 
the time and was later judged to be decisive in the BJP’s success in the election in UP and 
hence nationally.  
These riots were almost without precedent in this part of rural and semi-rural 
Western Uttar Pradesh. Locals that I spoke to mentioned disturbances in Muzaffarnagar 
town during emergency-era sterilization drives, anti-Sikh violence after the assassination of 
Indira Gandhi in 1984, and communal tension during the 1980s and 1990s, but nothing on 
the scale of the riots of 2013.  Up to 51,000 people were displaced over the course of them 
and 48 killed according to the district administration.61 Their cause remains disputed but the 
most widespread accounts centre on the harassment of a young woman from one 
                                                 
61 From interview with Kaushal Raj Sharma, Muzaffarnagar District Magistrate, 31 April 2014. NGOs and the 
ruling Samajwadi Party peg this figure much higher. 
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community by a youth from another. Shahnawaz, a Muslim from the village of Kawal, had 
reportedly been harassing Ritu, a Hindu belonging to the Jat caste, from the neighbouring 
village of Malikpura. A confrontation between Shahnawaz and the brother and cousin of this 
woman, Sachin and Gaurav, eventually resulted in the deaths of all three men. Prior to these 
events communal sensitivities had been heightened by talk of ‘love-jihad’, an alleged Muslim 
conspiracy to marry and convert Hindu women, which was somehow conflated with rapes 
that had recently taken place. The BJP and organisations associated with it were active in 
publicising this so-called conspiracy and protesting against these crimes.62  
Politicians from all parties played a prominent role in circulating news of the 
murders in ways that led to further polarization, making incendiary speeches in large public 
meetings and distributing images of the killings. Sangeet Som, a BJP local member of the 
legislative assembly from the Western UP constituency of Sardhana, shared what purported 
to be a video of the murders of Sachin and Gaurav on his Facebook page. The video in fact 
depicted the mob killing of two brothers in Sialkot, Pakistan, in August 2010, but by the time 
it had been blocked by police and Som booked under the National Security Act, it had been 
widely viewed and continued to circulate via the mobile phone application, WhatsApp. 
 The administration, and by extension the ruling Samajwadi Party, was also criticised 
for its handling of the violence. Perceived derelictions included the transfer of the 
Superintendent of Police and District Magistrate at the beginning of the riots, creating an 
administrative vacuum; failure to prevent and control the large public meetings that 
triggered them, despite the fact a curfew had officially been declared; and a policy of 
offering compensation to the displaced on condition that they not return to their original 
homes. Because most of those who had fled were Muslim, this condition was particularly 
controversial, and it was quashed in a Supreme Court Judgement issued just before the 
                                                 
62 The Vishwa Hindu Parishad, a Hindu nationalist organization with close ties to the BJP, had apparently been 
campaigning against „love-Jihad‟ in the surrounding towns and villages for a year previous to the incident. The 
local BJP unit had held a demonstration against police inaction in the case of a Dalit woman who had allegedly 
been gang raped in Shamli by four Muslim men in July 2013 (Jain 2014a). 
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election. Some believed these failings resulted from more than incompetence, from a 
compact between the BJP and SP who both stood to benefit from Hindu-Muslim polarisation. 
Splitting the electorate between themselves on religious lines would bring electoral 
dividends in a region characterised by cross-caste and religious voting patterns; specifically, 
the combination of Muslim and Dalit votes that had elected a Muslim BSP MP in 
Muzaffarnagar district.63  
Into this charged atmosphere stepped Amit Shah, whose words of revenge and 
violence carried extra force because of his relationship with Narendra Modi, Chief Minister 
of Gujarat during the 2002 anti-Muslim pogrom in that state. Shah had preceded Modi in 
joining the BJP in 1986 and after many years of working closely with him in the RSS and BJP 
had followed him into the Gujarat government in 2002. Shah was entrusted with overseeing 
Modi’s defence in cases relating to the 2002 massacres and 21 encounter killings 
(extrajudicial killings by police or armed forces) that occurred between 2003 and 2006.64 
Shah himself was arrested on 25 July 2010 for his involvement in the 2005 Sohrabbudin 
Sheikh fake encounter case and charged with three counts of murder. Between 2010 and 
2012 he was banned from entering his home state by the Supreme Court, which feared he 
would use his influence to prejudice investigations into the case. The ban was only lifted 
when it was transferred to the state of Maharashtra. Opponents of the BJP therefore viewed 
Shah’s appointment to head of the BJP’s election campaign in Uttar Pradesh on 12 June 
2013 with apprehension. Alongside the announcement that Narendra Modi would be 
contesting from Varanasi, it indicated that the BJP would be making a concerted effort to 
win the key state of Uttar Pradesh.  
These efforts seem to have paid off. Within a year of his appointment, the BJP’s 
ailing party organization had apparently been revived and its declining vote-share reversed 
                                                 
63 Given the pervasiveness of these rumours it is worth noting that SP did not do much better in the 2014 polls than 
it had in 2009. It once again came in third place and only increased its vote share by 0.20%. (In 2009 the SP had 
won 14.32% of the vote, and in 2014, 14.52%) The main difference was massively increased support for the BJP, 
who had not even fielded a candidate in 2009 and won in 2014 with a 59% vote share to BSP‟s 22.78%. 
64 An Amnesty International report estimates that 31 people were killed during this period (AI 2007). 
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to the tune of 71 out of 80 seats, a big improvement on its performance in the 2009 polls (10 
seats and fourth place). Shah’s electioneering skills, notably his expertise in poll booth 
management, were cited as reasons for the success of the campaign, but so too was the 
BJP’s careful use of ‘social engineering’, a phrase now associated with the rise of the Bahujan 
Samaj Party (BSP), a party representing the interests of Scheduled Castes (Dalits) and other 
socio-economically disadvantaged and minority groups. The BSP had come to power in the 
state of Uttar Pradesh through cross-caste and religious combinations: Dalit and Muslim, 
Dalit and Brahmin. However, the term has also been used to describe a BJP policy dating 
back to the late 1990s, of widening the scope of its membership beyond its traditional 
upper-caste north-Indian constituency. This involved making incursions into other parts of 
India, electoral alliances with the BSP in UP (in 1995, 1997 and 2002 – 2003), and also 
inclusion of a group identified as Other Backward Class (OBC) in the 1980 Mandal 
Commission report on extension of caste-based reservations. This amorphous category, 
encompassing both the ‘traditional’ category of caste and the ‘modern’ one of class, and as 
much as half the population of India, would be hard for any political party with national 
ambitions to ignore.65 Its genesis would seem to bear out Latour’s description of groups as 
“the provisional product of a constant uproar made by the millions of contradictory voices 
about what is a group and who pertains to what” (2005b: 31).   
The corollary of this theory, that those who participate in this process are also 
defined by it, would seem to be borne out by how the BJP’s ‘social engineering’ policy 
accompanied its attempts to shake off its upper-caste image. By the 2014 Lok Sabha election 
the party appeared to have overcome its opposition to reservations to such an extent that it 
was using Modi’s OBC status for electoral purposes. This was a steady undercurrent of its 
campaign, in which he was pointedly contrasted to the Congress Prime Ministerial candidate, 
                                                 
65 See “OBC count: 52 or 41%?”, The Times of India, 1 November 2006: 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/OBc-count-52-or-41/articleshow/263918.cms (accessed 10/09/2015). The Mandal 
Commission Report had reported that OBCs made up 52% of the population of India. The National Sample Survey 
Organisation in 2006 calculated this as 41%, a lower percentage even though total numbers of  OBCs had 
significantly increased, by 6.5% 
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‘yuvaraj’ (‘young prince’) Rahul Gandhi. Explicit references to Modi’s caste and accusations 
of casteism were made on the occasion of slurring comments by politicians closely 
associated with the Gandhi dynasty. Namely, in response to Mani Shankar Aiyar’s remark 
that he was only fit to serve tea at Congress party conferences, and to Priyanka Gandhi’s 
accusation that he was engaging in “nich rajniti” (“low politics”). The success of this tactic, or 
at least the irritation it caused the Congress party, can be measured in its attempts to 
question his caste status. Modi was a fake OBC, it was claimed. He in fact belonged to a 
prosperous, upper-caste, business community and had abused his position as Chief Minister 
to shoehorn this caste into the OBC category upon assuming office.66   
Beyond discussion of Modi’s caste, overtures to OBC voters included an electoral 
alliance with Apna Dal (a party with an OBC following which had splintered off from the BSP) 
and criticism of a Congress proposal to extend reservations to religious minorities within the 
OBC category. This extension was announced in December 2011, in what was seen as a bid 
to win the Muslim vote in upcoming assembly elections, and soon became known as the 
Muslim quota even though it referred to religious minorities generally.67   
BJP opposition to the quota appears to have been a case of selective outrage. 
Congress had also incurred the censure of the courts when it attempted to extend the OBC 
category to Jats just a few days before the EC announced the election dates for the 2014 Lok 
Sabha elections. The Model Code of Conduct becomes effective as soon as election dates are 
released, and State and central governments are barred from announcing major plans and 
projects during the period it is in operation. The move had been strongly opposed by OBC 
activists, who viewed Jats as wealthy agriculturalists, and by those who saw it as post-riot 
                                                 
66 This prompted the Gujarat government to release a two-decade old notification, proving that OBC status had 
been conferred on the Modi-Ghanchi caste before Modi had become elected CM: “Narendra Modi belongs to 
Modh-Ghanchi caste, which was added to OBCs categories in 1994, says Gujarat government” in DNA, 9 May 
2014: 
http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-narendra-modi-belongs-to-modh-ghanchi-caste-which-was-added-to-obcs-categories-in-
1994-says-gujarat-government-1986389, (accessed 25/10/2014) 
67 “Minorities 4.5% sub-quota as good as dead?” in The Times of India, 28 May 2014: 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Minorities-4-5-sub-quota-as-good-as-dead/articleshow/35644660.cms 
(accessed 01/11/2014) 
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appeasement of Hindu Jats for electoral gain. However, extension of OBC status to Jats, 
rather than religious minorities, seems not to have been a problem for the BJP. Once in 
power it approved these particular reservations. When the Supreme Court reversed the 
decision a year later, declaring that reservations should be awarded to “new emerging 
groups” rather than on the basis of “historical justice”, the BJP government challenged the 
judgment.68  
The subquota proposal was struck down by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in June 
2012 on the basis that reservations on religious grounds are unconstitutional.69  The 
Congress government appealed the decision in the Supreme Court and the case was ongoing 
at the time of the 2014 Lok Sabha election, during which opposition to the measure formed 
a key part of the BJP’s ‘social engineering’ strategy in UP. In an interview with Caravan 
Magazine, dated 1 April 2014, Amit Shah describes the anger felt by OBCs at creation of a 
4.5% reservation for religious minorities within the 27% quota. “The BJP is the only party 
which has opposed it”, he is quoted saying, “and we are naturally getting a good response 
from the OBC communities” (Joshi 2014); and arguably not just from the sizeable OBC 
community. In opposing the sub-quota the BJP was able to draw upon Hindu anger at 
Muslim ‘appeasement’ without referring to specific religious groups.  
Calls for voters, implicitly Hindu, to forget their caste differences and unify in 
supporting the BJP also often seemed to contain an anti-Muslim subtext. This subtext was 
very close to the surface during elections in Western UP, where there was resentment of 
compensation packages for Muslim riot victims and what was perceived to have been unjust 
treatment of Hindus who had been implicated in the violence. Although the culprit here was 
the Samajwadi Party State government rather than the Congress party ruling at the centre, 
                                                 
68 Information on judgment: http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/sc-quashes-decision-to-include-jats-in-obc-
category-rules-caste-cant-be-sole-ground/ (accessed 02/04/2015). And on BJP opposition to it: 
http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/govt-seeks-review-of-scs-jat-quota-order/ (accessed 
02/04/2015). 
69 Non-Hindus are included in the existing OBC lists, but on account of their caste status rather than religion. The 
Central list of OBCs for UP includes Muslim sub-sets of the mostly Hindu Teli and Kayastha castes. 
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the two parties seemed to be linked in the minds of voters. The SP had been lending 
external support to the Congress’s coalition government since the last general election in 
2009. Samajwadi Party Chairman, Mulayam Singh Yadav, may since have expressed a wish to 
be prime minister in a third front coalition government, independent of both Congress and 
the BJP, but an impression persisted that voting for SP locally would mean bringing Congress 
into power nationally. 
Social engineering also extended to selection of individual candidates chosen on the 
basis of “local clout and winning potential” rather than party loyalty or ideology (Joshi 2014). 
Sanjeev Baliyan, the BJP candidate for Muzaffarnagar, a vet from a prominent Jat Hindu 
family, was new to party politics. He seemed to have been selected as an antipode to the 
sitting BSP MP, Kadir Rana, who belonged to a wealthy, politically well-connected Muslim 
family. Rana’s CV included an extensive criminal record (five criminal cases, including 
charges for murder, attempted murder and criminal intimidation); recorded assets of: Rs 
135,202,262; and political experience in both the Samajwadi Party and the Rashtriya Lok Dal 
prior to joining the Bahujan Samaj Party in 2009.70 He was also reportedly an ‘angutha chhap’ 
(someone who signs his name with his thumb) although BSP workers told me that whilst 
functionally illiterate he was able to write his signature.  
Both candidates had been involved in the riots, and this detail did not seem to be 
accidental. Rana had been charged for inciting violence during a speech to a gathering 
outside a mosque in Muzaffarnagar city after Friday prayers on 30 August 2013. Baliyan was 
arrested and briefly imprisoned after a mahapanchayat (great village assembly) organised by 
a Jat-dominated farmer’s union on the theme of ‘bahu, beti bachao’ (save our daughters-in-
law and daughters), which took place the following day. In selecting them, their parties were 
playing upon post-riot, communal divisions, the BJP seeking to attract Hindu voters across 
castes and classes, the BSP, to reassure Muslims. This appeal to primordial identities was 
                                                 
70  Information from the page on Kadir Rana compiled by the Association for Democratic Reform: 
http://myneta.info/ls2014/candidate.php?candidate_id=226 (19/02/2014). 
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made possible by their very amorphousness and multiplicity. The history of categorisations 
such as Dalit and OBC reminds us of how the weakness of an identification can lend it 
political strength, how it can be all the more powerful because it lacks taxonomical precision 
and fails to evoke a positive sense of belonging, which does not preclude it from eventually 
doing so. A similar observation can of course be made about the catch-all term ‘Hindu’. From 
what Anderson, in his criticism of diaspora identity politics, diagnoses as a lack of “universal 
grounding” (1998a: 45), comes its power to move and to galvanise; hence the ability of a BJP 
to appeal to OBCs and Dalits on the implicit basis of their ‘shared’ Hindu identity.  
The instrumentalisation of these identities was also facilitated by what Latour has 
described as a ‘materialist’ view of technology and mediation, which encouraged blindness 
to less easily quantified infringements, what was said and done by candidates and their 
supporters in plain sight of election observers. Amit Shah’s words only came to the attention 
of the Election Commission because of an article filed by the journalist Neha Dixit for an 
Indian news website (Dixit 2014). The report was picked up by national print and electronic 
media, and eventually reached the attention of the ECI itself, which requested that Election 
Officers in the relevant districts pass on video recordings of the speeches. Dixit herself 
confirmed that in all her time covering the elections in UP she had never seen anyone 
reprimanded for provocative speech; monitoring teams seemed more concerned with 
measuring the decibels emanating from loudspeakers than moderating the words coming 
out of the mouths of politicians.71  
When I asked the District Magistrate of Muzaffarnagar, who was also its Election 
Officer, why he had not forwarded the videotapes to the ECI himself, he responded that he 
and his team “did not perceive any violation” in them.72 Referring to the riots was not a 
violation in itself he told me.  The “sentiment it creates in the people” and “the vote appeal 
it creates through caste and community bias” might be, but in assessing this “there is a very 
                                                 
71 From email correspondence with Neha Dixit on 24 December 2014. 
72  Interview with Kaushal Raj Sharma, Muzaffarnagar, 3 May 2014. 
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thin line that we have to observe, and there comes the experience and there comes basically 
the judgment”. This line might be hard for an outsider to judge because, in Muzaffarnagar, 
“the way of talking of the people, it’s *a+ little bit aggressive in nature”. But if one looks at 
the context of the entire speech, at its after-effects, if it in fact contains no communal 
charge, as evidenced by there being no law-and-order disturbances after it has been given, 
then it is possible to say that there has not been any violation. This theory of communication, 
in which it is judged by its outcomes, absolved the election office of moderating speech. No 
notices for inflammatory speech were issued at the instigation of the DM’s office. 
Both elements (ambiguous appeals to ascriptive identity and seeming bureaucratic 
blindness to them) were in evidence soon after Amit Shah’s visit, when news of it had begun 
to reach national media, during a tour conducted by the BJP candidate across rural parts of 
Khatauli, which had been affected by the riots and fell within the electoral boundaries of 
Muzaffarnagar. The riots were an open and carefully modulated feature of speeches 
delivered to a selection of villages. In a village with, I was told by BJP volunteers, a large 
‘Harijan’ population, a tightly packed crowd gathered around a tree to hear Baliyan talk 
about the importance of “man samman” (respect), without which a man would be unable to 
live although he might be able to go some days without food and water. This segued into 
talk of the necessity for “dharm-yuddh” (“religious war”), in the context of Hindus, including 
some of our “Harijan” brothers, being jailed after the riots on false charges. His words 
closely resembled those uttered by Shah in his ‘hate speech’ to a Jat Mahasabha two days 
earlier, although the themes of honour and respect may well have had a different meaning 
for this audience.73 The environment was grittier and the speech harsher in tone than that 
delivered in the Gujjar caste locality I had just left, where other women had been present 
                                                 
73 An overlooked aspect of Shah‟s visit to Western UP was that in addition to addressing Jats, he had also 
addressed a meeting of Dalits, although I often wondered about the way ostentatious appeals to Dalit voters 
worked out. Talk of a split Dalit votebank (divided between BSP and BJP) and a prospective BSP-BJP coalition 
was a feature of rumours of Muslim disaffection with the BSP. It would also have been an efficient way to shake 
off the party‟s “Brahmin party” image, and to appeal to other non-Brahmin castes. 
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and there had been signs of relative prosperity (expensive farm machinery, well maintained 
roads and houses, healthy looking and clothed children).   
I then accompanied the BJP convoy to a village with a mixed population, where SP 
flags were dotted about and Muslim families watched the proceedings from the back of the 
square and the rooftops of surrounding buildings.74 Here there was talk of how the BJP 
would bring about communal harmony and peace (even a halting invocation of ‘om shanti 
om’). Once in power it would be much more vigilant than the SP government in preventing 
riots from happening, the audience was assured. The District Magistrate insisted that a 
monitoring team had been filming and recording the speeches, but I saw no sign of this. 
Police were present throughout but they did not intervene until the end of a long day of 
campaigning when they prevented the convoy of 21 SUVs from driving into a built-up urban 
area after dark. The candidate and a small group of his supporters walked to a gathering in a 
side-street in Jansath instead. From speaking to police officers at this event and others, I got 
the impression that they saw their role as limited to protecting people and property.   
The tour was partly a warm-up event for a rally held in Khatauli town the following 
day, during which the father of Gaurav, one of the Jat youths whose murder was the 
ostensible cause of the riots, was a guest speaker. BJP Party President, Rajnath Singh, had 
also been due to address the rally, but his helicopter was grounded on the way and he had 
to deliver his speech via a mobile phone held up to a microphone instead. Most of the 
audience left after it was announced that he would not be speaking in person. The District 
Magistrate expressed surprise and anger when I asked him whether it was the case, as I had 
heard stated during the rally, that the DM’s office had refused permission for Singh to land 
                                                 
74 Identifiable as such by clothing, but also from conversations I had with children who were milling around the 
square, expressing disapproval of the event and displeasure at the “kamzor” (“weak”) position of the “hathi” 
(“elephant”), the electoral symbol of the Samajwadi Party. One small boy whom I had been chatting with recoiled 
when I told him my name (Sanskrit and therefore identifiable as Hindu).  
198 
 
his helicopter.75 This and the Amit Shah incident made me wonder how carefully public 
speeches were being transcribed and monitored.  
Such incidents encouraged speculation about the role of political influence in 
allowing obvious infringements of the Model Code of Conduct. However, immediate 
pressure from various political parties, the State and central government was combined with 
a historically derived understanding of the role of the ECI and its Code, making influence 
easy to intuit but hard to locate. Sensing that the BJP were likely to win in Muzaffarnagar, 
and being aware that a Samajwadi Party government would remain in power in UP until at 
least 2017, the DM’s office might well have chosen the path of least resistance. But I also 
heard much grumbling in the Muzaffarnagar BJP office about the pedantic requirements and 
unsympathetic attitude of the DM. In this country there are “3 Ms”, an RSS worker 
volunteering there informed me, the DM, the CM and the PM. The DM was subject to the 
influence of the other two, neither of whom were BJP. His words echoed those of former 
Chief Election Commissioner, T.N. Seshan’s comments on the scourge of “the three Ms: 
Minister-Power, Muscle-Power and Money-Power” (1995: 264), both expressed unease at 
the discrepancy between the ideal of democracy and the messy practice of elections.  
It was during Seshan’s period in office that more thorough curbs on candidates’ 
expenses and public advertising had been introduced, and his legacy seemed to live on in 
the election office in Muzaffarnagar’s preoccupation with ‘ethical’ campaigning. There is 
“some ethics involved in democracy”, the DM explained.76 In order to do our duty to the 
nation and preserve “clean democracy” we should avoid “tilting towards one candidate” 
thereby “disfavouring” another. The effects of all of this often seemed counterproductive, 
given that whilst individual candidate’s expenses are monitored and limited to Rs 5.4 million 
or Rs 7 million, general party expenses are self-reported and unrestricted. Set against this 
wider context there seemed something illogical in the idea that a level-playing field could be 
                                                 
75  Interview with Kaushal Raj Sharma, Muzaffarnagar, 5 May 2014. 
76 Interview with Kaushal Raj Sharma 31 March 2014. 
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maintained through the avoidance of excessive campaign expenditure by individual 
candidates, and a notion of decorum in public speech focused upon balance rather than 
content.  
Both concerns were united in the election office’s media monitoring practices, which 
were mostly concerned with print. The DM told me that although the main focus of their 
attention was newspapers, they did monitor candidate’s Facebook accounts and were aware 
of mobile phones. Two notices had been issued to candidates who had used lists of the 
mobile phone numbers of voters provided by private companies to send prerecorded 
messages.77 Again, the emphasis was on the expense involved. The content of the messages 
and the way in which these phone numbers had been obtained was not a concern.  
Every morning, the monitoring team would go through the local press and 
Muzaffarnagar editions of national papers, whilst keeping an eye on two small television 
screens positioned at opposite ends of the room. When they detected an article that looked 
like ‘paid news’ (party propaganda presented as a news item) they would calculate how 
much it cost to purchase and the amount would then be deducted from candidates’ 
expenses. Occasionally they would do the same when they detected a ‘paid’ item on local 
television. The form they were required to fill out also contained a section on radio, but I 
was told that this was “pro forma”. They did not bother to monitor radio because hardly 
anyone listened to it.78  
The entire exercise seemed to be ‘pro forma’ given that Indian newspapers were 
carrying front-page advertisements for Narendra Modi throughout this period, to say 
nothing of the omnipresence of the BJP on electronic media and the internet. During the 
election it was rumoured to have spent 50 billion rupees on advertising alone, not far behind 
the $1 billion (or 60 billion rupees) the Democrats spent on the 2012 US presidential election 
                                                 
77 Interview with Kaushal Raj Sharma, Muzaffarnagar, 31 March 2014.  
78 I initially thought this was a local interpretation of their responsibilities, but former Election Commissioner S.M 
Quraishi writes that it was introduced under his initiative (Quraishi 2014) 
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(Varadarajan 2014). It is indicative of the exhaustive nature of the BJP campaign that such 
claims seemed plausible.  This response also overlooked the role of the Model Code of 
Conduct itself in encouraging these violations. Central and State government adverts are 
restricted whilst the Code is in force, the idea being that they could become propaganda for 
the party in power. As discussed in a previous chapter, these ads are the mainstay of the 
vernacular press, so restricting them ironically leaves newspapers more susceptible to the 
placement of ‘paid news’ by political parties. 
After some prodding by the ECI, in January 2015 the BJP eventually declared a total 
election expenditure of Rs 714,28,57,813, but this self-reported and un-itemised figure was 
met with scepticism (Joshi 2015). Nivedita Menon points to the anomalies in an article 
criticising exemption of the BJP from proposed restrictions on foreign funding for NGOs:  “A 
Hindustan Times premium front page advertisement costs Rs 3950 PER SQUARE 
CENTIMETER. How many advertisements like this one did you see? In how many newspapers? 
Over how many days?” (2014). Provoking the further question, where did the money to pay 
for it all come from?  When I asked the DM about the role of black money in the election his 
understanding of it seemed to be limited to the illegal distribution of liquor, arms and cash.79 
Eighteen flying squads and 40 static surveillance teams were said to be sufficient to prevent 
circulation of these items. Transactions of the sort described by Menon, which are harder to 
track than the apocryphal chicken and moonshine used to buy votes, seemed to evade his 
attention as a local election officer.   
During the 2014 elections the BJP can be seen to have profited from the unfixity of 
ascriptive identities, slippages between the local, regional and national levels of the election, 
and election officers’ inability to span them. Locally, a circumscribed field of vision and 
relative unconcern with unquantifiable offences allowed the election in Muzaffarnagar to 
take on a communal tone, which worked to the benefit of the BJP candidate. Nationally, the 
                                                 
79 Interview with Kaushal Raj Sharma, Muzaffarnagar, 31 March 2014. 
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Model Code can be seen to have favoured a national, non-incumbent party above the ruling 
Congress, and smaller and regional parties. Whilst the Model Code may not have played a 
direct role in the BJP victory, it arguably did form one context for the shape of its campaign, 
its intense focus on the figure of Modi and national-level politics at the expense of the local 
leaders and issues formerly considered decisive in Indian elections.  
By this expedient the BJP was able to circumvent restrictions on candidate’s 
expenses, resulting in ECl statistics that suggested Modi had spent less on his election 
campaign in Varanasi than the two main opposition candidates, Arvind Kejriwal (Aam Admi 
Party) and Ajay Rai (Congress). This calculation, derived from how much money was spent in 
the district during the official campaign period, overlooked the fact that it began much 
earlier than the given start date and was not confined to Varanasi. Modi’s nomination was 
only confirmed on 15 March 2014, but rumours that he would stand from there were in 
circulation from August 2013 onwards. Modi’s prominence in the BJP election campaigns 
also made it hard to distinguish its various layers. Was he campaigning for the BJP nationally 
through his public appearances? For whichever BJP candidate he was supporting in his 
capacity as BJP ‘star campaigner’? For himself as Prime Ministerial candidate? As an MP 
contesting seats in both Gujarat and UP? Just as, during the emergency, underground media 
was able to profit from the state’s circumscribed view of communication, the BJP benefited 
from the ECI’s inability to span the spatiotemporal layers of its campaign.  
 
Supplementary legality and democratic anarchy 
Many aspects of the BJP’s populist election campaign seemed to parody Rancière’s theory of 
“democratic action” (the intervention of supplementary subjects in spaces outside those 
designated by executive and representative power): its opposition to dynastic rule, skirting 
of the informal and non-statutory rules of electoral conduct, and appeals to lower-caste 
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voters, women and youth. In this way, it seemed to bear out political theorist Ernesto 
Laclau’s criticism of his assumption that “the ‘people’ as a historical actor will be constituted 
around a progressive identity” (2007: 2.46). Rather than embracing emancipatory politics, 
supplementary subjects may well construct their uncountability in what he describes as a 
‘fascist’ direction. “To explore the system of alternatives”, Laclau suggests, “we need a 
further step that Rancière has not taken so far: namely, an examination of the forms of 
representation to which uncountability can give rise” (ibid: 247).  
I argue that Rancière anticipates this criticism in his understanding of politics as “a 
paradoxical form of action” (2001). This paradox lies principally in the dual nature of the 
demos, but it is also reflected in what he sees as the hybrid character of representative 
democracy, “a mixed form” founded on the privilege of elites, but “little by little” diverted 
from this function by democratic struggle, whose best example is said to be the movement 
for electoral reform in Britain (2006b: 54).  Accordingly, he refuses to dismiss struggles which 
redefine rights and transform institutions as illusory, seeing in state structures an “effective 
field of battle where each camp’s forces increase or diminish”; a battle not just to “take 
power”, as in a power struggle between political parties, but “to affirm the power accrued to 
the people on all terrains” (May 2008). In a recent discussion with Laclau he also emphasizes 
that in arguing this he is not proceeding from a substantialist conception of ‘the people’. For 
Rancière, the ““figure of the people” is the enactment of the capacity that does not belong 
to any particular group…but rather to the capacity of everybody, of anybody” (O’Connor 
2015).  This power is irreducible to a state-sanctioned representative model, precisely 
because it does not refer to “a mass of people united by a homogenous will” (ibid).  
As already mentioned in the discussion of the dispositif of suffrage, the struggle to 
affirm this power is an uncertain and hazardous process (for Rancière therein lies its value). 
These tensions and hazards can be seen to be acute in the untidy mixture of laws, norms and 
politics involved in electoral law’s regulation of a political process. In his monograph on the 
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Election Commission, Ujjwal Kumar Singh expresses its paradoxical nature in his observation 
that rules for electoral governance “generate ‘a radical uncertainty about authority’, through 
a certainty of procedures” (Singh 2004: 5). Begging the conjoined questions, what is the 
source of election law’s own authority? How can it be effective? His article on the Model 
Code describes how it is both legitimized and rendered effective by “offering a system of 
supplementary legality to plug the legal vacuum that existed during election time” (2012: 
150).  
I would suggest this anarchic authority lies in the internally divided nature of popular 
sovereignty (‘split sovereignty’), which both refuses the myth of ‘co-presence’ between 
rulers and ruled and emphasises the substitutability of persons. In this way it is radically set 
against inegalitarian understandings of politics as based in the making of distinctions. This, 
for example, is how Carl Schmitt describes it in his work on constitutional theory, in which he 
describes political democracy as incompatible with “the inability to distinguish among 
persons” (2008: 258). The democratic concept of equality, like all political concepts, is said to 
be founded upon “the quality of belonging to a particular people” (ibid). According to 
Schmitt, the “equality of everything “that bears a human face” is incapable of providing a 
foundation for a state, a state form, or a form of government” because it allows for no 
distinctive differentiations and delimitations (ibid: 257). Rancière would hardly disagree, but, 
not viewing democracy as a state form, in his eyes this would be its main virtue. Democracy 
for him means the “astounding principle” that “those who rule do it on the grounds that 
there is no reason why some persons should rule over the others, except the fact that there 
is no reason” (2009c: 276-277). Rather than being based in any metaphysical foundation, the 
anarchical principle of democracy is located in the “conjunction, or disjunction, of the two 
terms “people” and “power”” (ibid: 276).  
In practice supplementary legality has been most effective when the ECI and its 
Code have been able to function as a means to affirm ‘democratic anarchy’ by upholding the 
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principle of anonymity (the substitutability of persons, entry of supplementary subjects) and 
combatting oligarchy – the 1977 election being the best example of this. The Code has 
legitimacy precisely because it is non-statutory and administered by an un-elected body: in 
principle, above and beyond both law and politics, and therefore not quite falling within the 
remit of a ‘separation of powers’ model. As this chapter has discussed, its legitimacy and 
efficacy has resulted less from its certainty of procedures and solidity of structure than its 
capacity to be a site of anti-oligarchic struggle.  It is all the more effective because it does 
not involve lengthy legal procedures, allowing the ECI to make quick judgments and take 
swift action when it perceives violations of its Code.   
The ECI and its Code have also been most effective when the political parties and 
government are fractured and/or discredited, and when it has been supported by an 
additional force, notably the media. Former Election Commissioner, James Michael Lyngdoh, 
has vividly described leading a group of journalists into relief camps in Gujarat in 2002, and 
how the combination of ECI officials and pressmen rendered vocal those who had been 
“dumbed down” by fear (2004: 184). His decision not to allow assembly elections in Gujarat 
“in such a traumatic setting” provoked the anger of Narendra Modi (ibid: 185), who 
condemned what he described as Lyngdoh’s ‘fatwa’ against the election.80 But it is also said 
to have restored faith in the electoral process amongst politicians from all parties in Kashmir, 
where polls were being held in the same year (Lyngdoh 2004: 205).  
However, this is also not an inevitable process, the trajectory of the dispositif of 
electoral law being no more certain than that of suffrage. During the 2014 election a kind of 
‘state logic’, the narrowing of permissible public forums and speech, seems to have worked 
independently of the government and through the instrument of an extra-state body, the 
ECI and its code. At other times, such as the post-internal emergency election of 1977 and 
                                                 
80 „“Some journalists asked me recently, ''Has James Michael Lyngdoh come from Italy?''‟, Outlook, 30 September 
2002:http://www.outlookindia.com/article/some-journalists-asked-me-recently-has-james-michael-lyngdoh-come-from-
italy/217399 (accessed 21/09/2015) 
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during the 2002 assembly elections in Gujarat, something else, something more akin to 
democratic action, appears to have been at work. That is, the entry of ‘supplementary 
subjects’ and also the formation of other types of affiliation: combinations between 
different caste and religious groups which are not based in “mutuality of being” (Sahlin 
2011), to use Sahlin’s rock-bottom definition of kinship, and which are also not founded 
upon any transcendent principle (‘co-presence’), but made and re-made through this-
worldly ties.  
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Conclusion 
 
“Objects that are impossible but necessary always find ways of gaining access – in a distorted way, no 
doubt – to the field of representation.”  
(Laclau 2007: 247) 
 
One of the inevitable drawbacks of the wide-ranging approach adopted by this thesis is that 
it has not allowed space to cover a particular topic at length. Rather than an overview of a 
single period or in-depth study of a particular topic, it has been organised as a series of 
interventions into different aspects of political communication in modern India, with a view 
to better understanding this general process. Because of its strong theoretical orientation, 
empirical material has been edited out in order to allow its overall argument to come 
through more clearly. I hope to return to this material and elaborate upon themes that I 
have touched upon here, in subsequent work.  
Possible topics for further research would include: a follow-up of implementation of 
Urdu’s status as second official language in UP; as we approach the centenaries of the 
conclusion of the First World War and the partitioning of the Caliphate, more research on 
reception of the War in India, with special focus on the ‘Mohammadan press’, looking at 
other Urdu publications, press in other languages and information networks by which news 
of the War came to reach India; a survey of the rich corpus of prison literature produced in 
colonial and postcolonial India; a genealogy of the unofficial but respected status of ‘political 
prisoner’ as a way to understand how ‘the political’ was defined across the colonial and 
postcolonial period; a comparative study of electoral reform in nineteenth century Britain 
and India, which would combine archival research and theoretical engagement with the 
questions of representation discussed here; a comparative study of the political thought of 
Ambedkar and Azad, which would engage with how these two figures came to espouse a 
‘religious’ politics, in apparent refutation of their earlier stance; a study of the use of new 
media in the upcoming assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh, focusing on BJP attitudes 
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towards technology and spectacle, building upon work done on the UP elections; a study of 
the history of ‘social engineering’ in Western UP, looking at how local traditions of cross-
denominational cooperation manifest in farmers unions, the Communist Party of India and 
the Bahujan Samaj Party were affected by the 2013 riots and the 2014 election campaign. 
The work done here lays the foundation for such work in terms of identifying research topics, 
collecting material and identifying sources with a view to collect further material.   
In the thesis proper, dissatisfaction with identitarian understandings of group 
formation disposes me to focus on the means by which groups are mediated, rather than 
the boundaries that demarcate them or the contents that supposedly define them. In the 
first instance, to consider the status of Hindi and Urdu, languages whose conjoined histories 
refute assumptions about linguistic identity as a fixed marker of difference pertaining to 
objectively definable social groups. Scepticism about the coherence and efficacy of state and 
‘elite’ intentions, as attested to by the mixed results of language politics and policy in north 
India, informs my alternative heuristics of ‘techno-politics’, which by allowing greater scope 
for human and non-human agency, aims to better encompass the variability and 
heterogeneity of socio-political group formation. The post-sovereign view of agency 
advanced through this concept leads me to prefer a ‘dispositif’ of state to Althusserian 
theories of the state ‘apparatus’. To the complementary notion of symbolic mediation, I 
oppose a stronger awareness of the political potential of the open temporality of the 
performative, the productive nature of the slippages between a communicative act and its 
reception. I look in particular at how writing is able to access this potential in the past and 
the virtual.   
Texts produced by voluble actors have been the focus of my research: acts, codes 
and constitutions, reports and manifestoes, newspapers and magazines, published journals. 
But I do not view them as discrete documents or deal solely with their textual content. I read 
them against the findings of archival and fieldwork research, with a view to understanding 
208 
 
something of their context, the means by which they were disseminated and the ways in 
which they were received. I also pay attention to how they were produced and relate to 
other media: the printed image, broadcast word and video message.  
By reading along the grain, I discern the outlines of the groups which are sought to 
be sutured or lassoed into being by these ‘paper chains’. By reading against it, I try to avoid 
making assumptions about the success of these attempts. I am accordingly circumspect 
about making statements about how these messages are received, beyond looking at 
moments, necessarily fleeting, when groups have been coalesced in unanticipated ways by 
the pedagogic efforts of states and ‘elites’.  I also look at the obverse aspect of this process, 
at how the state itself becomes legible through these efforts.  
In the introductory chapter I situate my own understanding of group formation in 
relation to theoretical literature on nationalism, ethnicity and class, and the understandings 
of state construction and social cohesion, which inform them. To the instrumentalism and 
determinism of these theories I oppose the heuristic of techno-politics, which informs the 
key concepts of dispositif of state and the insurrectionary possibilities of writing. The 
subsequent four chapters go on to apply these insights to the examination of specific cases. 
Chapter one, “The Immense writing-machine and the reading public”, deals with 
post-Independence marginalisation of Urdu in the north Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. It 
takes on board ideologically motivated ‘misrecognition’ of the language, but describes how 
state policy can be undercut by the way it is interpreted, implemented and received. In 
practice, marginalisation of Urdu in the State where it was formerly the predominant 
language seems to have been achieved through collateral effects rather than direct means: 
in subversion of central state policy and through the medium of non-state agencies. It has 
also to an extent been successfully resisted by those on the receiving end of these efforts, 
with the result that, contrary to the prognostics of social scientists, the effects (intended or 
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not) of state policy, and both working through and beyond attempts to instrumentalise 
linguistic and religious identities, Urdu continues to remain significant in UP. 
Chapter two, “Impossible speech”, picks up on the preceding discussion of Urdu’s 
ambiguous status to deal with the attempts of two editor-journalists to exceed the 
constraints of direct and indirect censorship, and the roles allotted to them by the current 
dispensation, in order to address a ‘qaum’ and a readership conceived in their own image. It 
deals with these attempts through their response to a series of comparable crises and 
combinations; to a cosmopolitan politics: World War One and the 2008 Mumbai terror 
attacks; to a cosmo-politics: the Kanpur Mosque incident of 1912 and the 2010 Allahabad 
High Court judgement on the Ayodhya land title case; and to political organisations that 
attempted to unite Hindus and Muslims: the nascent Khilafat movement, which was key to 
their coming together in the Independence struggle and Congress party, and Congress’s 
ambiguous relationship with Muslims in the post-Independence period. I argue that Azad 
had greater room to manoeuvre despite his direct experience of colonial censorship and use 
of a much more cumbersome print technology. However, these two figures are not simply 
opposed; both men evoked reformist and revolutionary trajectories of South Asian Muslim 
politics. Through the heuristic of techno-politics, rather than an instrumentalist 
understanding of the manipulation of symbols, I also look at how they were aided and 
abetted in their efforts by techno-material constraints on both censorship and media 
production. 
Chapter three, “Emergency pedagogy”, deals with another pan-national and cross-
denominational political movement, in which Indians from across the political spectrum 
came together to oppose the internal emergency of 1975-77. It extends the previous 
discussion of state censorship by describing how its repressive mechanisms once again 
worked to coalesce socio-political group across standard ideological and identity lines. The 
focus here is on audiences rather than the state or spokesmen. Although, in keeping with my 
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scepticism about sender-message-receiver models of communication, I seek to blur the 
distinction between these positions by dealing with figures who were both senders and 
receivers of messages. I look at the reception of emergency-era messages in the political 
underground, through the writings of imprisoned political activists, and in the wider 
population, through the 1977 election result. I also tentatively advance an alternative way of 
understanding this circuitry: emergency pedagogy. In opposition to what Chatterjee has 
described as “the old liberal paradigm of civic pedagogy” (2011: 145), I describe how during 
this period the pedagogic operations of the state taught the populations so addressed 
something that it itself did not know, and as a result coalesced them in ways that it did not 
anticipate. At the same time, the highly improbable nature of these alliances would seem to 
exceed the terms of a ‘politics of performativity’ as it has come to be widely understood. 
Muslims who voted for a former member of the Jana Sangh, in response to Congress 
government population control measures that were perceived to have targeted them, would 
arguably have been doing more than strategically performing a ‘given’ identity, or even 
responding to such a performance. I understand these processes with reference to a 
stronger notion of audience reception derived from literary theory, which is sensitive to its 
hazardous nature, and therefore better able to encompass these apparent anomalies.  
The great populist election victory of 1977, which forms the conclusion to this 
chapter (“Reader voters”), segues into chapter four’s consideration of “The Model Code of 
Conduct and the scandal of democracy”. The ECI had played a significant role in encouraging 
Indians to vote without fear in the 1977 election and the Code was strengthened following 
the emergency, in order to prevent misuse of state resources by the ruling political party. I 
look in detail at how this legacy affected the shape of the 2014 election campaign, and more 
generally address the paradoxical nature of the idea of elections conducted in society and 
overseen by the state as free expression of the voice of ‘the people’. I illustrate the 
contradictions in this idea with reference to the history of electoral reform in India and the 
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communally charged Uttar Pradesh phase of the 2014 Indian national election. In more 
general terms, I contest the ideal of ‘authentic democracy’ based in transparent 
communication and ‘co-presence’ between rulers and ruled, which informs literature on the 
‘sacrality’ of elections. This chapter points instead to the ‘scandalous’ absence of any 
legitimizing principle of political community, and advances the internally divided nature of 
popular sovereignty (‘split sovereignty’) as an anarchic basis for democracy.   
More generally, refusing both technological determinism and sociological 
essentialism precludes the possibility of any substantialist perspective of social and political 
groups, making their formation both necessary and impossible.  Across the thesis as a whole 
I engage with this insight by looking at ‘the people’ as an impossible desideratum sought by 
a range of state and non-state actors. Through these cases I hope to demonstrate how, 
whether through texts, institutions or policy, there seems to be no unidirectional 
transmission of univocal symbols to homogenous audiences going on here. The circuitry is 
more twisted and knotted than the developmental state’s model of knowledge diffusion and 
nation-state formation allows. The groups articulated in this way are also more volatile. 
Unlike the mass reading publics described by Anderson, which are characterised by 
repetition and synchronicity, the collectivities invoked are altogether more kaleidoscopic: 
constantly being remade, and in their definitive form, ‘the people’, perpetually out of reach.  
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